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ABSTRACT 
 
Quemoy is a small island with an area of fifty-eight square miles at the mouth of 
Xiamen Bay on the southeast coast of China. As a Cold-War front of Taiwan shelled by 
the Chinese artillery for twenty years, Quemoy is becoming a heritage tourism 
destination attracting mainland Chinese to sightsee in its military structures. In this study, 
I examine landscape change in the post-conflict society through the interplay of three 
social dynamics—reconciliation, demilitarization, and touristification—exploring the 
cultural mechanism of landscape change and its meaning. Through a review of Quemoy’s 
history, I identify Quemoy’s geographical characteristics—marginality, cultural hybridity, 
and islandness—formed and articulated in a repetitive process that I term as the reversal 
of geographical coordinate system. The reversal coincides with a change of social 
concerns in the marginal society, whose negotiations with terrestrial and maritime powers 
direct its engaging front toward the land or the sea, and stimulates distinct human 
inscriptions in the landscape. Militarization of Quemoy as Chinese Nationalists’ 
Cold-War front initiated the last reversal, which turned its front toward the mainland 
China in 1949 and brought forth a military landscape characterized by its rigidity, 
hierarchy, and pragmatism. Simultaneously, the militarization incurred biopolitical 
production through militia duty, everyday regulation, combat economy, and battlefield 
knowledge. As the 1949-reversal is now dissolving under current demilitarization, from 
reinvention and destruction of military structures I reveal irony in the landscape as a way 
of cultural demilitarization subverting the significance of the past anticommunist 
conflicts. Furthermore, by reconstruction of historical landscapes and reinterpretation of 
symbolic landscapes, Quemoyans (re)localize landscape and jointly engage in a process 
xii 
of homeland construction. The juxtaposition of historical simulacra and reinvented 
military relics produces heterotopias of a museum island for heritage tourism. 
Consequently, the production of irony and heterotopias together serves as the cultural 
mechanism of the current identity reformulation from a battlefield to a heritage tourism 
destination. Uncovering the mechanism, I then demonstrate that ambiguity and 
multiculturality emerging from this irony’s multivocality and heterotopia’s multilocality 
is a cultural strategy of the border island society to negotiate with the post-conflict 
situation.  
1 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: POST-CONFLICT PLACES 
AS BATTLEFIELD PARKS 
In the last few years of my Master’s study in landscape architecture, I often hovered 
with a sketch book and a camera in my hands around the Port Hudson State Historic 
Site—a Civil War battlefield thirty minutes away from the LSU campus—conducting 
fieldwork for my thesis research to find out what the place means to Southerners today. 
An answer to my question did not hide for long, and revealed itself expressively in the 
annual reenactment in the late spring. With southern Louisiana geared up for the summer 
heat, I watched hundreds of soldiers in heavy wool uniforms, blue or gray, fighting in the 
field. Musket shots and canon thunders resonated in the open meadow as smoke drifted 
against the banner proclaiming “Lest We Forget!” In such a Southern assemblage, to 
carry out the reenactment somebody had to “put on the blue (to enact the Union soldiers), 
and a certain number of people never want to do that” (Chen 2005, 141). Little boys in 
gray emulated the older enactors, waving their wooden toy swords and guns, excitingly 
running behind the line of the Confederate cannons. Following their movements and 
joyful voices, I found the answer to my research question in a scene they made (Chen 
2005, 142): 
[Seeing the Stars and Bars falling back, the band of boys in grey ran] yelling at the 
General in the front, “General! General! We’re losing!” 
[Hearing them, the reenactor turned toward them with a smile and answered,] “we’re 
gonna lose, [but] we’ll still kick their butts!” . . . [In contrast to the scene on the 
Confederate side,] the only thing behind the Union army is an [oxcart collecting the 
bodies of slain Yankee soldiers] . . . . 
At that moment, witnessing the scene, I felt deeply part of the South, the Deep South. 
Being in the place, participants not only celebrated the significant siege but also polished 
their Southern identity that in the everyday life could only be expressed in full on such an 
occasion. In the reenactment, the place let the constructed identity to be: The historic site, 
2 
as the Southerners’ creation, was the place for them to be at home, acting out their distinct 
identity. The experience of studying a historic battlefield inspired me to look into the 
expressive cultural practice central to local identity in post-conflict places, and also 
encouraged me to investigate cases involved with even more intricate social relations and 
entangled interplay of cultural dynamics. From a research interest in understanding the 
current meaning of post-bellum battlefields, I turned from the Civil War battlefield in the 
American South to the other side of the Earth across the Pacific Ocean to the Asian Cold 
War front, Quemoy. 
This study seeks to explore three major problems: (1) how the place identity 
reformulation in the former Cold War battlefield changes its landscapes; (2) the cultural 
mechanism of the landscape change, orchestrated by an interplay of social 
dynamics—touristification, demilitarization, and reconciliation; and (3) the meaning of 
the cultural mechanism, which reveals the post-conflict community’s joint expression in 
the identity reformulation. In the following chapters, I describe how people in Quemoy 
collectively shaped their landscape to facilitate their activities to articulate themselves in 
the post Cold-War era. Their cultural inscriptions on the landscape reciprocally encourage 
spatial praxes constituting the reformulated place identities. The mutual reinforcement 
between human activities and the designed environment resonantly amplifies the current 
identity of Quemoy as an island of heritage tourism. Through an investigation on place 
formation on Quemoy, its geographic biography discloses why the coastal island has 
consistently been a contested place. The historical review contextualizes the islanders’ 
cultural praxes in response to the contestation, and reveals the meaning of the praxes. 
Unlike their counterparts in the American South, who through commemorative activities 
bring the past conflict near, people in Quemoy alienate themselves from their collective 
3 
past. Through the ongoing process of identity reformulation, the anticommunist past 
rapidly fades in order to pursue reconciliation. The alienation suggests a continuum of the 
local negotiations in the inherent territorial contestation stemming from the geographical 
marginality of Quemoy—a border island in between the land and the sea. In this round of 
negotiations, boosters in Quemoy create irony and cultural hybridity in the landscape to 
transfer the place image from a Cold War front to a heterogeneous heritage island. The 
negotiation strategy disengages Quemoy from the awkward position in the geopolitical 
either/or dichotomy, and fosters an ambiguous identity that juxtaposes and blurs all 
geographical representations of Quemoy.  
1.1 The Land and Water of Quemoy 
Quemoy (aka Kinmen, Jinmen and Chinmen 金門) is a coastal island of the Fukien 
(aka Fujiang 福建) Province in the southeast China (Figure 1.1). In the legendary 
Chinese geographical text, Collection of the Mountains and Seas 山海經, the ancient 
Chinese in their cultural hearth, the flood plain of the Yellow River, reported that “the 
Min [Fukien] is in the middle of the sea 閩在海中” (Yang 1998, 1). Their 
misunderstanding discloses the remoteness of Fukien for the ancient Chinese and 
seafaring as the prevalent and particular activity of the peoples there. The geographical 
and cultural distance of Fukien from the dominant Chinese culture has had a constant 
effect on Quemoy—situating it as a remote island of a remote region, an outlier of an 
outlier. Guarding the entrance of Xiamen Bay 廈門灣, Quemoy island controls the 
southern Fukien region through the Jiulong River 九龍江 flowing through the region 
and then into the bay (Figure 1.2). With an area of 51.83 square miles, Quemoy is in the 
shape of a dumbbell with its widest part aligned east to west stretching 12.43 miles (20 
km) and its narrowest part aligned south to north in the middle of the island stretching 
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Figure 1.1.  Quemoy in East Asia. [GIS map remade by 
the author] 
Figure 1.2.  Quemoy in the Taiwan Strait. The green area 
is the basin of the Jiulong River flowing into the orange 
area—the Xiamen (aka Amoy) Bay. [GIS map remade by 
the author] 
not in scale 
not in scale 
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1.86 miles (3 km). The satellite island of Quemoy, Lieyu 烈嶼, is 6,000 feet away on its 
west, and Amoy 廈門, the second large island in the bay (after Quemoy) is nine miles to  
west of Lieyu (Figure 1.3). Due to the location at the mouth of the Jiulong River, Amoy 
has been the major entrepôt of the region for centuries, while guarding the accumulated 
fortune in the region, Quemoy at the entrance of the bay gained greater and greater 
military significance over the years.  
The spine of Quemoy, the Taiwu Moutain 太武山 with a peak rising 840 feet (256 m) 
above the sea level, runs from the narrowest part of the island toward the northeast 
(Figure 1.4). The range has only scarce vegetation cover and most of its bedrock (mainly 
granite-gneiss) is exposed against the strong wind. The hillsides are generally steep, 
barren, and uninhabitable slopes and are flanked on both sides by the coastal plains. 
Extending from the range’s crest line to the northeast, a few low hills occupy the island’s 
northeastern territory. The southwest portion of Quemoy is also a hilly area rising up 
from the sea, and the walled city built to oversee the maritime traffic is also located in 
this area. Except for these rugged sections, the rest of the island has gentle topography 
covered with a bucolic landscape decorated with hamlets and towns. A few hiccups in the 
landscape produce loose wrinkles like drapes on the silk cloth. Two major creeks in the 
island flow through the landscape—the Wujiang Creek 浯江溪 in the west, and the 
Jinsha Creek 金沙溪 in the northeast. They are both short (less than five miles) and 
cannot hold much fresh rain water. Consequently, their upstream sectors often dry out, 
until the wet season, when the monsoon rain starts to pour down in the summer. Due to 
the prevalent dry conditions, artificial ponds and dammed reservoirs of various sizes are 
common landscape features. However, even with water conservation facilities, the 
insufficient water supply still makes farming unfruitful toil, and wet-field cultivation is 
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Figure 1.3.  Quemoy in Xiamen Bay. [GIS map remade by 
the author] 
Figure 1.4.  Topography Map of Quemoy. [Map remade by 
the author] 
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hardly practical on most arable lands in the island. Toward their mouths, both the creeks 
flow into estuaries with mudflats, and along Wujiang Creek there are also mangrove 
forests. The distribution of muddy beaches is generally on the west and north coasts of 
the island facing the mainland, while the east and south coasts consist of mainly sandy 
and rocky beaches. In the past, the locals turned the intertidal mudflats into oyster farms 
and salterns, while they fished and foraged along the sandy and rocky beaches. Inland, 
the two historic urban centers were both river towns, on the riverfront highlands where 
the water in the creeks flowed year round and enabled access to vessels from the sea. 
They were both points of attachment to the mainland society and the local centers of 
commercial activities. Not until the Chinese Civil War severed Quemoy from the 
mainland was a new town built at the foot of the Taiwu Mountain for the protection it 
provided from shelling. 
As a Cold War front of Free China in Taiwan, Quemoy has been under Taiwanese 
control since 1949, when the Chinese Nationalist troops successfully repelled a Chinese 
Communist landing operation. With the triumph, the island thus became the forefront of 
“Free China.” Following their defeat, the Chinese Communist army ferociously 
bombarded the island three times in the 1950s, and the last one eccentrically turned into a 
symbolic artillery battle that lasted for twenty years from 1958 to1978. During the period, 
the Chinese Communist artillery shelled Quemoy on odd number dates, and on the even 
number dates the Chinese Nationalist artillery struck back. The stalemate lasted for 
forty-three years, and put Quemoy under strict military control by the Chinese Nationalist 
army until 1992. That year, Quemoy renounced its role as a military base, and 
reconstituted itself as a tourist island, with the omnipresent military landscapes on the 
island as its selling points. 
8 
The change of identity released a great impact on the post-military society. As 
demilitarization withdrew troops, the masses in Quemoy who relied on military 
expenditures as their major income source immediately faced difficulty continuing their 
livelihoods. To cope with the stagnant situation, the county government promoted tourism 
as the new economic base. By negotiating with the military for land acquisition and 
autonomy, the local elites developed an island devoted to battlefield tourism, allowing 
outsiders to enter and to tour the island freely, even those originally military-dedicated 
facilities. In the recent years, after democratization restored the local autonomy, 
renovation of historic landscapes mushroomed. In addition, as a way to enrich and to 
diversify resources of heritage tourism, the locals took the opportunity to renovate and to 
reinterpret their past. By embodying their reinterpretations in the material settings, they 
then reshaped the military landscape to fit the image of their homeland. As a result, the 
renovated landscape articulated the local understanding of Quemoy and its past, from 
which the place identity and the meaning of homeland reconstruction shone through. 
After two decades of tourism development, the islanders have assimilated to the 
social changes spurred by the demilitarization starting in 1992. Although effective 
solutions for a lingering economic depression have yet to be found, tourism has become 
one of the major economic activities in the island. Furthermore, even though the 
impression of Quemoy as a Cold War front persists and encourages battlefield tourism, 
the identity as an island of heritage tourism also becomes representative enough to 
compete with the former place identity (cf. Ou 2005; Chang 2011). Meanwhile, the 
reconstruction and reinterpretation of landscapes, which demonstrate the social 
adaptation to the post-military society, are very much alive. In spite of the ongoing status 
of becoming, the endeavors to reformulate identity on Quemoy have manifested 
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themselves intelligibly in the landscape. My goal in this study is to reveal the cultural 
proclamations through an investigation of human interactions with the landscape, which 
have been made for the end of identity reconstruction for the former military island. 
1.2 Accounts on Former Battlefields in Cultural Geography 
This inquiry generally involves in two subjects related to contested places: reuse of 
battlefields and place making. One naturally follows the other after the social structure 
undergoes significant change following conflicts. Methods chosen to reuse places 
associated with conflicts traditionally depend on how the dominant group retrospectively 
defines the historic, and antagonistic events. According to Foote (2003), total obliteration 
is one option to manage landscapes of violence and tragedy, aside from sanctification, 
rectification, and designation. However, the destructive method leaves few physical 
traces for later investigation, and the meaning behind the actions for cultural cleansing is 
rather frenetically straightforward and dry. In comparison, other methods are more 
informative especially in the respect of the intricacy of social tapestry, and thence is able 
to unfold before scrutinizing eyes by analyses of the reuse patterns of landscape (e.g. 
DeLyser 1999; Gable and Handler 2003). Even with a tempo-spatial continuum from the 
past under preservation, the reused historic sites nevertheless do not always articulate the 
whole Truth of the symbolized historical events (see Hurt 2010; Karacas 2010). More 
frequent than not, as Lowenthal pointed out (1975, 27), 
[t]he tangible past is altered mainly to make history conform with memory. Memory 
not only conserves the past but adjusts recall to current needs. Instead of 
remembering exactly what was, we make the past intelligible in the light of present 
circumstances. 
Sequentially, some aspects of the conflict are preserved, commemorated, and showcased, 
while others are put behind, forgotten, and concealed from the public attentions. On that 
very account, Anderson comments that “[a]ll profound changes in consciousness, by their 
10 
very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias. Out of such oblivions, in specific 
historical circumstances, spring narratives” (1991, 204). Forgetting is therefore as 
important as remembering for historic narratives. Just as the shabby slave quarters are not 
much a strong suit, among other exquisite exhibitions of the antebellum elites’ life, in a 
Southern plantation tour, Hoelscher (2003) finds that the annual celebrations of the 
antebellum heritage in the Natchez Pilgrimage is another way to reassure the racial 
supremacy of the dominant group. In Sparke’s case study (1998) when Native American 
nations claim their land rights in court against the Canadian government, the long 
forgotten heritage of the subaltern group reemerges in the general publics’ attention. 
Kapralski (2001), on the other hand, exemplifies the dominant group’s art of forgetting by 
its deliberate “manipulations of landscape” in several Jewish-Polish settlements in the 
southeastern Poland after WWII, and laments for the oblivion leading Poland to its loss of 
“a great deal of its own identity” (56). On the subject of battlefield, Gough (2007) 
outspokenly pointed out that the “contrived” historic narratives pertaining to his studied 
battlefield (the Beaumont Hamel Memorial in Newfoundland) “prioritized certain 
memories over others” (693) to “lend authority to a particular reading of the space” (698). 
Hurt (2010) articulates that a dominant pro-military narrative that has long “silenced 
Cheyenne histories” (383) in an 1868-American-Cheyenne conflict site (the Washita 
Battlefield National Historic Site) currently undergoes a reinterpreting process “to better 
present a balanced historic narrative” (388). As these cases have shown, underneath the 
most glorified aspect of the past oftentimes the darkest shadow conceals the rest of the 
very same past. It is such concealment of the dominant culture that lead Richardson to 
assert, “every culture is a conspiracy, and its principle conspiracy is to deny conspiracy” 
(2003, 329). 
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For this reason, a place, or how the tract of land is construed, in cultural 
geographers’ understanding is not merely products of social construction (Johnston 1991; 
Relph 1985), or a depository of social relations (Duncan and Duncan 1988), but moreover 
are themselves “social processes” (Gold and Gold 2003; Hanna 1996; Schwenkel 2006; 
Till 1999). The view seeing places as social processes lays emphases on practice, 
simultaneity, and immediacy of the present world that both the authorities and minorities, 
the core and periphery are jointly engaging in. The conceptual transition of place from 
products to processes signifies a change in perceiving places from a fixed, passive, and 
objective “end product” to a fluid, dynamic, and non-representational dialogue, which 
continuously yields meanings to contest for the place. As shown in the case studies of 
monuments in Rome (Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998), Berlin (Till 1999), Tokyo (Karacas 
2010), and Montreal (Osbrone 1998), their meaning changes over time, and their very 
existence restlessly stimulates contests over their meanings. Edensor (1997) unraveled in 
his study of the Wallace Monument that the contests, as he termed as “the politics of 
memory,” are not only negotiations between the present and the past juxtaposing in 
places associated with conflicts, but also an ongoing dialogue among coeval social groups 
adhering to different understanding of these places. 
In addition to its continuous effects on specific locales, the legacy of conflicts also 
ignites a comprehensive reshaping process of landscape during the transitional period, 
especially the time immediately after conflicts. The reprocessing of symbolic landscape 
often happens hand in hand with the post-conflict reconstruction, which embeds and then 
showcases narratives of the incumbent dominant groups (see Foote, Tóth, and Árvay 
2000; Stangl 2003; Till 2001, 2003, 2005). In some extreme cases (e.g. Falah 1996; 
Kapralski 2001), the group arbitrarily obliterates the cultural landscape of Others. In any 
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event, the reshaping consequently produces a set of images which constitutes a 
hegemonic representation of the post-conflict place that its dominant group creates to 
impose on its residents and outsiders altogether.  
Against the imposition, contests over the meaning of place begin, and the politics of 
representation follows. The new representation tends to exclude incongruent 
interpretations of the contested places by re-emphasizing, appropriating, or obliterating 
former cultural inscriptions on the landscape. By maintaining an exclusivity, the 
reprocessed cultural landscape can therefore convey narratives of the dominant group to 
the public. In the sense, boosterism and place branding in the post-conflict place in the 
post-conflict time, to various degrees, manifest such intentions to produce exclusivity 
(see Hannam 2006; Palmer 2007; Vitic and Ringer 2007). Since the land is meant to be 
construed differently after reconstruction, the reshaping process is a process of place 
formation. Moreover, even when the competing representations do not necessarily 
exclude one another (see Boholm 1997; DeLyser 2003; Hanna 1996), over long 
juxtaposition they can still blur “to become mutually constitutive as a new” (DeLyser 
2003, 886). Thus the blurring and contesting both contribute to the evolution of place, 
and as a matter of course a battlefield is meant to be something else after the battles. 
By examining the social conditions of the post-conflict Quemoy, this study 
demonstrates an evolutionary process that begins when boosters reshape the landscape, 
providing new interpretations of the past, and consequently reusing the military 
stronghold as an island of heritage tourism. The transformation of place image and 
representation through the branding activities occasions most phenomena discussed 
previously: To reconcile with China, the locals obliterate anti-communist signs and 
military structures in the island. By doing so, they intend to pacify the historical 
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confrontation while at the same time sanitizing traces of the anticommunist struggle. In 
addition, to develop heritage tourism the local government reconstructs historic 
landscapes of the antebellum period, and appropriates military relics as tourist attractions. 
The “touristification” articulates the peacemaking in progress, and suggests, and 
reinforces, the strong social ties between Quemoy and the mainland. Conclusively, the 
reshaped landscape and the tourist activities in Quemoy constitute a place image that is 
supposed to supplant the former representation of Quemoy, the Cold War front. As 
previous studies have indicated, the known effects of touristification in the post-conflict 
places may facilitate an identity shift: Working on the landscape touristification can 
decentralize the former meanings attached to a place (Hannam 2006); can propagate 
designated narratives of the dominant groups (Cooper 2006; Holguín 2005); can 
re-fabricate collective group identity (see Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998; Muzaini and 
Yeoh 2005; Till 2005); and can unshackle the place from the hegemonic social 
constructions (Adams 1997; Evans 2002). With these changes taking place hand in hand 
with touristification, politics of memory and representation sequentially emerge.  
According to Johnson’s categories (1995), heritage studies are broadly based on two 
conceptual frameworks that first “examines the view that the heritage industry is mainly a 
mechanism for re-inscribing nationalist narratives in the popular imagination,” and the 
other “examines the link between heritage and the cultural changes associated with 
postmodernism” (552). The battlefield studies included in Johnson’s first conception 
commonly discuss the sanctification of their studied sites, and offer interpretations to 
shed light on the phenomena. Through these studies, cultural geographers associate the 
former battlefields with heroism, nationalism, and patriotism that grant them a 
quasi-religious quality and therefore incite pilgrimage to pay homage to the dead and 
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their causes (see Gatewood and Cameron 2004; Lloyd 1998; McLean, Garden, and 
Urquhart 2007; Stephens 2007). As a result, “identity” in these studies largely refers to 
group identity instead of place identity, while the latter is what this study of Quemoy 
mainly focuses on.  
Besides, with respect to meaning, although post-conflict societies in these studies 
bestow these sites with different (re)interpretations along time, their historic significance, 
despite a contentious one, remains in the social spotlight at all times. The continuous 
contest facilitates the persistence of their commemorated causes. In other words, these 
studies focus on the continuum of historic significance of former battlefields rather than 
the vicissitudes in their semiotic values, which however is the main concern of this study 
of Quemoy. To reveal the vicissitudes, studies of the latter sort investigate cases of 
“obliteration” and “rectification,” according Foote’s categories of management methods 
of tragic landscapes (2003). Atkinson and Cosgrove (1998) examine a monument in 
Rome that “has been derided throughout its history” and known “to the Romans who pass 
by every day as ‘The Wedding Cake’ or ‘The False Teeth’” (28). Hoelscher discusses the 
Nazi regime’s flak towers in Vienna as “monuments that, however much we'd like to 
forget, simply won't go away” (2008). The military landscape—which the Chinese 
nationalist impose upon the islanders in Quemoy to coerce them into carrying on the task 
defending the whole nationalist regime—is not locals’ preferred representation of their 
homeland. Although out of self-mockery they call their island a “big military camp 大軍
營” (Chang 2008, 67; Yang 1996, 97), a great portion of the local efforts in the 
post-conflict reconstruction are dedicated to undoing the forty-three-year militarization of 
“their” landscape. The causes commemorated in anticommunist and patriotic memorials 
are now inflated social currencies that have only little value among the Quemoy people.  
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Furthermore, heritage studies with emphases on place identity often concentrate on 
images, representations, and authenticity of the heritage sites (e.g. Adams 1997; DeLyser 
1999; Hanna and Del Casino 2003; Hannaford 2001; Gable and Handler 2003). These 
place-centered studies fall into Johnson’s second category, in which one examines “the 
cultural changes associated with postmodernism.” Tourism usually demands 
(re)production of place and its images, which eventually constitute representation of 
place. For the characteristic imagery consumption of tourism, the heritage studies in this 
category often share a common notion that “tourism is ‘prefiguratively’ postmodern” 
(Johnson 1996, 552-3). The constructivist view of imagineering enables these studies to 
investigate the socially constructed dimension of space and its relevant issues—the 
(re)production of space, the blurring of the reality and representations, the politics of 
representation (e.g. Knox 2006; Stainer 2006; Till 2005). The pursuit of a new place 
identity in the post-conflict Quemoy through imagineering intersects issues that the 
postmodern heritage studies have been investigating. As these studies illustrate, the 
currently perceived representation of place and dominant place identity are partially 
social constructions that articulate the dialectical relationship of our “social worlds real 
and imagined” (Stainer 2006, 104).  
The post-conflict imagineering in Quemoy—relying heavily on the local studies 
conducted by local K-12 teachers in the past two decades—concretizes the landscape in 
memory as well as the local aspirations for their homeland. To satisfy the local yearning 
for the antebellum landscapes, the post-conflict reconstruction is a culturally orchestrated 
experiment to revert the militarized reality to the nostalgic images in memory. The 
exchange of representations of Quemoy—from an anticommunist stronghold in the 
nationalist and geopolitical view to an insular destination of heritage tourism in the 
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constructivist and decentralized perspective—reveals the local negotiations with (1) their 
physical environment, (2) their collective local past, and (3) all the involved interest 
groups within and outside the island. Veterans, unionists, separatists, and local boosters 
are all concerned how the past of Chinese Civil War is re-narrated and re-inscribed on the 
landscape in the current process of identity reformulation. After the meta-narrative of 
civil religion has collapsed, the locals are struggling to free themselves from the carapace 
of military culture that they have lived in and under for more than four decades. Toward 
the end, they take advantage of touristification to justify their end of sanitation of the 
military landscape. The tourist development thus serves as an effective tool to propagate 
the new representation of Quemoy as a heritage site through boosterism. 
Although studies of the battlefield tourism share common research interests with 
other heritage studies, they are prone to and distinguished for their focus on the issues of 
contested places. As a legacy of war, sites of battlefield tourism often arouse polarized 
opinions on the conflictual past; therefore meanings attached to these sites are not only 
contested but also confronted. To characterize battlefield tourism—the activity to act out 
different opinions, scholars at times call it “dark tourism” (Lennon and Foley 2000) or 
“thanatourism” (Seaton 1999). Both the terms suggest a fact that tragedy, violence, and 
death in situ constitute the significance of place. As pilgrimages to the former battlefields 
gradually popularize battlefield tourism, the rite of civil religion sequentially brings about 
the landscape change/production of the former battlefields (see Gold and Gold 2003; 
Gough 2007; Knox 2006).  
Since the dominant group often attains power to embody their interpretation in the 
landscape, the touristified battlefields, due to the embedded hegemonic narratives, tend to 
arouse controversies, and turn into contested places. They beckon disputes over their 
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meanings held dearly by different social groups, especially the two rival groups 
previously fighting and involved in the battle (see Hannam 2006; Smith 2007; Frost 2007; 
Panakera 2007). Due to the symbolic value of former battlefields, changes in the material 
settings are thus able to articulate the power struggle of the post-conflict communities. As 
shown in some precedent studies (e.g. Falah 1996; Foote, Tóth, and Árvay 2000; Karacas 
2010; Moeller 2005), the dominant group likely undertakes a syncretic approach to 
reshape the landscape, with a hegemonic discourse overwhelming dissonant sounds made 
by other dissident groups. With the syncretic observations, these studies suggest an 
antagonistic incompatibility between the former landscape/power and the post-conflict 
power structure. However, such is not the case in Quemoy, where the coexistence of 
military and tourist landscape enunciates their compatibility after re-interpretation. 
Touristification of military sites is a tricky business that necessitates both 
authenticity and demilitarization. The latter however undercuts the former and vise versa. 
As a result, military sites of battlefield tourism are always a product of compromises 
between the two: They are partially militarized and partially touristified; both real and 
imagined. The ambiguity obfuscates the past conflicts, and delivers the compatibility. 
More importantly, the demilitarization in Quemoy stems from the pursuit of 
decentralization, democratization, and localization. In the circumstances, although the 
historical narrative about the past conflict changes after the demilitarization, the changes 
attribute to observations made from different angles by different social classes, yet, on the 
same side in the war, instead of totally opposite observations made by the rivals. The 
common ground between the two narratives provides a base for understanding. When the 
elite class in Quemoy drastically interpreted features of military landscape form war 
apparatus to peace tokens, the reinterpretation did not stimulate acute controversies. The 
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ambiguity of space and the reinterpretations with compatibility brought by tourist 
development enable and display the cultural hybridity after demilitarization. 
Following localization and touristification in Quemoy, the local study gradually 
becomes a popular subject matter for researchers. However, as the stage of knowledge 
production remains preliminary, most of the studies in the last two decades devoted to 
data collection in the extra-textual field of reference, and built an academic basis for 
advanced exploration later. Under this circumstance, the theoretical and inter-textual 
studies of cultural geography are scarce. In the present literature, a few studies relevant to 
mine generally center on two issues: production of space and methods of representation. 
Scholars studying the first issue share a common interest in revealing the mechanism of 
landscape production. Chi (2004) identifies a dialectic interaction in the production of 
space during militarization. The dialectics between the everyday space and the militarized 
space beget a contested “thirdspace” that “embraces conflicts, confusion, and 
ambiguities” (Chi 2004, 523). By her study, Chi highlights the impracticality of total 
hegemony, nationalism in this case, over space construction of Quemoy. Other studies 
with the same focus investigate the landscape change after demilitarization in 1992. 
Considering Quemoy as a “border-island,” the geopolitical study claims that “politics, 
nationalism and military are the three major and influential forces involve [sic] in the 
landscape transformation process and mechanism” (Chien 2004, 449). On the other hand, 
the study of urban planning credits the change “from a war-zone to a cultural tourism 
destination” to the local cultural industry, whose success hinges upon the legacy of 
militarization—the efficient local institutions and mobilization through the old civil 
defense mechanism (Yang and Hsing 2001). Last, Chang and Ryan (2006) in their study 
of battlefield tourism propose that heritage tourism renders Quemoy “a place in transition 
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from a site of war to a place of normalization” (151), and consider reconciliation as the 
solo force promoting the landscape change in Quemoy. 
Secondarily, studies concerning methods of representation often conclude with 
suggestions for tourist development or historic preservation in Quemoy. In her 
exploration of means to interpret former battlefield relics and monuments, Lin (2004) 
introduces the concept of “counter-monument,” which de-sanctifies the commemorated 
significance by viewers’ participation in completing the monument. Based on a review of 
memorialization methods and case studies of war commemorative monuments, she 
suggests the preservation of the social memory in Quemoy by a decentralized approach. 
With a discussion on the construction and the management of tourist images, Hou (1999) 
departs from the methods of recurrence, simulation, and disguise to represent the war 
history in Quemoy, “but rather, it should be transformed into tangible contents in artistic 
forms to reveal the universal meaning” (39). In addition to the introduction of artistic 
forms of representation, he recommends that the current tourist development should 
create spaces which invite experiential engagement in the historic battlefield, in addition 
to the traditional sightseeing activity. With these suggestions concretized in the landscape, 
Zhang (2007) analyzes representation of the war memorials and the touristified military 
structures; thereby concluding that the increasing awareness of the new place identity—a 
destination of battlefield tourism—among the local population is central to the success of 
tourism development. In general, all these studies emphasize the advantages of the 
experiential, partaking and bottom-up approaches of representation, revealing an 
underlying discourse of local empowerment and localization in the post-conflict Quemoy. 
Through the literature review, I discover a few missing points in the current 
literature of former battlefields and battlefield tourism. First, research on the subjects tend 
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to ignore what essentialists call geographical personality (Dunbar 1974; Norton 2000) 
and constructivists call conventional place image, “built up over many years of 
accumulated visual and textual representations” (Hannaford 2001). Noting that “former 
battlefields are often unprepossessing places” (Gold and Gold 2003, 108), research on the 
subject recognize only the significance of these places after the violent conflicts. Gold 
and Gold explain that the neglect is mainly due to the homogeneous material settings of 
former battlefields (2003, 108): 
fields of combat tend to lack imposing topography. Flat ground allows infantry 
commanders to deploy their forces in optimal formation and artillery commanders to 
establish uninterrupted lines of fire, at best looking for slight undulations or ridges to 
give themselves points of tactical advantage. Whatever their appearance during the 
heat of battle, most battlefields scarcely merit a second glance for their inherent 
landscape qualities once the debris of war has been cleared away. 
Since these studies intentionally or institutionally disregard the antebellum past of these 
places, they then fail to contextualize the conflicts and the venues. On one hand, for 
studies centering on nationalist narratives embedded in former battlefields, the 
de-contextualization can be excusable because meanings of these nationalist monuments 
nearly remains on the same page. However, insofar as the meanings of former battlefields 
are the focus of investigation, the neglect of context is to map the cultural geography 
without cardinal points. As this study sees the whole Quemoy island as a battlefield, 
overlooking its rich history while investigating meanings that locals attach to its 
landscapes could lead to fallacies and misinterpretations. 
On the other hand, for postmodernist studies focusing on politics of memory and 
representation, their ahistorical view of social constructionism sees the observed 
phenomena in former battlefields as the outcome of the interplay among present social 
dynamics rather than a legacy of war. With their focus on the present, the past is 
construed as a social construct of the current milieu. In the sense, the politics of former 
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battlefields are overwhelmingly negotiations among social groups in the present. The 
de-emphasis of the past and its influence on the present thus contextualizes and locks the 
current landscape in today’s social fabrics. By viewing the past as a manipulatable and 
manipulated creation for contemporary groups to pursue their social interests, the 
postmodernist conception realizes place as tools for certain purposes. The view does not 
account for how a place comes into being nor can it reveal site specificities contributing 
to place formation. To explore meaning of place without considering the dialectical, 
improvisatory relationship between praxes and conventions in every appropriation, 
negotiation, and resistance is to reduce the intricacy of cultural evolution to an image 
equivalent to any other in the postmodern time. The reduction of “Quemoy” to 
representations (a Cold-war battlefield or a tourist destination) may likely simplify the 
current negotiations of identity reformulation. The necessity to take negotiations in the 
past (i.e. the evolutionary trajectory of place formation) into account and to include the 
past into the current negotiations for place reformation is key to revealing the meaning of 
Quemoy and its changing landscapes today. For this reason, I endeavor to include a 
thorough review of the island’s past in this study to identify its distinct characteristics of 
cultural geography built in the long-term human-environment co-evolution, and to ground 
this research on place identity on a solid basis of the local understanding. 
Secondarily, another characteristic of former battlefields that the prior studies do not 
sufficiently address is how drastically the meaning of place and sequentially its 
landscapes can change after conflicts. The polarized change in their symbolic meanings 
from place of war to peace or from place of one group’s justice to their opponent’s 
induces a contradiction. With a great semantic contrast, such a shift in meaning of place 
introduces irony in landscape. Touristification of the former battlefield further reifies the 
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irony through reinvention of military relics in identity reformulation that turns the island 
orientation upside down and inside out. In addition, through a review of the local history, 
I discover that the ironic shift of place identity from one affiliation to its opposite has 
repeatedly occurred due to the cultural and geographical marginality of Quemoy. The 
resurfacing contradictions manifest geographical characteristics of this island on the 
border, and articulate the irony of human futility in the belligerent struggles for identity 
construction. The Sisyphean work in constructing a hegemonic identity for the border 
island through territorialization counter-intentionally brought a vague identity that reveals 
the locals’ negotiations with marginality and the conventional cognition of Quemoy. The 
landscapes in the border island are therefore ripe for irony. 
As “the cultural signature of the entire [sic] postmodern condition” (Fernandez and 
Huber 2001, vii), irony “most often is used to express skepticism toward authority,” and 
“describe[s] a questioning attitude and critical stance” (Fernandez and Huber 2001, 1). 
The cutting edge of irony makes it “an undercutting instrument” to demystify 
authoritative meta-narratives (Fernandez and Huber 2001, 3). As Foucault proclaimed, 
“power projects an image that is all pervasive, unavoidable and inscribed in the very heart 
of all ventures of knowledge” (Torres 1997, 30). To shatter the power-constituted image, 
ironies in the postmodern time obtain a greater significance (Knauft 1996, 95):  
These ironies are not just discursive, epistemological, or limited to world of trope; 
they have enormous impact on peoples’ lives. The play of signs is a powerful 
strategy of domination and disempowerment . . . . 
In terms of landscape, the constituent image of power/knowledge emerges from the 
“inherently descriptive text [of geographers’ writings] in the communication of social 
pretensions by privileged persons and groups” (Smith 1997, 78). The discrepancies 
remain between the pretentious myth and the reality “give rise to ironies” (Smith 2002, 
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324). As Orientalism exemplifies the postmodern irony, the geographical ironies, or 
precisely ironies in geographical writings, often involve refutation to the imaginative 
geography, such as the myths of American exceptionalism, American geographical 
uniformity (Smith 2002) and the Finnish northern imagination (Ridanpää 2007). With the 
emphases on the “awareness of irony [that] can lead to a salutary dissolution of pretense” 
(Smith 2002, 325), the current literature of geographical irony weighs in the discursive 
aspect of landscape texts, but is lack of a practice theory to investigate how social groups 
reshape their landscape to ignite ironic flair through pastiche and juxtaposition. The 
landscape change in Quemoy pertinently demonstrates the practice aspect of ironic 
landscape. As militarization of Quemoy manifests the nationalist pretensions, which 
cordoned off Quemoy from its nearby areas and produced a rigid, utilitarian, and 
hierarchical military landscape, touristification subverts the authoritative myth through 
irony. Irony in the post-conflict reconstruction, which transforms the former military base 
to a battlefield tourism destination, greatly changes the residents’ everyday life. As such 
often in the practice aspect of ironic landscape can the unique postmodern condition 
“have enormous impact on people’s lives” (Knauft 1996, 95).  
Furthermore, ironies, as a Woolgar discerned, “are useful for maintaining the 
ambivalence of things that can never be known for sure” (Torres 199, 20). In the place 
identity reformulation, their polysemy simultaneously makes Quemoy a heterotopia 
which “is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that 
are in themselves incompatible” (Foucault 1986, 25). Inspired by the concept, Duncan 
construes a heterotopia as “sites of difference,” each of which “with its own discourses 
linked to similar sites” in their discursive fields (1994, 407). Due to juxtaposition of the 
new and old identities of Quemoy in developing a cultural landscape pastiche for heritage 
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tourism, the identity reformulation consequently increases place ambiguity. The 
counterintentionality and contradictoriness maximizes the post-conflict irony in 
landscape. It is through the fluidity and eclecticism of heterotopias that the postmodern 
ironies serve as “a powerful strategy” to emancipate Quemoy from further 
territorialization.  
1.3 A Magpie Roaming in the Park 
Throughout my entire enterprise of this research, I heavily rely on the 
phenomenological research method acquired from my interdisciplinary training in both 
landscape architecture and cultural geography. Phenomenology, as defined, “suggests that 
we work to accomplish our efforts through that intensive mixture of experiencing and 
speaking” that results in “understanding” (Richardson 2006, 2). Students in landscape 
architecture for design purposes learn from site inventory and analysis to identify distinct 
qualities and themes of sites. This acquired knowledge sharpens in conceiving 
site-specific designs to transform their intentions to paper, by which landscape architects 
perfect their reading in creating new landscapes. Their line of work compels them to 
locate the sense of place in a design site and to analyze spatial composition of a design. 
The reading in locating, the deconstructing in analyzing, and the reconstituting in 
designing disclose landscape architects’ vision of human inscriptions on Earth as 
landscape paintings, consisting of iconographies, plant materials, design elements, and 
other manipulable components for aesthetic, ecological re-arrangement. Differing from 
the vision, cultural geographers however read landscape as texts. In this view, landscape 
communicates. As Richardson elucidates, “places we call ordinary communicate the 
taken-for-granted understandings of the present” (1994, 159). For cultural geographers, 
landscape conveys meaning by offering understandings for interpretations. The approach 
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to understand landscapes’ meaning resembles the one of language learning that requires 
total engagement in an estranged reality to acquire understandings through experience. 
By the understanding, landscape readers can read texts in a meaningful way and interpret 
their meanings. Through this effort of “reading a world that speaks,” Richardson 
comments, “reading engages us [creatures of symbolic communication]; through reading 
we enter the world of the text. The endeavor is . . . more given to addressing the how than 
the why, more given to pondering words than assigning cause . . .” (1994, 163). 
Phenomenology is thus a method to let the world reveals itself through our engagement in 
it. 
Since my first trip to Quemoy in January 2004 for this study, nearly ten years have 
passed. During the decade, I visited Quemoy four times for ten to fourteen days. In 
addition, I stayed in the island for sixteen months to do my fieldwork before writing this 
dissertation. In the first few visits, I started out as a participant in tourist pilgrimages, and 
gradually set my own courses of survey. To witness the landscapes described in texts 
through my own eyes, I undertook a basic survey over the whole island, proceeding 
quarter by quarter over the course of one to two days on my rental scooter. I tried to grind 
over every possible path in the island, and along the way photographed distinct local 
features, such as the military landscape in Quemoy. In the process of indiscriminate 
collecting, I felt myself like a magpie roaming in the park, intrusively breaking into its 
tranquility and compulsively hoarding its distinctive features. The detachment from 
touristic landscapes enabled me to see the landscape change in a broader view and to 
re-contextualize tourist development back to the ongoing social dynamics in Quemoy. 
With a big picture, the meaning of landscape change gradually emerged. In these trips, I 
also interviewed municipal officials, national park rangers, military officers, local 
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historians, and professors in Quemoy.1 Through these talks, I learned from their point of 
view the meaning of landscape change, and was able to identify the social concerns and 
controversial issues in the post-conflict society. My experience from the preliminary 
work channeled my research toward articulating phenomena of cultural change. 
In addition to the surveys and interviews, local festivals and events were also 
informative due to their evocation of situational performance which acts out the local 
interpretations of the landscape and the collective past. One of the occasions was the 
Bunker Museum of Contemporary Art in 2005, an installation art event taking place in 
abandoned military facilities. The event included eighteen works created by foreign 
artists and nineteen local children’s works. By reinventing military relics to be sites of 
artworks, the event aroused an intense discourse on representation of Quemoy between 
the nationalist perspective and the one under reformulation. My experience in the 
rehabilitated space, observations on viewers’ behavior and talks with interpreters, enabled 
me to approach the local understanding of the landscape change in demilitarization. By 
analyzing the rehabilitative methods applied to the military space, I also discovered the 
different interpretations of bunkers between the local and foreign perspectives. In the last 
trip to Quemoy in 2008, I participated in a workshop held by Kinmen County 
Government and Taiwan Historica on the subject of the local culture and tourism. The 
two government organs deliberately designed a five-day program consisting of lectures 
and fieldtrips from mornings to evenings in order to deliver participants the 
representative images of Quemoy. In the workshop, participants from Taiwan, like groups 
of tourists, acted together; transferred as a group from site to site by bus on fieldtrips. 
                                                 
1 Throughout my field studies, I had conducted nearly twenty in-depth interviews and approximate sixty 
informal ones. In in-depth interviews, I visited my interviewees, mainly public servants knowing my 
identity and purpose, and took notes during the interviews with their consent. Others happened in regular 
conversations. 
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Even though half of the participants were Quemoy locals, the Taiwanese participants, due 
to the controlled environment and tight schedule, experienced only limited aspects of the 
everyday life in Quemoy. My participation in the workshop allowed me to observe how 
the local elites portrayed their homeland to Others, and how biased the travel experience 
of mass tourism can be, due to the cultural immersion in the selected, exquisite images. 
By the personal experience in these events, I then could make close examinations into the 
imagineering of the demilitarized Quemoy. 
Through the understanding obtained from my preliminary study, I submitted my 
research proposal to my dissertation committee in December 2008, and with their 
approval I initiated my sixteen-month fieldwork in Quemoy. Before residing in Quemoy, 
I spent two months in the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Scinica as a visiting student 
reviewing the latest literature of Quemoy and exchanging ideas with colleagues in Taiwan. 
After that, I again stepped on Quemoy soil in March 2009. 
During the sixteen-month stay, I gathered information mainly through three channels: 
the local newspaper, my local networks, and my day job. The Quemoy Daily originally 
was a military newspaper that after demilitarization became an organ of the county 
government. In this daily newspaper, there were local news, editorials, literature 
supplements, columns, reader’s opinions and advertisements. Its materials did not differ 
much from regular newspapers. However, due to the fact that the government owned this 
medium, a great portion of the local news was actually press releases prepared by various 
government agencies. As such, the Quemoy Daily continuously served as an important 
mouthpiece for the authorities. Knowing this, although it provided a convenient access to 
keep track of the social phenomena in Quemoy, I remained cautious about its reports 
especially those concerning the local public policies. Nonetheless, the Quemoy Daily was 
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a major source of citations in this study. Due to the shadows of totalitarian control by the 
military in the past forty-three years, the restrained masses had grown keenly sensitive to 
audio recorders and cameras.2 Learning from experience, I often kept my interviews 
informal to encourage interviewees to speak freely. Besides, I must confess that I did not 
always keep field notes in most of the lengthy conversations happening at random, nor 
did I keep a regular diary to have my interviewee’s words in transcripts. Consequently, 
the open-ended interviews and my informal data collection rendered the local newspaper 
a necessary adjunct to my ethnography. For the newspaper articles provided credentials 
that my findings in casual conversations lacked for, more often than not, the Quemoy 
Daily substantiated my knowledge of the local opinions on public affairs enlightened by 
my other sources of information. 
The three major informants in my local networks were Josephine (a barista and the 
owner of a cafe stand), Dan (an innkeeper of a budget hotel), and Bill (my landlord).3 
Josephine’s stand was an information exchange center where her customers brought her 
the latest news of the community through their chats. She sometimes would share the 
information with me in our conversations, providing leads to the everyday culture from 
sundry matters of social life to taboos.4 Dan’s budget hotel reinvented from an old 
mansion was the rendezvous of Taiwanese contract workers, travelling merchants, and 
returned visiting emigrants. His tenants due to the requirements of their business would 
                                                 
2 For example, one old fisherman in Guningtou village was nervous, and continuously asked me the 
purpose of my recording and photographing, when we were on our way to his oyster farm. In spite of my 
explanation and reassurance, he still avoided his face from the camera. When the interview approached 
questions about the wartime past, the subject made his hair stand up on end. He turned even cautious, and 
defensively asked what I was asking those questions for. 
3 All the three informants’ names are pseudonyms to protect their confidentiality. 
4 She once commented on my decision to live in a traditional house in the Guningtou village by myself as a 
“very bold deed,” for the village and its vicinities were not clean (tainted by unrestful spirits). The area was 
a gory slaughter ground covered in bloodshed in the Battle of Guningtou and sequential artillery wars. 
Ghosts and spirits dying in agony were said still lingering on the ground. I later on also received the same 
comments on my “boldness” from other local acquaintances.  
29 
usually have to stay in Quemoy longer than regular tourists and business travelers. Dan 
on occasion would sit down with some of them after work in the walled front yard, the 
porch, or the lobby, drinking together and shooting the breeze. In such gatherings, their 
boasting would retell their impressions of the demilitarized Quemoy and its past. From 
Dan and his tenants, I then acquired the vision of Quemoy in the minority’s 
perspective—a vulgar view that texts produced by the elites and the educated class did 
not often share with their audience. Bill was a carpenter and a wood carving sculptor who 
mastered the traditional craft of creating religious artifacts. He just renovated his 
inherited house in the Guningtou village with the funding from the Kinmen National Park 
when I was looking for a traditional folk house for rent. After becoming a tenant of his 
countryside property, I regularly visited his home in the town center, and in our chats 
picked up piecemeal information of the local knowledge here and there. In addition, his 
recollections about the antebellum past and his experience in the Battle of Guningtou in 
his young days explained the local desire of reconciliation with the mainland society. His 
investment in the real estate in the Amoy city and business association with a mainland 
manufacture of wooden artifacts manifested the aspiration. His participation in the annual 
pilgrimage to his clan’s ancestor halls on the mainland also demonstrated a social 
reconciliation. However, his only sister, three children, and grandchildren living in 
Taiwan simultaneously fastened his life tightly with the island with the other side of the 
strait. Through him, I learned about the new relation established on the old connection, 
and witnessed such by my tagging-along in one annual pilgrimage of his clan to their 
common ancestor halls and graves in the mainland. From my informants, I then could 
hear the voice that announced without the privilege of education and mastery of words; 
however they spoke the everyday life of the people in the community. 
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In addition to the fieldwork, I also taught in the Department of Tourism Management 
in National Quemoy University, and worked as an administrative assistant in its graduate 
program. In the two semesters, the department assigned me a few space-related courses, 
including “Reuse of Abandoned Spaces,” “Public Space and Art,” and “Introduction to 
Urban Planning.” In exploring these subjects with my classes, the teaching assignments 
reciprocally enhanced my understanding of Quemoy: When the class was concluding the 
urban planning of Baroque cities characterized by its straight avenues and land marks at 
traffic nodes, we also discussed the military hegemony in the traffic network of Quemoy 
constituted by straight concrete roads and bunkers at the center of traffic circles. In the 
course, “Reuse of Abandoned Space,” the class focused on the reuse of “ruins,” which 
were commonplaces in Quemoy due to the damaged property, wartime personnel 
evacuation, and demilitarization in recent years. In an architecture student’s oral report, 
he demonstrated a reuse case of a beachfront fort turned into a successful bird 
observation station. The gun embrasures of the fort provided ideal settings for 
bird-watching, due to their discreet design to protect soldiers from enemy gunfire. Based 
on the structural characteristics, the transfer of military facilities through reinvention and 
reinterpretation into peacetime articulated the meaning of landscape touristification. The 
exchange of information with students in the classes granted me access to their life 
experience on the subjects concerning my research, and turned the class into a real-time 
venue of hermeneutics between the extra- and inter-textual fields of reference.  
The main responsibilities of my administrative assistant job were two: to conduct a 
survey of tourism resources in Quemoy and to write grant proposals for the department 
every once in a while. The survey of tourism resources prompted me to investigate the 
tourist spots in Quemoy in order to discover their distinct characteristics that produced 
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the tourist attractions of the island. Furthermore, in order to win the grant committee over, 
the proposals also adopted a strategy to stress the local specificity. As such, the process of 
conducting the survey and writing grant proposals led me to a journey of demystification 
to unravel the genius loci of Quemoy. In quite the same way, my involvement in other 
professional activities—such as site inventory for landscape design projects, review of 
public projects commissioned by the county government, and research on the local 
traditional industries—also benefited this study. With all the engagement in the local 
community, my life experience in the field allowed me to identify the landscape change 
after demilitarization. In addition, based on the immersion in the chorological culture, I 
then could reveal the meaning of landscape change according to the local semiotic 
system. 
The accomplishment of my fieldwork and literature review constitutes the following 
passages of this study. Chapter 2 provides a geographical biography of Quemoy as an 
overview of the local past from prehistoric sea-nomad cultures to the modern antebellum 
period. In a fashion similar to sequent occupance, the chapter introduces the past 
according to a series of representative place identities in each of its development stages. 
By examining the co-evolution of the environmental and social system, the overview 
provides a context for the formation of local culture, from which the meaning of cultural 
landscapes derives. Also the examination uncovered a repeating theme of landscape 
change throughout local history. Identification of the theme that I term “reversals of the 
geographical coordinate system” ties the militarization and demilitarization of landscape 
in the geographical personality of Quemoy.5 The contextualization then re-presents the 
                                                 
5 Similar orientation changes also occur in the Baltic countries both in the history of (Tuchtenhagen 2003) 
and in the post-communist present (Istrate 2012; Nekrašas 2003; Pavilionis 2003) especially in terms of 
transportation and economy (Himanen 2000). 
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landscape change in a perspective of historical geography, and permits a new reading of 
the change that emits irony. Chapter 3 explores the change in a holistic view by 
considering Quemoy as a whole to examine the shifts of the insular coordinate system. 
From its repeated reversals, an irony of Sisyphean futility emerges between 
reterritorialization and deterritorialization. Chapter 4 further looks into the irony in 
landscape by investigating individual cases of military structures, which underwent 
different management practices and reinvention treatments after demilitarization. The 
investigation concludes that the irony in landscape is the embodiment of cultural 
demilitarization that subverts the anticommunist ideologies, and dispatches the conflicts 
to the past. Chapter 5 proceeds to discuss the landscape touristification in Quemoy to 
supplant the military landscape. Through reinvention of military structure, 
reinterpretation of war memorials, and reconstruction of historic landscape, the 
post-conflict Quemoy presents a cultural variation. Juxtaposition of these variant cultural 
features in the landscape collapses the nationalist meta-narrative, and the cultural 
hybridity encourages the formation of places with ambiguity in Foucault’s heterotopias. 
Chapter 6 provides an overall conclusion of the study, disclosing the irony in landscape 
and formation of heterotopias as the cultural mechanism of landscape change in Quemoy. 
By the resulted ambiguity and multiculturality, the identity reformulation in Quemoy 
therefore articulates the local aspiration to free themselves from the Sisyphean struggle of 
the either/or dichotomy of the border island. 
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CHAPTER 2  WHEEL OF HISTORY: FROM NOWHERE TO HOMELAND 
Chien Mu 錢穆, a modern Chinese historian had once criticized a popular metaphor 
that indicated history is a play and geography is the stage of history. He considered the 
analogy fallacious because actors could repeatedly reenact the same play on numerous 
stages. However, only specific milieu could induce the idiographic history to occur. As a 
result, “Confucius cannot be born in India; Buddha cannot be born in Jerusalem; and 
Jesus cannot be born in China. This [evolution trajectory of a place] comes with double 
conditions of geography and history” (Chien 2005, 56). Chien emphasizes the uniqueness 
of a place and its history, and denies their duplicability by refuting the metaphor which 
however suggests a critical mechanism of place formation. By discovering a repetitive 
historical theme of Quemoy, I argue that the repetitive social performance is key to its 
place formation. Just as the Sisyphean toil makes the condemned king, the reiterative 
theme constitutes the border island. Its marginal environment stimulates the specific 
social-spatial practice which reciprocally articulates geographical characteristics of the 
place. Chien considers that geography condition the development of a place, of which 
accumulation becomes the local history. If so, a study on the local history should be able 
to reveal the underlying geographical characteristics of a place. Vidal de la Blanche 
termed these idiographical characteristics as “geographical personality.” According to 
expositions by cultural geographers, the “personality” is “something that grows through 
time,” deriving from the local way of life, which signifies inhabitants’ adaption to “the 
physical characteristics of the land” (Dunbar 1974, 28; Norton 2000, 91). In this chapter, 
I explore the geographical personality that promotes historical events through a reading 
of the Quemoy history, discovering how the reiterative historical theme contributes to the 
formation of the border island and its culture. 
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Quemoy as an island on the Chinese coast controls the regional entrance of Southern 
Fukien 閩南 region. Its geographical characteristics are distinct, so are the inhabitants’ 
adaptations to them. Through its development, Quemoy has been a virgin land for 
Chinese pioneers, a grazing pasture and saltworks for early settlers, a military base and an 
international gateway for Imperial China, and a homeland for the overseas Chinese. As an 
island, its small size and its proximity to the mainland make Quemoy inseparable from 
the Chinese culture. Nevertheless, as a regional entrance, Quemoy is also susceptible to 
foreign influence. Located on the periphery of the mainland, Quemoy is far away from 
the Chinese political center and cultural hearth in Northern China. With mountains 
surrounding the Fukien region in southeast China and limiting its accessibility, China 
took thousands of years of political expansion and cultural assimilation to reach Quemoy 
(1556 BCE-ca. 980 CE). It took Chinese settlers four-hundred years to adapt fully to the 
insular environment after they landed there (ca. 980-1386).6 During the adjustment 
period, Imperial China established two state-owned enterprises on the island—first, horse 
pastures and later saltworks. Concomitant with development of overseas trading in the 
Southern Fukien, pirate activities gradually arose, and over time became a thorny issue 
for the Chinese imperial authorities. Due to the strategic location of Quemoy, empire 
constructed the island to be a regional outpost. As “Quemoy” in Chinese literally means 
“the golden gate,” Quemoy had long been an impregnable fortress of empire at the 
gateway in its seafront frontier. 
As early as the seventh century, foreign merchants from as far away as Arabia and 
Persia had already arrived and settled in Quanzhou 泉州—the capital city of the 
                                                 
6 The official Quemoy history, Gazetteer of Kinmen (2010), dates the establishment of the first Han 
settlement in 282 or 317, which the current historians consider problematic (Xie, Yang, and Wang 2003; 
Yang 2004). By a historical review, I propose 980 as the earliest date possible for a continuous Han 
settlement in Quemoy. Please see 2.3 for details. 
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Southern Fukien (Shi and Xu 2007). The development of international trade attracted 
armed mercantile fleets, as well as pirates. In the eleventh century, the first documented 
pirate activity occurred in Quanzhou, and in 1218 in Quemoy. Thenceforth, the maritime 
powers and the Chinese Empire continuously skirmished in the vicinity of Quemoy. The 
constant conflicts prompted the empire to reinforce its military deployment in its insular 
frontier, and with reinforcement, the scale of conflict ascended. In the confrontation, the 
characteristics of a military base emerged in the landscape in Quemoy, and every 
imperial victory further thoroughly impressed the fledging identity on Quemoy. The 
reiterative constructions of military defenses developed the landscape characteristics of 
this imperial frontier. I use the action—hammering nails along the edge—as the metaphor 
for the formative process: The nails, symbolizing the peripheral city and its coastal 
defenses, would stay on the brink (of the imperial bloc figuratively) after the hammering, 
but over time, due to impact and wear, they would be the first to fall apart from the edge. 
The falling beckons another hammering, which eventuates in another falling. In a 
diachronic view, the construction of Quemoy as an imperial frontier proves to be a 
Sisyphean task. However, it is through the repetitive efforts of building that the insular 
society left its cultural impress on the landscape. As such, the futile “hammering” 
produces the homeland image of Quemoy.  
2.1 Theories of Landscape Evolution 
In 1893, the American historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, presented his Frontier 
Thesis, asserting that the repeated experience in the advancing western frontiers shaped 
the American culture, and distinguished it from its European antecedents (1920, 1):  
American social development has been continually beginning over again on the 
frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion 
westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of 
primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character.  
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Later, the theory received broad critique for its presumptions pertaining to which Norton 
(2000) summarized a few: The thesis described the cultural formation happening in 
isolation without interaction with the eastern seaboard area, and presumed that European 
settlers had generally experienced a primitive livelihood of subsistence production, which 
was not the typical case of economic activities in the frontiers. And most importantly, 
Turnerians considered American culture to be founded on the frontier when in fact the 
direction of cultural diffusion goes the other way around from the eastern seaboard. 
Nevertheless, aside from its widely debated conclusion, the merit of this thesis rested in 
its view of the formative process, of which Turner’s emphasis on the continuous 
repetition of this formative process was obvious. Accompanying the advancing frontier 
line, the early American settlers relived the frontier experience through reclaiming the 
“free land” again and again (Nostrand and Estaville 2001). The social development that 
“has been continually beginning over again” resulted in “this perennial rebirth” of life 
experience. Both the repetition and the recurrence articulated the Sisyphean character of 
the process that Turnerians considered to accomplish the characteristics of American 
culture. 
2.1.1  Related Concepts in the Sauerian Tradition 
Whereas historians are interested in the immaterial aspect of cultural evolution, 
geographers focus on the cultural landscape. Following the Vidalian and Sauerian 
traditions, such a focus is often bound to a geographical delineation with shared cultural 
traits, namely pays or a cultural region. To constitute a cultural region, diffusion is 
considered as the major formative mechanism. The place of origin for diffusion is 
commonly known as a cultural hearth, a core area, or later a homeland, as it is variously 
called. Accounting for the genesis of a cultural region, Zelinsky considers the indicator of 
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the establishment as the first effective settlement. He defines such a settlement as the first 
one with specific characteristics “able to effect a viable, self-perpetuating society” in “an 
empty territory” or when “an earlier population is dislodged by invaders” (1973, 13). As 
so defined, the first effective settlement is taken as the starting point of cultural diffusion, 
from which diffusion of cultural traits gradually forms the sequent cultural region. The 
clearly theorized start then gives geographers full access to explore the evolutionary 
patterns of cultural regions from their genesis to the following succession of human 
occupation. To narrate the evolution of a cultural region, some studies adopt a framework 
describing the regional development stage by stage in terms of the land-use patterns 
following the timeline. The framework first conceived by Derwent Whittlesey (Norton 
2000) is known as Sequent Occupance, according to which each stage of regional 
development is identifiable by a prominent way of life that characterizes the 
human-environment relationships in a specific historical period. Due to the nature of such 
studies focusing on a cultural region, the identified stages, except the initial one, could be 
often idiographical and place-specific. Nevertheless, the general trajectory of human 
society from agriculture to industrialization, and in some case to urbanization also shows 
in these regions, but they do not always follow in linear sequence. 
2.1.2  Meinig’s Model of Cultural Evolution in the American Wests 
Cultural areas are each particular, and it is difficult to induce a general pattern of 
evolution. However, Meinig’s study on the American Wests makes a stride toward a more 
generalized set of evolutionary stages. This inter-regional study incorporates an economic 
dimension into the cultural evolution of the regions in the West, and identifies four 
evolutionary phases of the regions: transplant, regional culture, impact of national 
culture, and dissolution of historic regional culture (1972, 163; Figure 2.1). The 
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Figure 2.1. Meinig’s model of cultural evolution in the American 
Wests [Source: Foote et al. 1994] 
selected transplant from one or more source  
regions; never a complete cross-section of the  
older society; experimental adaption of imported 
cultural traits to new environment. 
STAGE 
regional culture; new amalgam of people, forming 
cohesive society, adjusting to insularity and new 
environment; high potential for cultural lag and 
divergence.  
dissolution of historic regional culture; all areas 
directly exposed national culture; emergence of 
ethic mosaic and new innovative centers; new 
consciousness of local environmental and cultural 
values.  
strong impact of national culture; nationwide 
communications, marketing networks, and 
control of facilities diffuse national culture 
through central place network. Only 
subcultures with tenacious social patterns 
(religion, language, race) can persist as 
distinct.  
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transplant stage denotes for the initiation of immigration when bands of pioneers 
swarmed into the West. In the second stage, regional culture, settlers successfully 
adapted to the environment, and established six insular nuclei. These nuclei coming with 
“high potential for cultural lag and divergence” are actually cores of the six regions of 
Meinig’s American Wests. The development of these cores constitutes the cultural 
plurality in the regional culture stage. In the third stage, the regional cultures decline due 
to the impacts of national culture through the “central place network.” The national 
impact eventually brings “the end of insularity and local cultural identity and the onset 
of . . . national cultural uniformity” (Norton 2000, 119). In the fourth stage, the cultural 
integration results in the dissolution of historic regional culture; however simultaneously 
encourages the “emergence of ethnic mosaic and new innovative centers” (Meinig 1972, 
163). Overall, Meinig’s study focuses on the evolution of regional cultures rather than the 
landscape evolution in a cultural area. In other words, the study emphasizes on the 
geographical changes instead of changing geography. 
Parting from the idiographical narrative of cultural geography, Meinig’s study 
provides the theoretical latitude to yield nomothetic value through his model. The initial 
stage requires immigration. The immigrants develop specific ways of life through the 
process of environmental adaptation in the second stage. Although variant land use 
pattern and industries may come into being through time, they are theoretically still 
human adaptations to the environmental and cultural change. Successful adaptations 
would enable the settlement to endure outside challenges, which in Meinig’s study are the 
impacts of national culture. These challenges may lead the cultures into demise, or may 
well reinforce them due to the defense against variant threats. The persistence of a 
cultural landscape thus relies on the constant reinforcement and the successful adaptation; 
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whereby the formative process of this stage somehow resembles in the repetitive cycle of 
the Frontier Thesis. In Meinig’s model, the regional culture eventually diminishes in the 
last stage due to the impact of national popular culture, and the decline subsequently 
beckons the dissolution of the cultural regions. Nonetheless, such dissolution refers to the 
collapse of the core-domain-sphere structure of a culture region but to the demise of 
regional cultures. Even though cultural regions collapse, regional cultures remain at the 
core areas, and some even would reversely diffuse outward through the national network 
of popular culture. Such diffusion forms a cultural mosaic nationwide, and may well 
further popularize regional cultures to constitute a “patchwork quilt” (Clark and Tsai 
2002, 423) of the regional and national culture. 
2.1.3  The Homeland Concept 
After the cultural regions dissolve and their domains and spheres demise, a cultural 
region core by itself has little meaning. Also, without research focus on diffusion, a 
cultural hearth is less significant. When the two concepts decline, the homeland thesis 
fills in their place in the geographical discourse of place evolution. While the local 
cultures become parts of a national culture, each of them is still distinguishable. They 
point back to their origins, and sustain these places as sanctuaries for people practicing 
the culture. Based on the geographical association, Nostrand conceives the homeland 
thesis to interpret the evolution of cultural geography in particular places, and seeks to 
re-visit the humanistic dimension in cultural geography—viewing place as a locale where 
a group of people imbue their affections. The overtones are manifest in Nostrand’s 
definition of homeland (1992, 214): 
The people must have lived in a place long enough to have adjusted to its natural 
environment and to have left their impress in the form of a cultural landscape. And 
from their interactions with the natural and cultural totality of the place they must 
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have developed an identity with the land—emotional feelings of attachment, desire 
to possess, even compulsion to defend. 
Similar to the Vidalian concept of geographical personality, the homeland thesis also 
requires human interaction with a place through time. The environmental adjustments, in 
a form of palimpsest leaving marks on the ground as the people’s landscape impress, also 
correspond to the concept of sequent occupance but without a deterministic sequence. 
The thesis innovatively treats daily landscapes as the embodied local culture, and 
considers that the collective identity of the residents greatly hinges on them. As such, in 
additional to the functionality of daily use, these landscapes consist of symbolic meaning 
of the place and of the group of people. In this case of the homeland when a cultural 
landscape is under threat, so is the collective self of the people, to defend the landscape is 
then a matter of course. Nostrand and Estaville propose five homeland ingredients 
(people, place, bonding with place, control of place, and time) and consider bonding with 
place as the key to spur the defense mechanism against outside challenges (2001, xix): 
The tie [bonding with place] happens when a people adjust to the natural 
environment, stamp the environment with their cultural impress, and from both the 
natural environment and the cultural landscape create a deep sense of place. 
According to the definition, cultural impress refers to human creation capable of 
triggering the intangible sense of place among the cultural group and stimulating a sense 
of bonding. Beyond the connection, Nostrand and Estaville move further and affirm a 
reciprocal relationship between culture landscape and a cultural group (2001, xx): 
Bonding with place thus means that a people shape the area with their culture, and 
the area in turns shapes them: Feeling of attachment and belonging develop. If 
threatened, desire to possess becomes compulsion to defend. 
The idealistic view of homeland, its emphasis on senses, feelings and attachments, allows 
the thesis to move beyond essential regions and tangible traits, and resorts to a form of 
topophilia (Tuan 1974, 4). Consequently, the homeland concept comprises an idealistic 
connotation, inasmuch as the constitution of a homeland depends upon the psychological 
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factors. The defensive compulsion arises when the cultural group encounters outside 
challenges. To defend is to retain the control of place. Successful defense not only 
survives the culture but also revives cultural identity, and furthermore makes the culture 
persist through time by the reinforced self-consciousness (Jordan-Bychkov 2001). As in 
fact bonding with place is often latent and impalpable until the defensive measures—as 
the intensive cultural expressive practice—are taken against outside challenges, I propose 
that only in the struggles can a homeland, constituted by the five homeland ingredients, 
realistically emerge: A people defend their cultural landscape to maintain its control over 
time. The defensive action sustains a homeland from assimilation; substantiates bonding 
with place from intangible sense of place, feelings and attachments; and retains control of 
place in the process of negotiation. In this regard, repetitive defense is key to homeland 
constitution, and ultimately, it is such constant negotiations with Others that persist a 
homeland. As Turner (1920) proposed that the repetitive adaptation to the remote 
frontiers is key to culture formation of the Euro-American immigrant society, the 
repetitive outside challenges are also critical to homeland formation. In a marginal island 
like Quemoy its place formation heavily relies on the situational repetition through 
collective performance of environmental adaptation and defense against assimilation. 
This chapter presents Quemoy as a homeland to substantiate my proposal of 
homeland formation through the constant negotiation. The conflicts between the maritime 
powers and the Chinese Empire in Southern Fukien articulate the contest between the 
nation and the region. As the regional conflicts recur over time, the external challenges 
and the negotiations with the empire repeatedly appear in the regional coastal frontier, 
and further strengthen the identity of Quemoy as a border island. Negotiation, aroused by 
the imperial construction of Quemoy into an exclusive military bastion, repeats similar 
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life experience among different generations. The cycles of negotiations unfold how the 
defensive mechanism turns Quemoy from a coastal island into a homeland. The dispute 
originates from the different views of Quemoy, of which empire saw a vulnerable point of 
military defense, but people in the region used it as a major gateway to overseas foreign 
lands. Although the two conflicting parties read the place identity of Quemoy differently, 
both of the identities stem from the same geographical settings and the historical context. 
As the geographical personality has greatly influences on the development of Quemoy’s 
place identities, a discussion on the homeland formation of Quemoy necessitates a review 
of its geographical biogeography in terms of landscape evolution.  
2.1.4  The Four Evolutionary Stages of the Landscape in Quemoy 
Based on former theories of cultural regions’ evolution and homeland formation, I 
propose four stages of homeland evolution in Quemoy. As recognized by cultural and 
historical geographers, the first two stages are the initial peopling stage and the second 
environmental adaptation stage. At the end of environmental adjustment stage, the 
immigrant society has largely left the subsistence production behind through successful 
environmental adaptations. With the establishment of a functioning settlement, the 
society proceeds and eventually faces challenges from outside. To cope with these 
exterior challenges of territorialization, which bring the society into the social struggles 
with others, the people create their cultural symbols in the landscapes, or attach meanings 
to the ordinary landscapes. The third stage therefore, as identified in the homeland thesis, 
is the landscape impress stage. Successful defense against outside challenges not only 
sustains the culture but also reinforces and may diffuse it outward. With the repetitive 
success, the residents transform the place into their homeland. Its establishment in 
Quemoy brings forward the last cultural diffusion stage, and the major struggle of the 
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society turns into the cultural one. The diffusion of homeland culture does not proceed as 
a one-way exportation but a bidirectional cultural exchange between Quemoy and the 
migrant societies. Meanwhile, modernization facilitates the spread of national culture to 
individuals at home, and also impinges on the local culture. The outcome of the exchange 
shows in the landscape in a cultural mosaic as Meinig noticed in the last stage of his 
regional evolution model. The cultural hybridity then represents the latest stage of 
homeland evolution. 
The fact that the culture in an immigrants’ homeland, like Quemoy, is heterogeneous 
rather than homogeneous is surprisingly refreshing whereas the concept of a cultural 
hearth being the origin of cultural diffusion and the scheme of cultural core being the 
typical representation of a cultural group both suggest their cultural purity and intensity. 
Accounting for another conceptional characteristic, it is noticeable that the homeland 
evolution does not proceed in a linear progress with one stage following another as 
sequent occupance suggests, but in a complex manner with one or more happening at the 
same time. Immigration should serve as a pertinent example: Immigrants continuously 
enter Quemoy from the mainland after the initial peopling stage. The latter immigrant 
groups could come with their own cultural baggage and different ways of life, which 
trigger additional environmental adaptations, and sequentially create new cultural 
landscapes. This is to say the homeland evolution is a continuous dynamic process with 
different major struggles in each stage. The merit of clarifying evolutionary stages rests in 
the identification of major struggles but not of each stage per se. Although immigrants 
might face, for instance, the cultural and economic struggles at the same time, for early 
immigrants the economic ones are the major concern for their society. Such is the case of 
the Quemoy migrants in their colonies, while the pidgin culture they import to Quemoy 
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plays a part in the cultural struggle at home. Based on the fact that different milieus could 
lay weights on respective struggles, cultural evolution eventually hinges upon the 
co-evolution of environment and social system that constitute the milieus. 
2.2 Prehistoric Cultures: Oyster Eaters on the Waterfront 
The earliest Human traces in Quemoy date eight thousand years ago. According to 
the latest archaeological survey, there are four major Neolithic sites in Quemoy (Chen, 
Liu, and Lang 2001; Figure 2.2). Among them, Fukuotun 復國墩 and Jingueishan sites 
belong to Fu-kuo-tun culture (6000-3800 BCE), and Pubian 浦邊 and Houfenggang 后
豐港 sites belong to the Pubian type (2000-1500 BCE) of Tanshishan 曇石山 culture 
which originated in the Min River 閩江 estuary in northeastern Fukien. Archeologists 
have found sizable prehistoric oyster shell middens in these sites (Chen 1997; Chen W. 
1999; Kuo, Liu, and Dai 2005; Figure 2.3). Inferring from these remains that the people 
practiced a “maritime hunter-gatherer culture” without agricultural activities (Chen 1997, 
1998; Chen W. 1999; Kuo, Liu, and Dai 2005). Chen (1998; 1999) considered the group 
of prehistoric people in Quemoy among the “sea nomads” on the southeast coast of China. 
Kuo and Liu (2006) defines the time of Fukuotun culture as the early phase of prehistoric 
Quemoy, and the time of the Pubian type as the latter phase of prehistoric Quemoy. The 
human activities between the early and the latter phases (3800-2000 BCE) and between 
the end of the latter phase and the beginning of the historical era (1500 BCE-319 CE) 
remain unknown. None of the artifacts from the four prehistoric sites could provide 
information about the two gaps. 
2.2.1  The Prehistoric Sea Nomads in Quemoy 
Shell middens sites of the sea nomads are distributed over southeast Chinese 
seaboards and islands. Their widespread geographical distribution marks the territory of 
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Houjiang Bay 
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Fuigure 2.2. The Distribution of Neolithic sites in Quemoy. The four sites are all 
located in the favorable habitats of sea nomads, including estuaries, sandy beaches, 
and mangrove-covered coastal mud flats. The two sites belonging to Fukuotun culture 
are found on waterfront hills along the estuary and the cove. The other two of Pubian 
period are located on the flats behind the seafront sand dunes adjacent to muddy 
beaches. Although there are also sea nomad sites in Leiyu, this study limits its scope in 
Quemoy only. [Map remade from: Chen et al. 2001]  
Taihu Lake. 
Not in Scale 
Figure 2.3. The Jinguishan 
Shell Midden Site. The shell 
middens mainly consist of 
oyster shells. Archeologists 
also find stone tools, pottery 
shreds, and small animals’ 
bones. They consider these 
sites belong to a “maritime 
hunter-gatherer culture” 
without agricultural activities 
(Chen 1997; Kuo, Liu, and Dai 
2005). [Source: Chen 2006] 
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the sea nomads and also proves their seafaring skill. Their far-flung distribution suggests 
that sea nomads did not belong to a single archaeological culture but different cultural 
groups practicing similar life styles. Chen identifies four characteristics of the 
shell-midden sites in the Southeast China, which could also be used as criteria to identify 
sites belonging to the sea nomads (1999, 52):  
1. Most sites are located on the terraces alongside estuaries, or on the slopes of small 
crescent islands. 
2. Most sites are small and have only thin cultural strata, suggesting short duration 
[occupation] and possible seasonality of settlement. 
3. Livelihood depends mainly on fishing and gathering shellfish, with hunting of 
small animals. 
4. No shell midden sites in Fujian or Guangdong show any signs of agriculture. 
Chen found shell midden sites in Quemoy that fit all the criteria, and identified all of 
them belonging to the sea nomads. In addition, the shell-midden deposits of Jingueishan 
金龜山 site suggest a migratory life: “The site has only one cultural layer. This stratum 
spans 4,000 years in one meter from its lower level to its upper level, indicating the 
short-term settlement pattern of the sea nomads” (Chen C. 1999, 6). The deposits reveal 
an amphibious life style that sea nomads were not always on the sea, but would at least 
periodically stay on land when they made shell middens. Even though their livelihood 
mainly relied on the sea resources, they “cannot be completely divorced from terrestrial 
resources, and . . . cannot completely separate themselves from the inhabitants on 
land . . .” (Chen 2002, 52). In other words, they would maintain a “mutually beneficial 
symbiosis” with semi-nomadic and land-dwelling people (Chen C. 1999; Sopher 1977). 
These traits suggest two life patterns of the sea nomads. First, the sea nomads could 
customarily migrate on familiar routes in a diachronic timeframe since the shell midden 
deposits of the Jingueishan site disclose an intermittent usage of the place for 4,000 years. 
They might visit Quemoy periodically. Second, since all prehistoric sites in Quemoy 
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belong to sea nomads, there must have been some land-dwelling peoples living along the 
migratory route who exchanged necessities with the sea nomads (Yang 1990). Through 
contact with these land-dwelling peoples, the sea nomads, by their widespread 
geographical distribution, simultaneously played a role of cultural transmitters on the 
southeast coast of China (Chen C. 1999; 2002). Chen considered that the migration of 
these cultural transmitters might explain the complicated cultural patterns of the Neolithic 
sites in this area (2002, 53):  
In-depth investigation of the pottery, stone tools, jades and other artefacts of these 
Neolithic cultures show [that] there is both unity among diversity and diversity 
among unity. All apparently have close relationships but do not belong to a single 
cultural phenomenon. 
Chen attributes the cultural mixture to the outcome of the sea nomads’ cultural 
transmission: “Their free transmissions interrupted the hypothetical rules of cultural 
boundaries . . . and made it hard for them [archaeologists] to agree upon the sequence of 
these southern coastal Neolithic culture of China” (2002, 53). The marine peoples thus 
contribute to an important linkage between the archaeological cultures in the region. 
2.2.2  The Sea Nomands’ Hybrid Culture in Quemoy 
Kuo and Liu (2006) speculate that the sea-level change might be responsible for the 
end of Fukuotun culture and the first gap. According to the geological research, sea level 
rose ten meters every thousand years until 6,000 years ago during the time of Fukutun 
culture. In the succeeding period (4000-2500 BCE), the maximum sea level reached 
about 2.4 meters higher than today (Rolett, Jiao, and Lin 2002). After a short recession, 
another marine transgression during 2000-1500 BCE caused the sea level to rise 2.3 
meters higher than at present (Kuo and Liu 2006). The sea-level change, in terms of 
cycles of marine transgressions and regressions, might erode the early Neolithic relics on 
the lowlands and caused the first gap, which was why both the sites of Fukutun culture 
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were on hills. Otherwise, the gap could simply mean that the people of Fukutun culture 
left Quemoy. In that case, marine transgressions, which reduced their habitat or changed 
the environment into an unfavorable setting, would encourage their migration. Despite all 
the uncertainty, what could be sure was that the marine transgression coincided with the 
end of the archaeologically documented culture in Quemoy and the outset of Tapenkeng 
大坌坑 culture in Taiwan about 6,000 years ago. 
Although the sea level changes might cause the end of Quemoy’s early prehistoric 
phase, nonetheless the following marine transgression (2000-1500 BCE) could be the 
incentive for a new wave of immigrants to Quemoy. As identified by Kuo and Liu (2006), 
the archaeological culture of Pu-bian type is closely related to the culture of 
Chuangpianshan 庄邊山 upper strata phase—a successive type of Tanshishan 
culture—on the estuary of the Min River in the northern Fukien. Notwithstanding, the 
artifacts assemblage also shows characteristics of the archaeological culture of Paojinwan 
寶鏡灣 site on the estuary of the Pearl River 珠江 in Canton (a.k.a. Guangdong 廣東; 
Figure 2.4) Kuo and Liu provides an explanation for the phenomenon of cultural 
hybridity, which Chen, as mentioned before, considers as the contribution of sea nomads, 
(Kuo and Liu 2006, 193):  
The relics of Pu-bian type in Quemoy should attribute to the small-scale 
immigration of the prehistoric people of the Chuang-pian-shan upper strata phase. 
The reason urging these people to immigrate possibly has to do with the sea 
transgression concomitant with a reduction of their habitats. . . . By the time, a few 
prehistoric people from the estuary of the Pearl River might also immigrate to 
Quemoy. They live with the people of the Chuang-pian-shan upper strata phase from 
the estuary of the Min River, and the two peoples together develop the distinct 
culture of Pu-bian type in Quemoy. 
The Pubian type archaeological evidence in Quemoy suggests a cultural mixture by two 
bands of sea nomads. Their migration validates the early traffic alongside the southeast 
coast of China which, as Bellwood (1995) claims, have already existed since 6,000 years 
50 
 
 
Figure 2.4. The Early Neolithic Cultures on the Southeast Coast of China and in 
Taiwan. The arrows indicate the cultural transmission among the four cultural 
spheres in the region—Dawan culture in Canton, Fukuotun culture in Fukein, 
Hemudu culture in Zhejiang, and Tapenkeng culture in Taiwan. Although the artifact 
assemblages in some sites of Tapenkeng culture show characters of Hemudu culture 
and Dawan culture, Fukuotun culture has the direct influence on the motif of the 
early Neolithic culture in Taiwan. The intricate exchange network in the strait also 
suggests a frequent marine traffic at this time in the southeast coast of China. [Map 
remade from: Kuo et al. 2005] 
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Table 2.1.  The Chronologies of Neolithic Cultures in the Early Prehistoric Quemoy 
[Source: Kuo, Liu, and Dai 2005] 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2.  The Chronologies of Neolithic Cultures in the Latter Prehistoric Quemoy 
[Source: Kuo and Liu 2006] 
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ago “amongst the hundreds of small islands which flank the coasts of Zhejiang [浙江] 
and Fujian Provinces . . . if the Austronesians ever required a maritime ‘nursery’, it might 
have been here” (104). Rolett, Guo, and Jiao (2007) reports that the volcanic adzes found 
in the Neolithic sites in Taiwan are actually made in and transported from Pescadores 
archipelago in the Taiwan Strait (Figure 2.3). By the exchange networks, he then affirms 
that the “systematic open-sea voyaging” between Pescadores archipelago and Taiwan 
“began at least 4000 years ago” (Rolett, Guo, and Jiao 2007, 275). Lapteff (2006) 
considers that the archaeological cultures in Fukien has direct influences on Jōmon 
culture in Japan since its early period (4500-3000 BCE, or ca. 5300-3600 BCE) through 
“direct cross-cultural contact or migrations” (Lapteff 2006, 258). And “the migration [is] 
limited to some convenient sea bridges, like Fujian-Taiwan” (Lapteff 2006, 262). As early 
as the time indicated by Bellwood and Lapteff, the only archaeological culture in Fukien 
was the Fukuotun culture, and sea nomads were the cultural transmitters. They perfected 
their seafaring skill by voyaging along the southeast coast of China for thousands of years, 
and then traversed the 140-km Taiwan Strait at the latest 6,000 years ago. As late as 4,000 
years ago, the cross-strait voyages had become regular and systematic and supplied the 
volcanic stone adzes to Taiwan. The relatively frequent marine traffic across the strait and 
along the southeast coast of China thus rendered Quemoy, sitting at the traffic intersection, 
one of the major entrepots of the continental archeological cultures, and consequently a 
place with cultural mixture. 
As it might be evident, prehistoric Quemoy achieved such cultural hybridity due to 
its geographic location. The mouth of Jiulong River and Xiamen Bay providing favorable 
habitats for sea nomads with estuaries, sandy beaches, and mangrove-covered coastal 
mud flats on numerous islands (Sopher 1977), has attract the people of Fukuotun to settle 
53 
in Quemoy. Its close distance to Taiwan with Pescadores archipelago as the midway point 
constitutes a convenient sea bridge for migration. The median position on the coastal line 
of southeast China between Zhejiang and Canton makes Quemoy an essential point on 
the migration route ascending or descending along the coast. All these geographical 
characteristics suggest Quemoy was the sea nomads’ traffic node in the southest coast of 
China, and consequently brought cultural hybridity to the island. 
2.3 Origin Myth: The Northern Elite? 
Although the prehistoric archaeological cultures in Quemoy hold noticeable 
significance in anthropology (see Appendix A), the current inhabitants in Quemoy 
seemingly have difficulty relating themselves to these findings. Since the discovery of 
these prehistoric sites in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the local government 
and commoners together have made only limited efforts to preserve these prehistoric sites. 
The Fukuotun site, for example, is desolate.7 Residents in Quemoy commonly identify 
themselves with the Han Chinese, and do not conceive themselves as genealogically 
related to these indigenous populations. However, the understanding is a socially 
constructed misconception because the indigenous peoples in Fukien have endeavored to 
conceal their indigenous origin for nearly 2,000 years (Chen 2006). The objective of the 
social practice was for the indigenous people to attain social and cultural equality in the 
Chinese society. There is a continuum of the indigenous settlement in the coastal Fukien 
since the prehistoric era till the turn of the last century, and the indigenous people belong 
to the cultural ethnicity of the sea nomads. Due to the inclination to eradicate relations to 
                                                 
7 When I carried out my fieldwork in the summer of 2010, villagers told me that the site was located 
behind the ancestor hall of Guan 關 clan. However, the path to the site was covered by thick grasses and 
the site was therefore inaccessible. Notwithstanding, during the winter when the grasses wither, or in the 
mid-spring after the locals enter the area for a pilgrimage to their ancestors’ graves on the annual tomb 
scrub day, the site would be in the villagers’ view. 
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the indigenous people, only a few in Fukien today would identify themselves with 
indigenous populations. Although the ancestor worship weighs heavily in their religious 
life, commoners in Quemoy treat the prehistoric sites as the landscape of Others. 
2.3.1  The Problem of the Genesis of Quemoy 
Likewise, the local members of the educated class share a similar neglect. In the 
latest official history of Quemoy, the sixteen-volume Gazetteer of Quemoy (2010) 
devotes only three pages to prehistory, while it repeatedly states that Han Chinese 
emigrants from northern China established the first settlement in Quemoy in 282 or 317. 
The assertion arbitrarily overlooks the fact that long before such migration became 
possible, indigenous populations prospered in this region. Although the historians may 
merely parrot clichés in the previous gazetteers, the assertion reveals the traditional 
Han-centric perspective of the Chinese intellectuals. Nonetheless, it is intriguing that 
when archeological discoveries abundantly document indigenous settlements in 
prehistoric Quemoy, the well-informed committee tenaciously maintains a problematic 
statement offered by early historiographers nearly two-hundred years ago.8 The 
presumption of Quemoy’s genesis and the neglect of prehistoric Quemoy are two sides of 
the same coin. They cannot simply attribute to the limit of the craft of historiography. The 
central problem of the proposition of Quemoy’s genesis hinges on the cultural inclination 
toward ethnicities that Quemoy people identify with. 
                                                 
8 Certainly, one may argue that the great division between history and archaeology can prompt the 
abbreviation of the discussion on prehistoric Quemoy in the gazetteer: historians can only speak on textual 
records but not on artifact assemblages. However, the argument is not necessary true as many monographs 
of regional history, including some of Quemoy, start with pertinent discussions on the regional prehistoric 
sites and the archaeological findings (e.g. Lee 2005; Shi and Xu 2007; Tang 1995; Xie, Yang, and Wang 
2003; Zhu 1985). And even if the argument prevails, it still does not explain why the far-fetched genesis of 
Quemoy by Han Chinese is dogmatically maintained. The presumption of Quemoy’s genesis and the 
neglect of prehistoric Quemoy are two sides of the same coin. They cannot simply attribute to the limit of 
the craft of historiography. 
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2.3.2  Two Historical Discourses of Quemoy’s Origin 
The presumption originally derives from two historic records—one regarding the 
establishment of Jinan County 晉安郡 in 282 and the other about the Wuhu Chaos 五胡
亂華 during the years 304-316. Under current historians’ scrutiny, neither incident in the 
records can substantiate the presumption of Quemoy’s genesis. In 282, the Chinese 
administration of Jin Dynasty 晉代 established Jinan County which covered half of the 
current Fukien Province, mainly the seaboard and the southwest hilly areas. The 
establishment indicated a growth of Han population in the county and the political 
expansion of Han Chinese to southern Fukien. However, in terms of regional 
development, the establishment of this county remained nominally at the level that 
marked a large tract of land on the map for administrative purposes, but did not signify a 
full exercise of dominion or wide spread occupancy of Han Chinese in the region. In fact, 
Han Chinese at this time only controlled a small part of this territory, and the vast land of 
Fukien largely remained in the hand of indigenous peoples. Using the county 
establishment to date the genesis of Quemoy was therefore problematic (Xie, Yang, and 
Wang 2003, 12): 
In fact, before Tang Dynasty [618-907] only the Min River Delta, the northern 
Fukien corridor [the Min River Valley], and the Jin River Delta 晉江 had been 
preliminarily developed [by Han Chinese]. Areas that the power of Han Chinese 
could reach . . . were only limited to the capital cities of prefectures, the county seats, 
the town centers, as well as the corridors along the major traffic lines. Territory out 
of these areas was almost undeveloped or only with very limited development. 
Remote islands like Quemoy and Leiyu were either treated as barbarian land or even 
unknown to the administration at the time. As a result, the issue regarding which 
prefecture or county that Quemoy islands belonged to by this time was actually 
irrelevant. 
In other words, although Quemoy was in Jinan County, historians did not interpret the 
county establishment as an indication that Han Chinese had already settled in, or even 
known about, this remote island. 
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The other record in the gazetteer incongruously indicated that the first Han 
settlement in Quemoy occurred in 317. In the third volume of Gazetteer of Quemoy 
(2010), the section “Genesis of Quemoy People” provided a complete version of the 
record (Huang et al. 2010, 39): 
When Wuhu Chaos happened in the Jin Dynasty, Central Plain [in the mid and lower 
Yellow River basin] was under turbulence. The righteous people following the 
imperial court of Jin emigrated southward. Six clans—Su, Chen, Wu, Tsai, Lu, and 
Yan—fled to and resettled in Wuzhou [the toponym of Quemoy before 1386]. This 
was the beginning of settlement in Quemoy. 晉，五胡亂華，中原紛擾，義民隨晉
室南渡，逃居浯洲者六姓，曰蘇、陳、吳、蔡、呂、顏，金門之有居民，實自
此始。 
Wuhu Chaos was a nomadic invasion during the years 304-316. Northern nomads crossed 
the Great Wall, and established their regimes in northern China. Following the invasion, 
Tan (2000) estimated that approximate 900,000 people, equivalent to one eighth of the 
population in the northern China, moved southward during 304-317. After Han Chinese 
established a new regime, Eastern Jin 東晉, in southern China, immigrants from the 
northern China constituted one sixth of its population. These immigrants mainly, if not all, 
resettled in the immigrant prefectures in the Yangtze Basin and the Huai River 淮河 
Basin. Also, the northern border of Eastern Jin was generally demarcated in the two 
regions. Fukien was located far beyond the northern border, being surrounded by 
mountains with only a few land routes to communicate with neighboring lands. In 
addition, indigenous peoples, occupying the Fukien territory, often conflicted with Han 
pioneers over the control of Fukien at this time (Chen 2006). The geographical condition 
and the social milieu rendered Fukien a foreign land with dangerous environment and 
unfriendly population. As a result, Fukien at the time was an unlikely destination for the 
northern refugees. In fact, the Eastern Jin regime had not established any immigrant 
prefectures and counties in Fukien. By their geographical distribution, Xie, Yang, and 
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Wang (2003) took the exclusion of Fukien as a proof that Fukien did not accommodate, at 
least, a great amount of refugees after Wuhu Chaos. Without the migration waves taking 
place, the contemporary historians were unable to establish the relationship between 
Wuhu Chaos and the regional development of Fukien, which in its due course would lead 
to the establishment of permanent Han settlement in Qemoy. Xie, Yang and Wang futher 
clarified that the presumed relationship actually originated from a theory of the genesis of 
Fukien—Eight Clans into Min 八姓入閩—from the book History of Nine Kingdoms 九
國志 (2003, 12):  
In the second year of Youngjia period [308], the Central Plain was under turbulence. 
Eight clans of the gentry class—Lin, Huang, Chen, Zhen, Zhan, Qiu, He, Hu—were 
the first [Han] group entering Min [the ancient name of Fukien before 733]. 永嘉二
年，中州板蕩，衣冠始入閩者八族，林、黃、陳、鄭、詹、丘、何、胡是也。 
However, Xie, Yang, and Wang (2003) considered that even the theory was fictional, but 
just so well-known that the latter-day historiographers took the theory for granted. The 
late discovery of tombs from the Jin Dynasty produced a rebuttal to the prevailing theory. 
According to the dates on these tombs, Han Chinese had already immigrated to Fukien in 
a constant and small-scale fashion. The immigration continued throughout the East Jin 
Dynasty (317-410), and directly contributed to the growth of Han population in Fukien 
(Chen 2006). These Han immigrants mainly resettled in the areas with preliminary 
development, i.e. the Min River Basin and the Jin River Delta, where the tombs had been 
found. The tomb owners ranged over all social tiers, and were not limited to the gentry 
class, and their family did not necessarily belong to the eight clans mentioned in the 
theory (Tang 1995; Chen 2006).  
Although the theory of immigration was not literally correct, small-scale 
immigration did coincide with the gradual population growth of Han Chinese in Fukien 
since the turn of the fourth century. It was also at this time that Han settlers initiatively 
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entered the southern Fukien, in which their settlements mainly concentrated in the Jin 
River Delta. Due to the initial phase of development, the allegation, suggesting that a 
considerable amount of war refugees from the northern China had resettled in a remote 
and not particularly resourceful island like Quemoy, was hardly convincible. Besides, if 
Han Chinese first entered Fukien in 308 due to Wuhu chaos, the previous record, 
indicating the year of 282 as the establishment date of the first Han settlement in Quemoy, 
would simply be wrong. The establishment of the first Han settlement in Quemoy could 
not precede the one of Fukien. And if the theory of Fukien genesis was correct, the 
discrepancy in the immigrated clans, in terms of the eight clans to Fukien versus the six 
clans to Quemoy, would provoke even more suspicions over the second record of 
Quemoy genesis. 
2.3.3  The Alleged Evidences of Quemoy Genesis 
Some of the local historians in Quemoy noticed that the two textual records were at 
odds with each other, and the discrepancy between them and the theory of Fukien genesis 
generated even more uncertainties. To consolidate their view, they supplied another lead 
to complement the two records. In 1955 when the Nationalist troops under bombardment 
constructed defenses in Quemoy, they excavated a brick from the Xiancuo 賢厝 village 
(Kuo 2006a). It was described as a rhomb-shape solid with geometrical inscriptions on 
the narrow sides. One serviceman made a few rubbings of the geometric inscriptions, and 
sent them in a letter to his father, a museum curator in Taiwan. The curator wrote a 
review on the brick and dated it between 197-618. The review was then broadly cited in 
the official history of Quemoy but in a manipulated way that the purposely omitted an 
incongruent opinion in the quotation (e.g. Huang et al. 2010, 39; Kuo 2006a, 13; Kuo 
2006b, 63; Kuo 2007, 353). The review indicated that after the serviceman and his crew 
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found the first brick, they sequentially discovered similar bricks in the foundations of the 
folk houses and the surrounding stone hedges. Villagers told the serviceman that these 
bricks were brought back from the mainland China. Although the curator did not agree 
with the opinion, he included the local beliefs in his review (Zhuang 1958, 356):  
There might be ancient relics underground. The inhabitants’ opinion that these 
bricks were from the mainland was unnecessarily credible. When a scientific 
excavation could be carried out, I could assure that the findings, if any, must be 
significant to the Southeast culture. 想地下或有古人遺跡，居民所告甎係移自大
陸未必可信也。何時可從事學術發掘，倘有所獲，定與東南文化大有關係，可
斷言也。[emphasis added; indicating the omitted sentence] 
When the editors of Quemoy gazetteers extracted this passage, they intentionally omitted 
the sentence indicating the inhabitants’ opinion, and thus concealed one possible origin of 
the brick. The manipulation to supply a historic evidence for the Quemoy genesis further 
problematized the historic discourse. Since the villagers understood that these bricks were 
foreign objects, the manipulation was then projected for Others outside the social circle 
of Quemoy. Besides, not only the first brick but also those in the nearby village were 
missing from Quemoy today. Huang (pers. comm.) speculates that all of them must have 
been shipped to the curator in Taiwan so that he could examine them closely to make the 
identification. However, the curator stated in his review that his appraisal was merely 
based on the rubbings. As a result, this discovery of material evidence concerning the 
Quemoy genesis is unverifiable. 
The problems regarding the three “evidences” of Quemoy genesis can go on and on, 
if one scrutinizes them even further. However, the bottom line is that no sound evidence 
sustains the thesis, but also none absolutely denies it. Some historians, Xie, Yang, and 
Wang (2003), for example, consider that it is rather impossible that Han refugees would 
travel this far to an island like Quemoy, when they actually can find favorable habitats in 
the Yangtze River Basin that is much closer to their original settlements. The 
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establishment of immigrant prefectures and counties in the Yangtze River Basin 
substantiates this view. Nevertheless, historians also cannot rule out the possibility that 
sporadic Han immigrants ended up in Quemoy without historical records. The 
inconclusiveness reveals a void that needs to be filled with new historic and 
archaeological discovery, without which all claims about Quemoy’s genesis suffer. 
Consequently, the prehistoric Quemoy may extend, from 1500 BCE, further into a latter 
period, since the historical time of Quemoy have not begun from 282 or 317. 
2.3.4  The Non-Han Populations in Fukien 
In recently years, some local historians when discussing the development of 
Quemoy have mentioned the non-Han ethnicities in Fukien (e.g. Huang et al. 2010; Lee 
2005; Luo 2010). The ethnicity that they often mention is Yue 越, which is a term that 
the ancient Han Chinese commonly used to refer to all the indigenous populations living 
in the current day southern China. The term has a variation as Hundred Yue 百越 
(Meacham 1996). These peoples, as Meacham maintains, inhabited southern China 
between 1000 BCE-1000 CE.9 In history, the interaction of these indigenous peoples 
with Han Chinese was limited to their borderland, largely in the Yangtze River Basin. 
Before the third century BCE, the Han Chinese only acquired general knowledge about 
places beyond their borders. Without reliable historical records, attempts to define the 
geographical distribution of each ethnicity of Hundred Yue were often unproductive. As 
the southern Fukien was located in the hinterland of Hundred Yue, the geographical 
distance occasioned the epistemological unfamiliarity. A better understanding of the 
ethnography therein would accompany the Chinese political and military expansion into 
                                                 
9 Chinese historians usually report a much earlier appearance in the early Shang Dynasty 商代 ca. 1500 
BCE (Shi and Xu 2007). 
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the region. Before the expansion, the early Chinese records provided only dubious 
descriptions about the culture of these peoples who shared “common traits such as 
tattooing, short cropped hair, fighting abilities, adaptation to water environment” 
(Meacham 1996, 94). 
The Hundred Yues in Chinese History 
As late as the eighth century BCE (the beginning of Spring and Autumn 春秋
Period), Han Chinese had recognized the indigenous people in Fukien as Seven Min 七
閩. The name might stand for the seven tribes paying tribute to kings of the Zhou 
Dynasty 周代. In the early fifth century BCE, a group of Hundred Yue in the Yangtze 
Delta established the state of Yue, which by that time had grown formidable enough, 
letting the coeval Chinese warlords to concede its ruler the title of protector-general 霸 
(Brindley 2003, 10). The concession thereby ensured the Yue people a role in Chinese 
history. As late as the third century BCE, Min people in Fukien established their first 
state—Min Yue 閩越. The powerful state had served as an allied force to Chinese 
warlords during the revolution war against the Qin 秦 empire (Chen 2006). After their 
involvement in the Chinese political games, trace of Min people (Min Yue) then 
consistently appeared in Chinese history. The term “Min Yue” thenceforth stood for the 
group of Hundred Yue in Fukien. The term “Hundred Yue” first appeared in Chinese 
history and became a general term to name all Southerners on the Chinese mainland. 
Even with a general understanding of these peoples, the ancient Chinese knowledge of 
them was far too general to meet the current-day standards of ethnography. The 
recognition of their ethnicities was mainly a byproduct of the political and military 
pursuit for Han Chinese at this time, but nowhere near a systematic understanding of their 
culture (Meacham 1996).  
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The Archeological Cultures of Min Yue in Fukien 
Indigenous peoples lived in Fukien long before the Chinese were aware of their 
presence. Of the Yue “mega-culture,” Min people share common cultural traits with other 
groups of Hundred Yue, such as “the production of stamped geometric pottery, 
shouldered stone axe, and stepped adzes” (Meacham 1996, 6). Nevertheless, through 
analyses of the pottery typologies, decoration patterns, types of pottery stamps, late 
archaeological studies find this “Geometric Stamped Pottery Culture” in Fukien endemic 
and distinct (Kuo 2007; Kuo and Liu 2006; Wu 2002; Wu and Cao 2002). Tanshishan 
culture is the representative of this “Geometric Stamped Pottery Culture” in Fukien, 
which culminates in the Chuangpienshan upper strata phase (2200-1500 BCE), and 
diffuses to Quemoy forming the Pubien phase (2000-1500 BCE) as its variation. Wu 
(2002), by examining the cultivation tools of Tanshishan culture, concludes that the 
subsistence pattern of Min people is different from the one of Lungshanoid in the Yangtze 
Delta, who are famous for their sophisticated wet-rice cultivation, a legacy of Hemudu 
culture (6000-4000 BCE). Instead, the Min way of life, as shown by shell middens, relies 
on gathering marine resources and hunting small game, along with primitive horticultural 
activities (Wu 1997; 2002; Zhong 2005). According to Chen’s (1999) definition, the 
location of settlements and the subsistence pattern both characterize the Min culture as 
one of sea nomads. It belongs to Meacham’s category of “Yue Coastal Neolithic”—a term 
he invented “to highlight these archaeological cultures from those of the Lungshanoid” 
(1996, 96). The foraging livelihood was the cultural hallmark of sea nomads in the 
southeast coast of China, and remains to be the most prominent cultural trait of the Min 
people until 1200 BCE, when the sea nomad culture marched into the Bronze Age. 
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Chinese archaeologists (Wu 1997; Wu 2002; Wu and Cao 2002) generally agree that 
the metalwork is a foreign technology, which along with other cultural traits, such as 
burial customs of mound tombs, defused to Fukien primarily from the Yangtze River 
Delta. The cultural diffusion consequently brought a series of dramatic changes and even 
“Chinese characters” to the Min (Wu 2002). These changes signify the inception of a 
hybrid culture and the formation of Min Yue ethnicity before the third century BCE. The 
cultural interaction eventually diminishes the endemic quality of the Min culture (Kuo 
2007). The exchange of cultural traits with the Lungshanoid cultures turns into a cultural 
assimilation or even, as some proposed, Sinicization (Wu 2002; Wu and Cao 2002). 
However, the “Sinicization” has not thoroughly completed even now, especially when a 
boat-dwelling people in the southeast coast of China today are considered as the 
descendants of the Neolithic sea nomads (Chen 2002; Sopher 1977). 
Tan People: The Early Settlers in Quemoy? 
Chinese historians consider Tan 蜑 as the descendants of Min Yue (Chen 2006; Fu 
2007a; Li 2009; Ouyang 1998; Xu 1997). Informed by the genealogical discussion, two 
views between historians and archaeologists correspond with each other. Both agree that 
Min people are the ancestors of the Tan, who maintained the sea nomads’ culture. In 
history, the Tan originally consisted of the remnants of Min Yue after the annexation of 
their state by Han Chinese in 110 BCE. They spread all over the southeast coast of China, 
but mostly were active in the river estuaries and islands in their vicinities. Most of the 
Tan people spent all their lives aboard boats, while a few had straw huts atop platforms 
on the river banks. Their livelihood mainly relied on collecting marine resources, and, as 
Sopher points out, their way of life is distinguishable from the one of Han Chinese (1977, 
379-80):  
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Tan are an aboriginally primitive folk, later much acculturated but still subject to 
segregation and antipathy on account of their “un-Chinese” origin and “un-Chinese” 
way of life. One may infer most plausibly that their skill in swimming and diving 
and their boat-dwelling habit[s] were derived from nomadic strand and riverside 
collecting and fishing, which, in addition to collecting in the forest margins and 
mat-working, were their principal economic activities.  
Chinese, including assimilated peoples with indigenous origins, historically viewed Tan 
as uncivilized human animals of a pariah class. The view prevailed especially after the 
tenth century when population pressure in Fukien emerged. Thereafter, Chinese society 
customarily imposed unjust measures upon them: Land dwellers prohibited Tan people 
from owning land and deprived them of their rights to change class. The oppression, in 
the worst case, could lead to lynching till death, when occasionally land dwellers found 
Tan in their land. Due to their identical physiology, the land-dwelling people demanded 
Tan distinguishably mark themselves by following specific dress codes and using 
distinctive hair styles. The social injustice prevented their cultural fusion with Han 
Chinese, and consequently preserved their vernacular culture. Accordingly, the 
distinctness of their culture was partially an outcome of the thousand-year segregation 
from Chinese civil community. 
Due to the apartheid, the quarantined “marooned” communities of the Tan people 
became asylums for other fugitives banished from the Han Chinese society. Rebels 
suppressed by imperial forces, a Chinese emperor and his followers exiled by foreign 
conquerors, and defeated warlords and their troops during the revolutions all had been 
named as the ancestors of Tan in the history (Chen 1946). Due to their nomadic nature, 
the Tan society usually lacked organization (Ouyang 1998). However, with inclusion of 
these military-trained personnel, Tan, benefiting from their familiarity with water 
activities through everyday life, had grown into formidable maritime powers in specific 
historic moments since the fourth century, and participated in significant and massive 
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military operations of anti-governmental activities (Zheng 1999). Historians had reported 
their alliance with various Chinese forces in naval battles, and their engagement in the 
pirate activities and the oversea trading activities during peacetime. These records not 
only accentuated their power outside Chinese control, but also underscored their 
continuous influence on the coastal Fukien. 
Based on the studies of the sea nomads, there is clearly a spatial and temporal 
continuity to the existence of sea nomads in the coastal region of Fukien since prehistoric 
times (Table 2.3). These sea nomads, concomitant with the Chinese expansion, have been 
known by variant names—Seven Min, Min Yue, and Tan. Their archaeological cultural 
transplantation from the Min River Delta to Quemoy effects their sophisticated seafaring 
skill. With this cultural trait and nomadic lifestyle, their territory includes most of the 
coastal region of Fukien since prehistoric time. In the coastal region, the mouths of the 
Min River and the Jiulong River are the two favorable habitats for sea nomads (Sopher 
1977).10 Quemoy is located at the gateway of Xiamen Bay, one that the Jiulong River 
flows into, and was settled by the sea nomads in prehistoric time. Although no 
archaeological and historical evidence demonstrates that any sea nomads were active in 
Quemoy after the disappearance of Pubien phase, they are the most legitimate candidate 
for the early settlers in Quemoy before the Han Chinese claimed the island. 
According to a Chinese monograph of historical geography—Taiping Huanyu Ji 太
平寰宇記—written in the 980s (Wang 2007), when Quemoy was in the area of Zhuhai 
neighborhood 煮海里 in Tongan county 同安縣 (Yang B. 2010), the inhabitants in 
Quemoy at the time still lived as sea nomads: 
                                                 
10 Lin (2007) a Quemoy local in his late 40’s in 2010 reported that in his father’s childhood (the antebellum 
days) Tan people still anchored their boats in the Xiashu port 夏墅港 in the estuary of the Wujiang Creek, 
when they needed shopping or to repair their boats on shore.  
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Table 2.3.  A Summary of Archaeological and Historic Findings Related to Sea Nomads 
in Fukien [dates of archaeological sites after Pu-bein phase from: Guo and Wu, 2002] 
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The area of Zhuhai neighborhood includes four islands in the sea. A total of 
four-hundred some households live on these islands. There are no farmlands, and the 
livelihood of inhabitants relies on fishing and collecting shellfishes. 煮海里，一邊
在海中，有島嶼四所，計四百餘家居焉。無田疇，人以釣魚拾螺為業。 
Since the record does not name the ethnicity, the incumbent inhabitants in the record were 
not necessarily sea nomads. However, there was only a slim chance that Han immigrants 
from an agricultural civilization had adopted their prehistoric life pattern. In 
consideration of the impossibility of cultural atavism, I am prone to agree that sea 
nomads occupied Quemoy at the time. Aside from my speculation, the production pattern 
of fishing and foraging indicates a primitive condition of land use, meaning that even if 
Han Chinese had established settlements in or before the late tenth century, these 
settlements remained insignificant. In a view of cultural evolution, inasmuch as these 
settlers continued the cultural practice of sea nomads, their legacy persists and their 
culture endures. The progress of cultural evolution remains at a primitive stage. Under the 
circumstances, whether or not Han immigrants had established settlements before the late 
tenth century is irrelevant to the current inhabitants to have any essential significance in 
cultural formation or historical geography of Quemoy. As such, the prevailing insistence 
on the genesis of Han settlements in Quemoy around the turn of the forth century is 
essentially not a disputed issue in the realm of history, but rather a constructive one 
pertaining to the locals’ identity. 
2.3.5  Significance of the Discourse of Quemoy Genesis 
The people in Quemoy believe they are the descendants of Huang Di 黃帝, and they 
consider themselves with “no doubt” as Han Chinese (Huang et al. 2010).11 For them to 
                                                 
11 Huang Di is a mythological sage king in the Neolithic time who Han Chinese believe to be their 
common ancestor and the founder of Chinese civilization. His tomb in northern China has been worshipped 
for thousands of years. Although no archaeological relics from the Neolithic time have ever been found in 
the tomb, Chinese held it as the symbol of Chinese ethnicity. The place is significant to all Han Chinese, 
even in the absence of scientific confirmation. In contrast, the sea nomad relics in Quemoy are assembled 
and presented as scientific findings, but the inhabitants in Quemoy find it difficult to relate to themselves. 
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be Han Chinese, their ancestors had to be immigrants, because Fukien was originally a 
territory of indigenous people outside of Han Chinese domain. As the place defines the 
identity of its inhabitants, to establish a Han Chinese lineage, the place, too, had to be 
Sinicized as early as possible. Once the place has turned into a Chinese territory, 
thenceforward the successors can “naturally” be Han Chinese. The theory of “Eight Clans 
into Min” offers the earliest date of the migration of Han Chinese into Fukien, so it is 
indiscriminately adopted in historical gazetteers in Fukien. Besides, since the isolation of 
Tan and other indigenous peoples geographically confines the non-Han ethnicities to 
certain “marooned reservations” from the Chinese community, “Han” people in Fukien 
can therefore proclaim themselves as one of the “purest stock” of the Chinese race. With 
the production and the circulation of the knowledge through the gazetteers, prehistoric 
sites of indigenous people are treated as the landscape of unrelated, if not unwanted, 
Others. Under the circumstances, to relate oneself to the prehistoric Others and their 
relics one risks being “un-Chinese” with lineage of inferior ethnicities. An indigenous 
origin is therefore an unfavorable stigma that Quemoy people prefer to conceal, while the 
Han identity, which enables them to mingle in the Chinese community, is desirable for its 
cultural utility. The ethnic construction of a Han origin is a social exhibition for external 
audiences in the Chinese community, and the concealment of the villagers’ opinion on 
the antique bricks exemplifies such construction regardless of the local knowledge of the 
bricks as foreign objects. The constructive practice suggests a strategy that Quemoy 
intellectuals employ to negotiate with their fellow “Chinese” for the ethnicity of Quemoy 
people, and further to consolidate their Han identity. The continuous use of problematic 
historic records and the neglect of prehistoric sites in Quemoy then can be read as the 
outcome of Han-centrism working on Quemoy, both the land and its people. 
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The origin myth of Quemoy enunciates its marginality from the geographical and 
cultural center of China. The distance from the cultural center and the geographical 
characteristics of inaccessibility make Fukien a relatively late territory claimed by Han 
Chinese, in comparison to neighboring areas. As an offshore island in the southern Fukien, 
removed from its political and cultural center to the north, Quemoy is located on the edge 
of a marginal Chinese territory. Culturally speaking, the majority of people in the 
southern Fukien have been largely assimilated and, together with immigrants from the 
northern China, all have been considered as Han Chinese after the eleventh century. 
However, driven by the geographical marginality, Quemoy people later are still eager to 
telescope their perceptional distance to the Chinese cultural hearth. They have restlessly 
endeavored to demonstrate their “Chineseness” by using available testimonies of their 
history, genealogy, proficiency in Confucianism, and so on. On the other hand, because 
of the same marginality, one who resists the Chinese hegemony can also conveniently go 
behind its boundaries, pursuing enterprises, which Chinese elites deem unconventional 
and even obnoxious, such as overseas trading or piracy. The geographical marginality 
therefore sets the cultural motif of Quemoy. Both the practice of resistance and 
compliance to Chinese conventionality constitute the daily life of Quemoy people living 
in the outskirts of Chinese civilization. Their “Chinesenss” or none are two cards in a 
hand for them to play when either one is found proper to the situation, although, along 
with the process of assimilation, their non-Chineseness is embraced and compromised by 
Han Chinese as a regional sub-culture of “Han” in the southern Fukien. 
2.4 Sequent Occupance: Industrial Trials Leaving a Mark 
Development of the functioning settlement usually demands specific production 
modes to secure the economic base. In Quemoy, the first two historical local industries 
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were both state-owned enterprises supplying national consumption. They were horse 
ranches and saltworks. Horses and salt were both important resources for the Chinese 
regimes, which traditionally held state monopolizes on the two industries, and usually 
would set up specific agencies to administer them. 
2.4.1  Horses and Salt Industries in the Pre-modern China 
The significance of horses for pre-modern China largely stemmed from their use by 
the cavalry. The administration of horse breeding conventionally belonged to the 
department of military affairs. The most desirable situation was state pastureland in 
northwestern China, where the temperate dry climate created a suitable habitat. Otherwise, 
the establishment of official horse pastures elsewhere in China often signified the 
nomadic invasion in the northern territories. The establishment of official horse pasture in 
Fukien was specifically a remedy for the loss of northwestern pastureland. It was the first 
and the most short-lived effort to restore military horse populations. As Yu (2007), Ma 
(1984), and Nie (2006) reported, during the latter half of the eighth century, the horse 
shortage had forced the Chinese government to repeatedly expropriate private horses for 
its military. Even though the condition continued, the imperial providers did not establish 
horse ranches until 804, but acquired horses through international trade. The horse 
pastures in the central and southern China were often ephemeral due to disappointing 
reproduction rates, and the inevitable conflicts between ranching and farming. The horse 
pastures in Fukien during the time operated only for a year (804-805), and others did not 
last over fifteen years in central and southern China (Nie 2005). As a result, these efforts 
failed to remedy the horse shortage. According to the Gazetteer of Quemoy (Ni 2010), the 
significance of the ranching enterprise lay in its consequent influence on regional 
development. The government, in order to establish horse pastures, invested 
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infrastructure and manpower. These investments laid a foundation for further 
development in Quemoy.  
Salt on the other hand was an important revenue source for the Chinese regimes; 
therefore the authorities usually enforced strict control over its production and trade. 
Although Fukien was one of the regions in China capable of salt-producing, its salt 
industry in China had never been prominent. According to Wang and Lü (2008), both the 
scale of salt industry in Fukien and the amount of its production were the smallest among 
other salt-producing regions in China. In addition, due to Fukien’s geographical 
inaccessibility, the revenue of its salt industry, restrained by the transportation difficulties, 
was also the lowest. All these disadvantages made the industry in Fukien less important 
for the Chinese regimes. However, its insignificance granted the salt industry in Fukien 
more freedom from the imperial control than others. For example, the salt industry in 
Fukien was the first to adopt advanced evaporation production methods. Taking 
advantage of the climate with its high evaporation rate, the evaporation method was an 
invention and found widespread application in Fukien before modern times. Before 1299, 
six out of ten saltworks had adopted the advanced method, when salt industries in other 
provinces mandatorily followed the conventional method of boiling (Tang 1995). Wang 
and Lü (2008) considered that the adoption allowed the salt industry in Fukien to 
generate great surpluses, which consequently gave rise to rampant bootlegging activities 
and impacted official salt marketing in the region. The situation forced the imperial 
administration to lift its strict control over the salt production and trade, while 
concentrating on tax collection. Salt trade, freed from the state regulation, became an 
important economic base of the local society in Fukien. The privatization of the salt trade 
in Fukien signified a success in the environmental adaptation. In retrospect, the 
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environmental characteristics of Fukien provided suitable conditions for the people to 
discover and to perfect the evaporation method, while the social milieu of marginality 
enabled them to promote and to adopt the advanced technology. Taking advantages of 
both the natural settings and the social milieu, the locals then constituted a specific way 
of life to perpetuate their society. 
2.4.2  The Early Horse Industry in Quemoy 
The Gazetteer of Quemoy views the establishment of the national horse ranches in 
Quemoy as the inception of a functioning and permanent Han settlement in Quemoy. The 
local history indicates that the headmen with official appointments led twelve-clan 
herdsmen to Quemoy in 804, and they “plan and work together to turn the wildness into a 
paradise; whereby inhabitants could farm, fish, and produce salt. Their population thus 
gradually increases 協謀並力，化荒墟為樂土，自是耕稼漁鹽，生聚蓋日蕃焉” (Ni 2010, 
208). According to the entry, the livelihood of the later generations in Quemoy did not 
rely on herding horses. Under such circumstance, the establishment becomes only an 
ephemeral incident whose significance apparently lies in its contribution to the change of 
Quemoy from “the wildness into a paradise” (Ni 2010, 28). The change set the 
cornerstones that enabled the Han people to permanently settle in the island by farming, 
fishing, and salt making. However, the entry only presents a partial account. Due to the 
problematic timeframe of the horse industry, its influence on the landscape in Quemoy is 
taken lightly. In fact, the horse industry existed much longer in Quemoy, and operated 
long enough to commence and also to implement the initial stage of landscape formation. 
A Proposal for the Timeframe of the Horse-herding Past in Quemoy 
In recent years, some historians (ex. Lee 2004b; Lee 2005; Xie, Yang, and Wang 
2003) express concerns about the authenticity of the information in the entry. First of all, 
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the founding date of the horse pasture in Fukien and in Quemoy was the same. The latter 
might borrow its founding date from the former. National historical records pertaining to 
the establishment in Fukien do not name the exact locales of the five ranches in 
Quanzhou prefecture, and thus can not validate the local belief of an official ranch in 
Quemoy during the years 804-805. The earliest time of the establishment in Quemoy that 
the national historical records can provide is the early Song Dynasty before 1009 (Yang B. 
2010). The records regarding the national horse policy provide some clues to its inaugural 
date in Quemoy. According to these records, only after 980 did the central government of 
the Song Dynasty dispatch horses to the local official ranches (Bai 1999). Hence, the 
establishment of the national horse pasture in Quemoy cannot predate 980. Also, as the 
historical record in the earlier section has shown, people in Quemoy in the 980s still lived 
like sea nomads without agricultural activities (Wang 2007). In the case, the entry 
claiming that inhabitants in Quemoy had been living by farming, fishing, and salt making 
since 804 is problematic, and it is unlikely, too, that the official ranches existed in 
Quemoy before 980. According to the national historical records, the inception of the 
horse herding activities in Quemoy likely happened during the years 980-1009. Besides, 
in order to have a profound influence on the local development, the animal husbandry 
industry, practically speaking, should have lasted longer than a year for the herdsmen to 
“effect a viable, self-perpetuating society” (Zelinsky 1973, 13). If national horse ranches 
did exist in Quemoy during the years 804-805, its short life cycle likely did not produce 
an outcome as significant as claimed. As a reasonable speculation, the horse-ranching 
activities may have existed continuously much longer in another time to bring Quemoy 
the effects as the common belief has insistented. Therefore, I would propose that the 
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horse industry in Quemoy began during the period 980-1009 and ended during the years 
1068-1085 when the government abolished the official horse pastures. 
As the local record indicated, the period during 1068-1085 was also the time when 
the government first set up a thorough administrative system in Quemoy based on the 
unit of households (Ni 2010). Such an establishment would inevitably involve a census 
and a land survey, and proceeded with a land reformation and redistribution for the tax 
purpose. Meanwhile, the government, after the abolishment of the official horse industry, 
also released the pastureland to civilians for their farmsteads (Wang 2008). By piecing the 
information together, the establishment of the administrative system in Quemoy thus 
closely correlated with the abolishment of horse pasture, and both measures were 
contingent to land reformation. With this in mind, the national and the local history then 
agree that the demise of the national horse pastures in Quemoy happened during 
1068-1085. After all, by pushing back the time frame, the national horse pasture could be 
in operation in Quemoy for at least fifty-nine years (1009-1068), which is abundant time 
for the industry to inscribe tangible influence in the landscape. In the following 
paragraphs, I will discuss these landscape inscriptions. They served not only as material 
evidence of the unseen past but also as present keys that unlock the past of the horse 
industry in Quemoy. 
Landscape Inscriptions of the Horse-herding Past 
The locals commonly believe that a few landmarks in Quemoy today link them with 
historical horse ranching. These landscapes include a historical shrine and a few 
toponyms: the Horse-wash Creek 洗馬溪, the Horse-lake village 駟湖村, and Mt. 
Bean-and-straw 菽藁山 (70m). The most prominent landscape feature of the group is 
the shrine of the Pasture Lord 牧馬王祠. The shrine contains not only historic 
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significance but also religious ones because the cult of the patron saint of Quemoy 
originated here. Places and geographical features with names relating to horse herding 
activities generally occur in the southwestern Quemoy. The legendary pastureland is 
geographically defined by the Wujiang Creek on the north, Mt. Fonglian 豐蓮山 (46m) 
on the west, the sea on the south, and Mt. Breast 雙乳山 (82m) on the east (Chang 
1996). As the longest watercourse in Quemoy, the Wujiang Creek flows through the 
middle of the western half of the island. Its southern tributary is the Horse-wash Creek. 
Although the river is hardly distinguishable in the landscape today, the locals remember it 
as where the herdsmen washed and watered their horses. Its course meanders by the foot 
of Mt. Fonglian on its east, and then turns westward flows into the Wujian Creek. Mt. 
Fonglian refers to a hilly area surrounded by a ring of five hills, which from a distance 
look like green petals. The hillocky highland obtains its name that in Chinese literally 
means “the great water lily.” Because of the protective topography with water source and 
grassland inside, the leaders of the twelve-clan herdsmen established their headquarters in 
the heartland of Mt. Fonglian. To the south of the Horse-wash Creek stands the 
Horse-lake village, whose name is after a lake that no longer exists. As the largest water 
body near the headquarters, Horse Lake has been an important water source for the 
herdsmen, who would lead their horses to the lake and water them there. The lake also 
marks the southwest corner of the legendary pastureland. Mt. Breast is located in the 
middle of the island; consists of two peaks and the in-between saddle terrace. The saddle 
area, called Green-mountain Plain 青山坪, is a gentle slope where the herdsmen have 
built straw sheds as shelters for their horses. On the south of Mt. Breast, ravines and 
gullies cut into the laterite ground, and form a broken coastal terrace overlooking the 
sandy beach under the seafront cliff. A highland between two ravines called Mt. 
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Bean-and-straw is where the herdsmen planted the horse fodder, and marks the southeast 
corner of the legendary pasture. 
Narratives in the folklore about the land use patterns not only explain how these 
places were associated with the horse industry, but also materialized the horse-herding 
past of Quemoy with and within these locales. Although the site selection of the pasture 
facilities may have been arbitrary, their interrelation was logically sound, and the 
land-use patterns suited the geographical characters of each locale. Of course, chances are 
that some of these narratives are sheer fictional, coming out from folk memories and their 
inspirations, but, likewise, it is hard to imagine that folklores and oral histories have 
forged them all. If the existence of the horse-ranching past in Quemoy is beyond question, 
the land-use patterns of these locales in the narratives should at least be partially true. The 
shrine of Pasture Lord as the most prominent memorial of the horse-herding past in 
Quemoy would best represent the complexity of the interwoven historical imagination 
and reality. As Woodward (1974) once pointed out, “The twilight zone that lies between 
living memory and written history is one of the favorite breeding places of mythology. 
This particular twilight zone has been especially prolific in the breeding of legend” 
(Hoelscher 2003, 663). The narratives revolving around the shrine constitute the 
discourse of the Pasture Lord, and consequently blur the horse-herding past in the history. 
2.4.3  The Cult of the Pasture Lord in Quemoy 
The shrine of the Pasture Lord perches on top of Mt. Fonglian, and overlooks the 
Anchien 庵前 village sprawling over on the southern slope below. The northern slope of 
Mt. Fonglian rises immediately from the estuary of the Wujiang Creek on its southern 
bank, while the Horse-wash Creek washes by the foothill of the eastern slope. The gentle 
southern slope of Mt. Fonglian stretches down to valleys and lowlands. With one wing on 
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the Mt. Fonglain, they each lay the other on the surrounding low hills and mounds in the 
south. On the mildly undulating land a few villages are scattered. The Anchien village is 
one of them. It is said to be the locale of the headquarters of the legendry horse pasture, 
and the shrine is located on the northeastern corner of the village. The shrine and its front 
plaza nestle on the highest terrace of Mt. Fonglian against the ascending woodland on 
their back. Although the current structure is a 1843 reconstruction, the shine, according to 
a poem written by a hermit, Chiu Kui 丘葵 (1244-1333), should have existed at the 
location before 1333. The major divinity of the shrine is the legendary leader of the 
twelve-clan herdsmen, Chen Yuan 陳淵, whom the locals deem as the founder of the 
island and, with the status, the patron saint of Quemoy. Another village on the undulating 
land is the Yaojing 藥井 village. It squats in a bottomland between Mt. Fonglian and Mt. 
Shanqian 山前 (40m) on the west of the Anchien village. The name “Yaojing” comes 
from a well of medical springs that the Pasture Lord created by wielding his sword 
thrusting at the ground. With the Guangli 官裡 village on the south and the Dongsha 東
沙 village on the southeast, these villages on the undulating land encircle an area, around 
which the Pasture Lord and his ghost army would occasionally patrol at night in a line of 
red lanterns (Chang 1996).12 The patrolled area then marks the geographical core of the 
Pasture Lord cult, and contains rich folklore and landscape features associating with the 
deity. 
Legends of the Pasture Lord 
According to the local historical record, Chen Yuan during his lifetime was known 
for his marvelous horse herding skill. He led the twelve-clan herdsmen to Quemoy in 804, 
                                                 
12 In the folklore, Chen Yuan was buried in a place called Turtledove Stone 斑鳩石 on the west of the 
Guanli village, and for that reason he would lead his army marching down the hill from the shrine of the 
Pasture Lord to his grave and therefore patrolling the area. 
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and together they converted the island from a wildness to a horse pasture. Because of the 
skill and his contribution to the herdsmen community, people made him a god and titled 
him as the Protector-general of the Horse 護驥將軍 after his death. The location of the 
shrine was said to be his home-office and where people enshrined his body as an idol. He 
was said to be the incarnation of Pegasus 天降駟精 in a human form born on earth to be 
Ancestor of Horse 馬祖. His death further amplified his miraculous power. In 1417, 
testimonial stories about how he repeatedly manifested himself to protect the locals from 
manifold misfortune by his supernatural power were well propagated. In these stories, the 
Lord summoned rain to relieve drought; repelled locust swarms into the sea; created 
spiritual springs to cure diseases; and led a ghost regiment to defeat malicious pirates 
(Kuo 2008b). In the last incident, Chen Yuan fought the battle with his two assistant 
generals and two other officers during 1335-1340, and their names were then known to 
the world. After recognizing his accomplishment in the incident, the government praised 
all five of them with noble titles and a full expansion of the shrine. The newly built shrine, 
thereafter known as the Fuji Temple 孚濟廟, was a compound with six courtyards, and 
the Lord, with his newly granted title, became the Saint Marquis of Protection and 
Fortune 福佑聖侯. In addition to the miracles that the Lord had performed to aid the 
local people, the local history also included a side episode: A Quemoy girl voluntarily 
married to the Lord at a cost of her own death, and by his supernatural power she became 
a goddess in charge of pregnancy and childbirth. After the pirate incident, the government 
also recognized the marriage, and honored the goddess with a marchioness title. 
The Production and Circulation of the Knowledge of the Pasture Lord 
Other than folklore and oral history, knowledge of Chen Yuan in text largely comes 
from the inscriptions on the stone tablets or wood planks in the shrine. The earliest one 
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among these is a stone tablet engraved with an essay written in 1417 by a serviceman 
stationed in Quemoy. However, without mentioning his sources of the mythological 
narratives, the essay is likely a faithful record of folklores and oral histories. Information 
in other inscriptions from the time basically confirms the original story yet adds records 
of subsequent events. The only record showing recognizable discrepancies is an essay in 
History of Yangzhai 陽翟誌 cited in the book Canghai jiyi 滄海紀遺 published in 1568. 
The record indicates a different background of Chen Yuan as a figure born in the central 
China (in the current Gushi 固始 County, Henan Province) during the period of the Five 
Dynasties (907-979). In addition, both his two assistant generals in the battle with pirates 
are replaced with famous historical military figures, and also the battle was postponed to 
the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). Notwithstanding, the following essay on the subject, 
written by Lu Ruo-Tong 盧若騰 in commemoration of another reconstruction of the 
shrine in 1661, refutes all the incongruent sayings in the previous record, and supports the 
earliest version of the story. The essay then sets the tone for the story, and the discourse 
about Chen Yuan has never been challenged again until recent years. 
A Discussion on the Discourse of the Pasture Lord 
In the discourse, a change of the divinity from a deity of horse husbandry to the 
genius loci of Quemoy may be discernible. The first two titles of Chen Yuan—Pegasus 
and Ancestor of Horse—are actually borrowed from the deity of horse husbandry whom 
the Chinese authorities pray in the spring for horse reproduction. Of the ancient Chinese 
belief, both Pegasus and Ancestor of Horse are ultimately the animal embodiment of the 
Chinese constellation of Room 房宿 on Earth (Ma 1983). The deity hence stems from the 
animistic cult system of natural gods (Deng 2006). In the history, a set of Confucian 
rituals, prescribed and practiced since the Zhou Dynasty (700-256 BCE), first mention 
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the divine trinity of horse husbandry (Ma 1983). Four ceremonies in the four seasons for 
the deities of horse husbandry produce explicit instructions, and certain ranch works are 
contingent to each ceremony.13 These ceremonies reflect instructions defining specific 
timing for certain ranch works, through which the knowledge of the four deities circulates 
among commoners. Over time, the rituals, in spite of a few modifications and 
amendments, have been continuously held until modern times. The deities of horse 
husbandry are literally supported by the state power, and are commonly worshipped by 
administrators in charge of horse affairs. Even though no historical records show that 
these rituals have been performed in the national pasture in Quemoy, they were the only 
legitimate rituals that a governmental facility could perform to pray for the success in 
horse husbandry in the Middle ages. With the connection to Pegasus and Ancestor of 
Horse, Chen Yuan is either an indigenized variation of the Confucian deities in a later 
time, or a deity of popular religion influenced by the legitimate official cult from the 
beginning. In either case, the discourse of the horse-guarding god in Quemoy owes its 
originality to Confucianism. In the discourse of the Pasture Lord, his first honor title “the 
Protector-general of Horse” should have clearly pronounced him as a deity of horse 
husbandry. In addition, all the miracles that Chen Yuan, the human incarnation of the 
Pasture Lord, has performed before death are limited to the trade of horse husbandry. The 
specialization should have spoken for the nature of his divinity.  
Notwithstanding, after the narrative account detailed Chen Yuan’s death, the 
divinity of the Pasture Lord began to change. The change most obviously appeared in his 
disaster relief deeds. The Pasture Lord turned from the horse-guarding deity into a deity 
                                                 
13 The instructions in the ranch works include: After the spring ceremony, the herdsmen should put colts 
under two years old away from females. Geld horses after the summer ceremony, so it will be tame. Prepare 
horses and riders after the fall ceremony. Train coachmen and present horses to the King after the winter 
ceremony (Ma 1983).  
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of the place, and protected the local people instead of the pasture horses from misfortune. 
The pirate incident marked the watershed of the conversion, after which the Pasture Lord 
received secular recognitions with a noble title and a temple as instruments to spread the 
cult. As the poem showed, when the hermit visited the shrine of the horse-guarding god 
before 1333, he still addressed the deity as the Protector-general of the Horse, in spite of 
his knowledge of the posthumous marriage. It was then clear that the divinity of horse 
guardian persisted, but the cult might have barely survived. After the national horse ranch 
had been long abolished, the hermit described the settings of the shrine as a straw hut in 
the deep woods with mosses on old stone tablets. On the other hand, given the marriage 
as a way to bring the deity into the local community, the conversion of the divinity to the 
genius loci should have already been launched, but not yet completed. The completion 
came by the governmental recognition after the alleged pirate incident during 1335-1340. 
In 1417, the inscriptions on the tablet had already included all the testimonial stories and 
therefore all the secularity had been imposed upon the deity. It was also by then that the 
human name of the deity—Chen Yuan—first showed in the historical records. By 1568, 
the cult of Chen Yuan should have spread out from its core area, and therefore people in 
the Yangzhai village in the eastern half of Quemoy knewn about the deity. However, 
their knowledge of the Pasture Lord was different from those in the core area. The 
nuances of understanding should come from the method of the circulation of his legends, 
which travelled from one narrator to another, and resulted in the discrepancies shown in 
the second essay. More importantly, the discrepancies revealed that the discourse of Chen 
Yuan was founded on collective improvisation instead of historical facts. In 1661, the 
discrepant understandings of the Lord had been all united, so Lu in his essay asserted, 
“according to the clear evidences in the past gazetteers, one should have no doubt that the 
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deity is a figure in the Tang Dynasty 郡邑舊志，皆謂神唐時人，證據甚析，無可疑也” 
(Hung et al. 2010, 176). The unification of the discourse in the scholarly field thus turned 
the religious discourse of Chen Yuan into a taken-for-granted historical fact. 
In fact, without the figure “Chen Yuan,” the discourse of the Pasture Lord can be 
separated into to two sound stories, one of the horse-guarding god and the other of the 
patron saint of Quemoy. In light of this, Chen Yuan actually functions in the discourse as 
a human medium to connect the two narratives into a whole. Furthermore, the discourse 
also uses Chen Yuan as a human agent to act and therefore to bring forth the connection 
between him and the Confucian deities of horse husbandry. By performing marvels in the 
art of herding horses, Chen Yuan establishes his divinity as a horse-guarding god, and 
earns the titles of Pegasus and Ancestor of Horse, which connect Chen Yuan to the 
Confucian deity of horse husbandry. The purpose of establishing the connection is the 
same with the purpose of endowing him a social identity as an official representative. 
They both aim to provide the Pasture Lord with a legitimate and orthodox origin. In that 
sense, Chen Yuan likely starts out as a deity of popular religion influenced by 
Confucianism. Moreover, through his posthumous marriage, the discourse also connects 
the Pasture Lord to the Quemoy community. As the connection to the Confucian deity 
legitimates him to assume the status of the horse-guarding god, likewise the posthumous 
marriage facilitates Chen Yuan to inaugurate the status of the patron saint of Quemoy, not 
to mention the co-deification of a local woman. In summary, without Chen Yuan as the 
hinge, the discourse of the Pasture Lord will fall apart into two portions of individual 
stories. Although the hinges are critical to the discourse as a whole, they are appendixes 
to each of the stories. For them both, the role of Chen Yuan can either be acted by the 
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same super being or different ones, and the change will not affect the soundness of each 
story. Chen Yuan is therefore a replaceable trope in the discourse. 
As mentioned previously, the knowledge of Chen Yuan ultimately stems from 
folklore and oral history, so both Chen Yuan and his belongings are mythical. No historic 
records can substantiate the existence of Chen Yuan during his supposed lifetime, and 
even his name is a violation of the naming taboo in the Tang Dynasty (Lee 2004b; Lee 
2005). The discrepancies of his birth place and date disclose an improvisational 
dimension of the discourse. Both the inconsistent facts are subject to his background in 
the story, depending on the narrators and their intersubjective understandings. Neither 
Chen Yuan, his subordinates, nor the twelve-clan herdsmen left any descendants, so, too, 
genealogies cannot provide any of their information (Huang et al. 2010). In the end, no 
concrete facts can be linked to Chen Yuan, and he is more realistic as a god than a man. 
However, the mythical existence of Chen Yuan and his legendary story recorded in text 
in 1417 are used as historical evidence to prove the establishment of the first effective 
settlement in Quemoy in 804. The abuse of the religious discourse turns itself into a 
carnival mirror reflecting a distorted image of the past. 
Although the theory of the first effective settlement in the Tang Dynasty originated 
from the misusage of the religious discourse, the landscape and the cult of the Pasture 
Lord both substantiated a horse-herding past of Quemoy. The cult may coexist with the 
national horse ranches in operation, which in Quemoy stretched approximately from the 
late tenth century to the late eleventh century. During the time, the agricultural population 
in Quemoy increased. Therefore, after the abolishment of the national horse pasture, the 
government redistributed arable land to civilians and established the administrative units 
in Quemoy for tax purposes. The population growth provided a congregation for the cult, 
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and turned the deity of a single trade into one protecting the locals with various 
occupations. Evaluated by these social conditions, the landscape evolution in Quemoy 
should have entered the peopling stage at this point. The beginning of the horse-herding 
activities in Quemoy then marked the establishment of the first effective settlement, 
which should have happened during the years 980-1009, a much later time than the 
conventionally proposed beginning of the peopling stage. 
By the distribution of the national horse pasture, two inferences of the horse-herding 
past in Quemoy could be made. Since ranching activities inevitably conflicted with 
farming, an ideal site of national horse pasture would be locations away from the 
developed agricultural areas. In a larger scale, the site selection of an offshore island like 
Quemoy in a remote territory like Fukien for national pasture congruently followed this 
logic. In other words, when the horse pasture was first established in Quemoy, its 
development should have remained primeval and the population of the colony did not 
require intensive agriculture to sustain itself. The historical record about the livelihood in 
Quemoy in the 980s also confirmed the underdeveloped condition. Second, the 
concentration of horse pasture in the southwestern Quemoy also implied that the area was 
less developed than other parts of the island, where other ways of life might coexist with 
the ranching activity. According to Huang (2010), pioneers in Quemoy inaugurated the 
salt industry in the early tenth century, and saltworks largely concentrated in northeastern 
Quemoy. Although Huang might predate the salt industry in Quemoy, the coexistence 
indeed explained why the ranching activity was exclusively confined to the southwestern 
area. Concomitant with the development of Quemoy, the population pressure and the 
demand of food gradually promoted agriculture. Arable land turned to the use of food 
supply, and forced the demise of horse ranches. After the abolishment of national horse 
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ranches, the southwestern Quemoy simply became an agricultural area. By contrast, the 
northeast, due to its propinquity to Quanzhou city and the prosperity brought by the salt 
industry, was the entrepôt and the political center of Quemoy before the late fourteenth 
century. Even though the local center of Quemoy shifted to the southwest after the walled 
city was completed in 1386, the salt industry in the northeast intermittently remained in 
operation till 1995. The industry led the local society marching forward to the 
environmental adaptation stage, and further provided the locals an economic base to 
usher in the landscape impress stage. 
2.4.4  The Salt Industry in Quemoy 
The northeastern Quemoy commonly refers to the area on the north of Mt. Taiwu 
(Figure 2.2), consisting of the coastal plain and the low hills. It is roughly in a triangular 
shape with its two sides on the seafront and the other on the foot of Mt. Taiwu. The Jinsha 
Creek flows straight through the middle of the triangle, and generally separates the 
coastal plain on its west and the hilly area on its east. Along the curvy north coastline, 
pairs of rocky headlands projecting out form beaches bracket several bays, in which the 
silty clay seabed and muddy flats with a gradual descending slope create a suitable 
environment for land reclamation. Among these bays, the estuary of the Jinsha Creek is 
the most characteristic. Mt. Jingui 金龜山 (53m) on the rim of the estuary divides it into 
two coves in a shape of a tilted “3.” The Jinsha Creek flows into the southern cove, and 
via its channel, saltwater can intrude deep inland into the coastal plain due to the great 
tidal range (of which the greatest value of the mean range of tide reaches 6.4m). The 
intertidal flats in the open areas along the riverbanks therefore are capable of producing 
salt without direct impact of tidal waves. 
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Settlers in Quemoy have utilized the vast intertidal zone along the estuary and the 
riverbank in various ways. The sea nomads in the Jinguishan site and the Pubian site 
heavily relied on fishing and foraging marine resources in the intertidal zone for their 
livelihood. Historically, the earliest utilization of the intertidal zone was similar to the 
dike-and-polder farming.14 Immigrants in the latter half of the twelfth century brought 
the farming method to Quemoy from Quanzhou, where a movement to construct 
irrigation systems arose to cope with the population explosion. Because commoners 
could not afford the construction of dikes, sluices, and irrigation channels, such 
developments were often undertaken by the regional elite families with capital and 
manpower to establish new colonies. Some development involved in encircling a tidal 
land with stone walls and channeling fresh water into the prospective fields to ameliorate 
the soil and to wash away the salty sediment. The reclamation ground usually turned into 
rice paddies, while the lower land subject to intermittent tidal floods and land without 
accesses to fresh water could be sites for salterns and shellfishes aquafarms. However, 
these polders required constant maintenance against coastal erosion; besides, storm 
surges and torrents forced repeated re-construction of dikes and levees. Maintaining 
agricultural use of the intertidal zone was actually a painstaking and costly job for regular 
farmers and land owners. A commemorative essay for reconstruction of flooded polders 
disclosed the fragility of polder farming in the sixteenth century in the coastal Fukien 
(Zheng 2009, 53):  
                                                 
14 Huang (2010), according to the records in the genealogy of the Chen clan in Yanzhai, proposed that the 
founder of the clan introduced salt industry into Quemoy from Tong-an in 913. Yang (2010) agreed on the 
opinion, and further proposed that the industry should end during 1128-1162 because of a social turbulence 
aroused by roving rebels at the time. With clarification of the duration, he then proceed to hypothesize that 
the abandonment of the saltworks in the first half of the twelfth century should occasion the development of 
polder farming in Quemoy in the latter half of the twelfth century. However, their views of the beginning of 
slat industry in Quemoy may require further historical research to substantiate in the future. Adhering to the 
official history, this study takes 1297 as the inaugural year of the salt industry. 
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Turbulent torrents [destroyed levees and] deluged polders into desolations. . . . [The 
reconstruction] took three years and amounted to a thousand gold. . . . Over time, 
floods breached levees again, and recurred after every reconstruction, which was 
eventually efforts in vain but only cost toil. 溪水橫溢，决為煙莽 . . .  三年始成，
計費千金矣 . . . 歲久復决，屢築屢壞，訖無成勞。 
The costly nature of polder farming did not deter farmers and landowners from 
undertaking the development because of scarcity of arable land in the coastal Fukien and 
its goodly yield that “could reach ten times more than regular farming 其稼收比常田利
可十倍” (Wang 2002, 140). However, the plantation economy in Quemoy based on 
venture investment of foreign capital eventually declined when social turmoil aroused by 
the Mongol invasion disturbed the economy of the planters’ society. 
After the Mongol government established the national saltworks in 1297, workers in 
order to adopt the evaporation method of salt production then repaired abandoned and 
damaged polders as salterns. With state support, salt making gradually prevailed and 
became the dominant land use in the intertidal zone. Nonetheless, coastal fishing and 
polder farming continuously endured through time, but diminished to minor and 
supplementary economic activities in this area. The variant and coexisting land-use 
patterns in the intertidal zone demonstrated, on top of a geographic palimpsest of the 
traces of economic activities, also a “dynamic cultural landscape mosaic that reflect how 
people and their environment have co-evolved” (Clark and Tsai 2002, 427).  
The co-evolution in Quemoy between landscape and human society brings forth two 
facts: (1) The land-use diversity is a result of environmental adaptation, when immigrants 
with different cultural baggage experimented their traditional ways of life in the colony to 
determine the fittest adaptation. However, the effectiveness of a livelihood changes along 
with the socioeconomic development, and over time the definition of the fittest adaptation 
may change and therefore it is dynamic in different milieus. Polder farming of rice 
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paddies once indicated the fittest utilization of reclaimed ground, when the immigrants 
had managed the construction technology of irrigation systems. The population explosion 
in the mainland also prompted the development due to a great demand of staple crops. 
However, concomitant with the change of the socioeconomic development, the demand 
of rice diminished before the salt industry prevailed in Quemoy. The Mongol invasion 
between the Song and the Yuan dynasty decreased the population in the region, and the 
establishment of the Mongol regime of the Yuan dynasty brought a shift of the ruling and 
upper class. In this sense, salt production, strictly speaking, did not replace polder 
farming to be the dominant land-use pattern; it just prospered with a cultural milieu that 
favored this utilization. The state support manifested such a cultural advantage. 
As the Vidalian possibilists proposed, “the physical environment was regarded . . . 
as a factor that sets limits on the range of possible human options in an environment,” and 
probablists added, “the various possibilities have varying probabilities of occurrence” 
(Norton 2000, 53-4). Salt production, polder farming, and aquaculture are all possible 
human options in the intertidal zone in the northeast Quemoy, but each stands with 
different probabilities to thrive in distinct milieus. For the salt industry in Quemoy, the 
relics of polders, repaired and then reused as salterns, indeed increased the probabilities 
of occurrence for the salt industry as the successor of polder farming. Thereafter, salt 
production remained as the major land-use pattern in the northeast coast in Quemoy 
despite the change of socioeconomic conditions until the 1840s. Notwithstanding, its 
persistence can merely result from a lack of other options of land utilization, rather than 
from an absolute economic supremacy of the industry. The environmental adaptation 
highlights the importance of the environment in human activities, while the evolutionary 
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trajectory points out culture as the determinant for landscape changes. The mosaic 
landscape in the saltern country then manifests co-evolution of nature and culture. 
(2) The polyculture of the intertidal zone suggests the failure of a single occupation 
in supporting the commoners’ economic requirements, and demonstrates the shift of the 
major struggle from subsistence to commerce. A single livelihood oftentimes did not 
suffice for commoners’ economic needs due to the scarcity of natural resources. Settlers 
in coastal Quemoy could not but pursue multiple livelihoods, as a Quemoy proverb 
portrayed, “Live by farms when sun rises, by aquafarms when rain falls, and by salterns 
when sun scorches 日出食田坵，落雨食海坵，日炎食鹽坵” (Chen 2003, 79). Even 
though salt production was a comparatively profitable mode of land utilization, the 
industry did not benefit the majority of the population in the saltern country. After being 
exploited by tax collectors, administrators, and merchants (who in fact were reluctant to 
purchase salt from the island due to its inferior quality and the extra cost of shipment), 
immigrant workers often had to live by supplementary employment. Due to stagnant 
conditions, the government revoked the prohibition against the private salt trade in 1443. 
However, for common workers who traded through brokers, the revocation was not much 
help. 
The profits of the salt trade, if any more than a minuscule amount, accumulated 
within the bureaucracy and the gentry. Lee proposed, “Perhaps due to the small-scale 
production, I had never learnt anyone in Quemoy got rich by the salt trade 可能是鹽場
規模不大之故，所以未聞浯洲人因販鹽而致富者” (2004b, 42). On the contrary, Huang 
proposed, “the salt industry must have a great significance to the economy of Quemoy at 
the time 鹽業對當時金門經濟的助益，必然佔有很重要的地位” (2010, 13). Huang’s 
assertion derived from a census of the scholar-bureaucrats born in Quemoy. He found 
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that more than two third of these scholars were from the saltern country. Based on the 
discovery, he argued, it was the surplus of salt trade that enabled the locals to invest in 
education. Whereby their young could receive high education and subsequently pass the 
imperial examination, becoming scholar-bureaucrats and literati. The incongruence 
between the two views on the salt industry actually has roots in the proposition about the 
major source of prosperity in the Quemoy society. Huang obviously attributes economic 
gain to the salt trade, while Lee inclines toward overseas trade. On account of Huang’s 
view, the monetary capital out of salt trade turned, through education, into human capital 
which reciprocally contributed to the governmental personnel. The capital accumulation 
and transition detained the authority within the gentry group and re-produced the 
institutionalized economic inequality. Consequently, the uneven distribution of wealth 
thus aroused social struggles. 
During the peopling stage, population in Quemoy increased dramatically. Since the 
late tenth century, the population grew at least forty times and amounted to 20,000 people 
in a hundred years (Lee 2004b). In the 1560s, the estimate of population was 
approximately 70,000-80,000, indicating the population increased more than a hundred 
times in six-hundred years (Xie, Yang, and Wang 2003). The population growth mainly 
resulted from immigration from nearby developed areas in the mainland. The reclamation 
of the intertidal land by the elite families in Quanzhou was an example of such 
immigration. The population explosion produced a significant impact on the landscape, 
and overdevelopment of land through deforestation subsequently caused desertification 
and depleted insufficient water resources. After the latter half of the sixteenth century, the 
deterioration of land consequently reduced the human options for land utilization, and 
encouraged employment in a narrow range of activities that were less affected by the 
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environmental degradation. Salt production, fishing, and trade under the circumstances 
became even more significant, and accordingly emerged as the crucial economic support 
for the local society. The significance of the salt industry engendered from the 
co-evolution of ecosystem and social system marked the completion of environmental 
adaptation because the social stratification and the economic inequality, which the 
industry sustained, changed the location of the major struggle from economy to society. 
As such, even though people in Quemoy in the following ages did not stop adopting other 
ways of life and other land use patterns, their central problem of life had shifted. The 
problem was less about how to obtain wealth than about how to fight the wealthy class 
reproducing social inequalities. 
Before the late fourteenth century, immigrants mainly settled in the northeast 
Quemoy because of its proximity to the developed areas with excessive population in the 
mainland and its natural setting with the estuary as a natural harbor for immigrants 
arriving by sea. After the imperial government established the national saltworks, its 
office, as the highest administrative organ in Quemoy, was situated in northeast Quemoy. 
With the population concentration and the administrative office, northeast Quemoy 
served as the first economic and political center of Quemoy for ninety years until the 
erection of the walled city in the southwest Quemoy. In 1387, the imperial government of 
the Ming Dynasty ordered the construction of a walled city named Quemoy as a part of 
the national coastal defense network in order to stop armed harassment by pirates. The 
military measure officially changed the orientation of Quemoy from looking up at the 
mainland to overlooking the ocean, and incurred a shift of the identity of Quemoy from 
an insular colony to an imperial gateway. Meanwhile, the habitat destruction and resource 
scarcity caused by overpopulation motivated settlers in the eastern half of Quemoy 
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relocating themselves to the west. The area of population concentration gradually moved 
to the southwest, as did the commercial center of Quemoy. Together, these 
socioeconomic changes then switched Quemoy’s front and rear, left and right, and 
constituted the first reversal of the situation (coordinate system) of Quemoy. 
 
In general, the economic development in Quemoy generally followed the mercantile 
model of urban development in the Latin America conceived by Sargent (2005; Figure 
2.5). Nonetheless, some aspects of Quemoy’s development are incongruent with the 
model, and the discrepancy underlined the exact characteristics of Quemoy. The 
development of Quemoy has gone through the first exploration stage in which Han 
Chinese attained knowledge of Quemoy and the indigenous population theren. The 
establishment of the national horse pasture lifted the curtain of the initial settlement stage, 
in which the colonial power, in this case the Chinese Empire, founded permanent 
settlements with the major objective to exploit the natural resources in the colony. The 
exploitation shows in two aspects of the horse industry: its objective for exportation and 
its incompatibility with the subtropical environment. 
In comparison with the transplanted horse industry, the development of wet-rice 
cultivation and polder farming denotes a better adaptation to the environment. However, 
the plantation economy established by the prestigious families from the mainland still 
emanates a colonial overtone. After all, both horses and rice were essentially agricultural 
commodities demanded by the market of the mother country. By contrast, the 
development of saltworks displays a breakthrough from the cycle of colonial economy 
when the profit from salt trade created a gentry class in Quemoy. The formation of a 
stratified society connotes the establishment of an internal economic network enabling 
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Figure 2.5.  Sargent’s Adaption of Vance’s Mercantile 
Model. The model discerns four evolutionary stages of the 
economic/urban development in Latin America. Although 
the development in Quemoy generally conforms to the 
model in its early stages, the last stage does not occur. 
[Source: Sargent 2005] 
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capital accumulation in situ and retaining the industrial gains within. The network is a 
direct result of population growth and establishment of new settlements. In the case of 
Quemoy, the establishment of saltworks expanded the areas of economic activities from 
the coastal fishery and the estuarine polder farming to the foot of Mt. Taiwu. In addition, 
the recruitment of immigrant workers, who founded new settlements in the vicinities of 
their salterns, also contributed to completion of the network. The development of salt 
industry therefore exemplifies the stage of expansion of the network. 
Up to this point, the evolutionary progress of the economic development in Quemoy, 
in spite of a few nuances, basically conforms to Sargent’s model, however, of which the 
last stage, infilling the network, did not happen in the successive time in Quemoy. The 
reversal of its geographical situation (coordinate system) prevented the development of 
this final stage. The shift of the political and economic centers inevitably interrupted the 
evolutionary progress of the economic/urban network, and consequently spurred its 
mutation. Whereas Sargent (2005) and Vance (1970) conceived their mercantile models 
by the empirical data from continents, their inconsistency in the latter stage with the 
phenomena in Quemoy is not surprising. The “islandness” of Quemoy has absolute effect 
on its landscape evolution, and the susceptibility of Quemoy to changes—from inside: the 
environmental degradation, from outside: the state policies, and from the border-crossing: 
the population explosion—also exemplifies the geographical characteristic of 
islandness.15 
As an offshore islet, Quemoy was not immune to the political and socioeconomic 
influence of the mainland society. Significant changes in the national scale brought 
                                                 
15 For a summary of the current geographical discussions on islands, islandness, and insularity, please refer 
to the special issues of Geographical Review 97(2) and Cultural Geographies 20 (2) on islands. 
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cataclysmic impacts to the insular society. Examples abound, and one is that the refugees 
escaping nomad invasions resulted in the population explosion and subsequent 
environmental degradation in Quemoy. Sometimes, even only in the provincial scale, 
trends and policies can significantly influence the island landscape, and about that, the 
establishment of horse pastures and the construction movement of irrigation systems 
provided pertinent demonstrations. Due to the social and the environmental sensitivity, 
landscape in a small island, compared with those in the mainland, is relatively capricious. 
The mutability is less perceptible during the initial stage of development due to the 
long-lasting primordial land-use patterns and the insignificant economic activities of the 
agro-pastoral life. It often requires further maturity of the socioeconomic system and the 
magnitude of changes in the colony to overtly reveal the characteristic. In the process of 
environmental adaptation, the development of the salt industry delivered a social maturity 
by the formulation of an economic/urban network and class stratification. Against the 
social condition, the reversal of the coordinate system, as a result of military, political 
fulfillment, inducing a sharp change in the landscape pertinently exposes the mutability 
of Quemoy. The shifting landscape thus discloses the susceptibility of a small island. 
2.5 Landscape Impress: Hammering a Nail along the Imperial Edge 
Pirates had long been a thorny issue in South Fukien where the society thrived on 
overseas trade. Whereas armed mercantile fleets pursuing overseas trade were 
simultaneously capable of piracy, pirates and merchants were actually two permutable 
identities for sailors in the sixteenth century (Office of Historiography 1990; Lee 2004a; 
Zheng 1999). Mercantile pirates had been active in the vicinity of Quemoy since the 
thirteenth century. However, no historical documentation indicates islanders in Quemoy 
were involved in any pirating or overseas trading activities until the sixteenth century. 
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Nonetheless Quemoy people had randomly suffered from pirate raids since the 
mid-fourteenth century, as the inscription regarding the sanctification of Chen Yuan 
showed. Before the construction of the walled city in 1387, piratical pillage in Quemoy 
happened only once. In other words, the islanders were, for the most part, passively 
implicated in the conflicts between the imperial forces and the maritime powers when the 
imperial government first established the coastal defense network in the late fourteenth 
century. The design of the walled city was thus more to guard the mainland than the 
border island. 
The movement of walled city construction in Fukien as the embodiment of the state 
policy of coastal defense consolidated the governmental control and its authority over the 
seaboard region of Fukien (Xu 1999). The walled city in Quemoy, as the centerpiece of 
the defense network of the island, was also an emblem of the state hegemony. In addition 
to the walled city, the imperial government constructed four citadels on the southern and 
the eastern coast of Quemoy, and in-between the city and citadels distributed six 
encampments, beacons towers, and a navy base. In all these military facilities, the 
government stationed 1,800 soldiers. In a conservative estimate, the garrisons and their 
dependants in the walled city amounted to at least 4,000 people (Jiang 2003). By this 
calculation, the population in Quemoy increased to a total of at least 5,000 people, 
including soldiers and their families in the four citadels. These new immigrants, coupled 
with workers in the state saltworks, accounted for a great proportion of the local 
population. The population boost of the governmental personnel suggested an emerging 
hegemony that empire could exert over the everyday life of the islanders, in addition to 
the military control and regular civil administration. Having Quemoy exposed to the 
national impact, the fulfillment of the defense policy inducted cultural uniformity that 
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gradually formed through the shared life experience among inhabitants in the imperial 
outpost. By the master plan of military deployment, islanders come to conceptualize 
Quemoy as a whole instead of separate neighborhoods or individual villages. It is based 
on the shared living condition and the holistic perception that islanders first developed an 
identity with Quemoy (Kuo 2006b). 
Through the implementation of the coastal defense network, imperial authorities 
arbitrarily imposed two divided social categories upon the inhabitants in the coastal 
Fukien: They were either imperial subjects or malicious outlaws (Chen 2010). The great 
divide reposed geographically on the imperial defense line. People outside the line were 
pirates whereas people inside were obedient subjects. Coinciding with the construction of 
defenses on the seaboard, the authorities simultaneously evacuated inhabitants in the 
islands along the Fukien coast to isolate the maritime powers. According to the strategy 
of eviction, one who escaped from the eviction and whom the government left behind 
after the relocation deadline became “pirates” indiscriminately (Wang 2008). In addition 
to control of place, imperial powers deprived the locals of their own identities. To enforce 
the imperial demarcation, the empire required a large army guarding the military facilities 
on its seafront border. For this purpose, the government conscribed a large number of 
involuntary civilians, and a portion of the evacuated residents received immediate 
assignments to serve in garrisons on the military outposts. The rest of the inhabitants, 
following the governmental instructions, resettled in new towns on the seaboard as 
reserves for military levies. Serving at garrisons in the borderland was a form of 
banishment in the pre-modern China, and military service was mandatory for all the male 
descendants of borderland soldiers. Based on a coeval Jesuits missioner’s observations, 
lives of these soldiers resembled that of a pariah class (Ricci 1953, 89-90):  
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There probably is no class of people in the country [China in the sixteenth century] 
as degraded and as lazy as soldiers. Everyone under arms necessarily leads a 
miserable life because he is following his calling . . . solely as a subject laboring for 
an employer. The greater part of the army are bondmen to the crown, and serve in 
slavery either for their own crimes or for those of their ancestors. When they are not 
actually engaged in military activities they are assigned to the lowest menial 
employments . . . . 
Conscription accordingly was a form of punishment. According to the imperial definition, 
the soldiers in the coastal defenses in the Southeast China were supposedly criminals. 
They consisted of the inhabitants in the seaboards and coastal islands, boat-dwelling sea 
nomads (largely Tan), and seamen serving in the former warlords’ navies. The empire 
conscribed these people because they lived outside or along the defense line. In this 
situation, the empire punished these people merely for the geographical locations of their 
settlements. The rationale for relocation as punishment was that empire considered that 
these people were, or potentially would be, accomplices of the maritime Others. Wang 
pointed out that the governmental purpose of the conscription was “to finalize further 
troubles in the future and to make use of them [as the imperial forces] 以絕後患，且得其
用” (2008, 59). The authorities employed conscription as a complementary measure to 
their defense strategy. The line drawn by the ruling class realized the dichotomy which 
was instrumental in drawing distinctions between subjects of empire and malicious 
pirates. The geopolitical borderline thereby works on the local society, and constituted 
social segregation. The imperial dichotomy arbitrarily created two domains and a social 
group of Others. In fact, the dichotomy resembled much in the nationalist/communist one 
that the Chinese nationalist established in Quemoy after 1949. The imposition brought 
both a great impact on the local culture and on the daily life of the local civilians.  
Quemoy as a military outpost of empire was ostensibly a land of obedient subjects. 
Social identity has a profound effect on the culture of Quemoy. Living on a borderland, 
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the islanders in Quemoy had been under constant suspicion of involvement in overseas 
trade and piracy. To offset that impression, Quemoy people “endeavored to mold an 
image of local culture congruent to the social institutions that empire expected 努力型塑
符合朝廷礼治的地方文化形象” (Chen 2010, 83). The image articulated the locals’ 
submission to the imperial social institution and power relations, especially those 
between empire and Others. The most frequently employed demonstrations were the 
accomplishments of the scholar-bureaucrats and the literati from Quemoy. Their 
achievements signified the local political and cultural submission to the empire. Through 
imperial examinations, the local gentry attained the status of scholar-bureaucrats whose 
service for empire implemented the imperial will in the local regions, and became proof 
of the Quemoy locals’ support to the imperial political and social institution. The local 
literati’s proficiency at Chinese high culture and Confucianism, on the other hand, served 
as the manifestation of the locals’ conformity to the imperial cultural and moral canons. 
Although the institution of the upper class in Quemoy ultimately sustained the 
socioeconomic inequality, the locals have considered the social production of these 
scholar-officials as an exceptional achievement of their insular community. These historic 
figures were undoubtedly the cultural and social capital of Quemoy, and their historic 
significance should partially originate from their social utility as bargaining chips in the 
identity negotiation with empire. The material culture remains in relation to them were 
therefore the early landscape impress central to the identity of Quemoy. 
To adapt to the social category of obedient subjects, the islanders also “normalize 
and interpret their everyday life according to the imperial ideologies and social institution 
按照国家的典章制度与意识型态来规范和解释自己的日常生活” (Chen 2010, 83). 
They interpreted their everyday life to demonstrate their socio-political correctness and 
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affiliation, and by the interpretation appropriated and justified incoherent conduct. 
Together with the overt statements of the local obedience, the normalization carried out a 
tacit proposition, by which the locals implicitly rebutted the common suspicion about 
their conspiracy with pirates. It was central for them to claim by the compilation that they, 
at large, did not engage in overseas trading that empire deemed as a crime and therefore a 
cultural practice of Others. As such, the cultural image of an imperial frontier community 
embedded in the text of the local history, and resulted in a dominant representation of 
Quemoy. The elaborately constituted local knowledge thereby engaged itself in the 
creation of a “discourse,” which as Foucault defined (Weedon 1987, 108), refers to: 
ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of 
subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations 
between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. 
They constitute the ‘nature’ of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and 
emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern.  
By adopting the imperial view, the Quemoy residents’ discourse attached meanings to 
local affairs, and convinced other imperial subjects of their affinity to the empire. More 
importantly, it communicated explicitly who they were and implicitly who they were not, 
according to the imperial dichotomy. Whereas the collective constitution of the discourse 
first emerged as a cultural strategy to negotiate with the imperial others about the locals’ 
identity, over time the discourse conversely overrode these people. The identity of 
Quemoy and its residents that the border society strategically conceived to sustain itself 
due to the imperial maritime policies, in turn, overwhelmed the locals, who thus 
consciously and unconsciously affiliated themselves to the empire. Subsequently, the 
latter generations living in the different milieus took and have taken the cultural identity 
of obedient imperial subjects for granted. The social strategy thus excises critical effects 
on the constitution of local subjectivity and the cultural identity. 
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From the scheme of local historical knowledge, it should be now comprehensible 
why Huang (2010) proposed that Quemoy’s wealth, which contributed to the social 
stratification, derived from the salt trade instead of overseas trade as Lee (2004b) 
suggested. Lee pointed out that the salt industry in Quemoy was on the verge of 
bankruptcy in the 1540s (Lee 2004b, 42; Yang B. 2010, 379):  
Because of the difficulties of overseas transportation and the inferiority of salt, 
merchants did not want to withdraw [salt from Quemoy] . . . The warehouses 
eventually collapsed and the government let these sites to civilians for farming 因海
洋遠涉，兼且鹽色低點，商人不願支[領]…其倉[厫]遂至倒廢，地基招民耕種.” 
However, most of the gentry in Quemoy had assumed the status of scholar-bureaucrats 
after the mid-sixteenth century, when the salt trade could not sustain the local gentry. By 
contrast, piracy, smuggling, and overseas trade were rampant in the vicinities of Quemoy 
at this time (Zheng 1999; Chen 2010). As historians (Chen 2010; Lee 2004b; Yang 1998) 
reported, the coeval inhabitants in Quemoy also actively took part in the Others’ 
operations. The imposed demarcation between the two social groups was fading away. 
And, their involvement in the trade rewarded them with great fortune (Chen 2010). In this 
light, the overemphasis on economic effects of the salt trade connotes a latent 
disparagement to the overseas trading, and more importantly, articulates the discourse 
that persists to the present. 
I witnessed a scene in the 2008 Conference of Quemology, when Chen (2010) 
presented his research on the historical piracy in Quemoy. He reported that the categories 
of “pirates” and “decent subjects” were merely social constructions delineated by the 
Ming Empire. Inhabitants in Quemoy continuously engaged in the “piratical trade” for 
extenuating reasons. After his presentation, one Quemoy historian immediately expressed 
his discontent by asking why Chen defamed their forebears as pirates because, according 
to the local gazetteers, the vast majority in Quemoy were decent people! Evidently, it was 
102 
not much a question but more of a declaration. Although apparently the “defamation” 
triggered his defensive attitude; in a deeper sense, it was the threat to the historical 
discourse of the social dichotomy provoked his “compulsion to defend” (Nostrand 1992, 
214).  
“The past is a foreign country,” as Lowenthal remarked, “whose features are shaped 
by today’s predilections, its strangeness domesticated by our own preservation of its 
vestiges” (1985, xvii). Similarly, the historical discourse of Quemoy knitted together a 
“foreign past” for its general public audience when the first gazetteer of Quemoy came 
into being in the 1830s. The gazetteer “preserved” the foreign past shaped by the coeval 
predilections. Under the category of social custom, Lin (1987) described Quemoy as a 
simple utopian community: It was the birthplace of prestigious officials and celebrated 
literati; land of Confucianism; and home of unsophisticated farmers and fishermen. Such 
a portrayal of the “foreign” Quemoy remains authoritative even today. The 1830s’ 
discourse therefore resembles in a historical Orientalism, producing knowledge of 
representation “for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over” Quemoy (Said 
1978, 3). By analogy, my intention is to emphasize the temporal distance from the foreign 
past that enables an Orientalist lens to work on knowledge production of Quemoy. Along 
with the dominance, the discursive practices concurrently constructed an “imaginative 
geography,” which Said explained (1978, 55),  
For there is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to 
intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between 
what is close to it and what is far away.  
Likewise, the locals in Quemoy, by intensification and dramatization, developed the 
identity with place and the demarcation between self and others. Put differently, the 
locals’ image of Quemoy as a homeland was actually the partial reification of this 
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imaginative geography. Through their dominance, the locals acquired control of place; 
developed feelings of attachment; and when the discourse was under threat, as in the 
Conference of Quemology, the compulsion to defend immediately roused up (Nostrand 
1992). The bonding with place therefore hinged on a foreign country. 
The imperial social categories evidently have significant influence on the local 
society in Quemoy. However, their significance and persistence did not mean their 
institution came from an absence of negotiation. Trading activities, despite their 
insignificance, should have existed in Quemoy since the peopling stage for the growing 
demand for staples and crafts. As in the face of changes, the locals did not merely comply 
without resistance. The assigned social category did not impede Quemoy people’s pursuit 
in smuggling and overseas trade at the time, but turned the economic activities under the 
table. The neglect of negotiation is, as Thomas (1994) criticized, one pitfall of 
postcolonial theories today that “treat colonial discourse as ‘impervious to active marking 
and reformulation by the Other’” (Clayton 2005, 452). Clayton concurrently criticized the 
same presupposition (2005, 452),  
Postcolonialism runs a fine line between subverting and aggrandizing the grip of the 
colonial past on the present by placing colonialism too securely in the past or 
placing the colonial past too firmly in the present. 
It is obvious that the nineteenth-century Orientalist discourse of Quemoy shared the same 
pitfalls, and the current-day local historians inherited them. 
The defense policy, through its civil administrative measures, begot destructive 
consequences to the local economy. With the defense line drawn and the seaboard 
inhabitants evicted, the government further decreed an isolationist maritime policy—the 
Seafaring Ban 海禁—by which the imperial government prohibited its subjects to sail on 
the sea. The purpose was to prevent its subjects from contagion by or conspiracy with the 
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maritime powers. Border-crossing activities due to the decree became transgressions, and 
trade with sea merchants was illegal and analogous to harboring felons. The regional 
economy which relied heavily on overseas trade faced a fatal challenge. In addition to 
trade, the Seafaring Ban directly hampered the operation of fisheries because the policy 
limited the fishing grounds and the fishing seasons. Consequently, the ban prompted the 
local fishers to change their occupation or to pursue multiple livelihoods (Ouyang 1998). 
The ban indirectly effected the stagnation of the salt industry. The diminution of the 
fishery reduced the demand for salt—the major preservative at the time—and the strict 
control over water traffic brought complications to shipping freight. In terms of 
commoners’ livelihoods in Quemoy, fishery and salt production gradually became 
unsustainable. The ban eventually left these imperial subjects only degraded land which 
resulted from intense population pressure. Besides, the income from multi-livelihoods 
was insufficient for survival due to heavy tax and bureaucratic extortions before the 
Seafaring Ban decree. After the ban further limited their economic activities, the poor 
farmers and workers reluctantly deserted their fields and salterns to be free from the 
unsustainable exploitation: “The sea is Fukien people’s farms. [Due to the enforcement of 
Seafaring Ban] those in the coastal region could not make a living, and suffered from 
repeated famines. The poor among them often would gather together and form fugitive 
gangs and engage in piracy 海者閩人之田，海濱民眾，生理無路，兼以饑饉薦臻，窮
民往往入海從盜，嘯聚亡命” (Fu 2007b, 146). The gravity of economic destruction 
eventually forced commoners in coastal China to take on the social status that empire 
defined as “pirates,” while people in their social networks—families, kins, and 
friends—remained “imperial subjects.”  
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Chinese historians today commonly consider that the “pirate” problem in 
sixteen-century China resulted from the rigorous enforcement of the Seafaring Ban  
largely because it maximally constrained the locals to engage in seafaring economic 
activities even on the quiet (see Chen 2010; Dai 1982; Office of Historiography 1990; 
Wang 2006; Yang 1998). While the poor in desperation accounted for the majority of 
“pirates,” the maritime powers nonetheless consisted of individuals from all social tiers 
simply attracted by the considerable profit of smuggling and overseas trade. On top of the 
practical reasons, overseas trading was also essential to the regional culture. Since the 
twelfth century, the locals in Quemoy had been involved in overseas trading (Lee 2004b). 
As Chen remarked, for people in Southeast coastal China in the sixteenth century, 
overseas trading was not only a way of life but “a part of their daily life” and “a local 
cultural tradition” (2010, 87). Because of the tradition, there was a fine line between 
decent civilians and “pirates.” As one scholar-official commented, people along the 
seaboards “were all decent civilians before pirates landed, but after they arrived all 
became accomplices 賊未至皆良民，賊已至皆奸民” (Office of Historiography 1990, 
79). Although the portrayal might exaggerate the connection, the local conspiracy with 
the maritime powers “was common in Jiangsu and Zhejiang province; serious in Fukien; 
and especially serious in its Quanzhou and Zhangzhou prefectures 浙直皆然，閩為甚，
閩之漳泉尤甚” (Office of Historiography 1990, 79). Chen elaborated, “the 
half-mercantile and half-piratical operations [that the smugglers in the southern Fukien 
conducted] oftentimes had the locals’ support and was under protection of their clans 这
种亦商亦盗的行径，往往得到民众的支持与乡族的庇护” (2006, 226). The locals 
treated smuggling and even piracy as “an occupation, a pursuit of the good life, or at least 
a way of life” (Zheng 1999, 350-1). Their involvement in smuggling, overseas trading, 
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and piracy supported hundreds of thousands people’s lives in the coastal Fukien (Zheng 
1999). Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that one official-scholar cogently 
stated, “everyone living in the coast was pirates 海濱人人皆賊” (Dai 1982, 32). On 
account of the situation, Wang (2006) commented that the imperial enforcement of 
isolationism signified its immature maritime policy and also exposed the unfamiliarity of 
an agriculture-based civilization with the maritime culture. The cultural clash obviously 
resulted in the official-scholar’s prejudice against all seaboard inhabitants as sea rovers. 
The maritime powers consisted of various bands of sea rovers with loose 
organization in ongoing conflicts. They by no means were all single-mindedly 
cooperating with one another, and the relationships among them were oftentimes strategic 
maneuvers. Chen made a general but straightforward definition about the identity of the 
actors in the maritime powers: “The so-called ‘pirates’ [in the sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century China] in fact were sea-merchant bands involved in the smuggling 
trade” (Chen 2010, 85). Based on their backgrounds, historians divided Chinese pirates at 
the time into two general social groups—the proletarians and the capitalists (Dai 1982; 
Wang 2006; Zheng 1999). The latter consisting of landocrats, bureaucrats, and the local 
magnates, mainly undertook international trade, while the former mostly initiated with 
smuggling. Even so, both groups undertook pillage as an approach to accumulate capital 
(Fu 2007b). At the same time, Japanese ronins also embarked on piracy on the southeast 
coast of China, while the Western adventurers, first Portuguese and then Dutch, 
sequentially arrived at Chinese coast. All of them had more than once engaged in armed 
conflicts with empire, and all of them had done so for one single purpose—trade. Their 
complicated relationships between each other and the empire, as He remarked, teemed 
with “deceitful intrigues and precarious calculations,” but all depended on benefits (2006, 
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8). By all means, they bribed, lobbied battled, and repeatedly negotiated with the empire 
for free trade, but each was unsuccessful. On the situation, Fu commented, “these sea 
merchants’ activities and resistance to the feudal governance was significant to the 
socio-economy in southern seaboard China. However, their every resistance largely 
ended with failure” (2007b, 141).  
Quemoy was at the center of the armed conflicts, set out as a form of negotiations 
between the maritime powers and empire. During the years 1522-1620, Xu and Tang 
(2009) reported forty-seven historical entries in relation to the armed conflicts between 
the maritime powers and empire in Quemoy and its vicinities, and thirty-one during the 
years 1620-1645. Based on these findings, they explained the intensity of the armed 
conflicts in Quemoy (Xu and Tang 2009, 1): 
In the mid-Ming dynasty, the private trade prospered in southeast China. Quemoy 
due to its geographical location was the hot spot of trade in East Asia, and the 
situation consequently coined its maritime characteristic. [Sequentially] conflicts of 
interests constantly happened [in Quemoy and its vicinities]. They first showed in 
the Japanese pirates’ harassment and later in Chinese pirates’ occupation. 
In this view, the “maritime characteristic” of Quemoy emerged through the practice of 
piratical trade, which occurred due to the geographical location of Quemoy, and 
consequently aroused the constant armed negotiation. If so, the distinctive image of 
Quemoy, hinged upon its geographical location and the regional cultural practice, 
appeared for the first time at this time. 
Quemoy is located at the entrance of Xiamen Bay, and, during the age of sailboats, it 
was the last stop before sailing to the ocean. Seaward sailors would often reprovision 
their ships and wait for favorable winds in Quemoy. Conversely, for the seaborne ships 
arriving Southern Fukien, Quemoy was often the terra firma when voyagers cry out 
“Land-Ho!” Its location granted Quemoy significance in the nautical age. However, as 
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Chen explained the causes of Southern Fukien people’s enterprising characteristics, he 
clarified, “living in the seafront was only an environmental factor responsible for 
Southern Fukien people’s enthusiasm for overseas trade and exploration, but not the 
cultural factor” (2006, 230). Chen also indicated the people had a tradition of undertaking 
overseas trade that other people on the coastal Fukien did not have. And so, without 
historical factors in the equation, an investigation into the formation of the maritime 
characteristics of Quemoy would be incomplete. 
After implementation of the scorched earth policy and eviction, most islanders, 
according to the imperial definition, became pirates. During the fourteenth to the 
seventeen century, their islands were the abandoned land of empire, and were largely land 
“out of governmental reach and free from imperial sovereignty” (Zheng 1999, 15). These 
coastal islands were therefore the territory of the maritime powers, and some of them 
were ideal sites for pirate hideouts. Although Quemoy was obviously not an ideal site, 
most islands in its surrounding waters were the lebensraum of the maritime powers. An 
island ten miles southwest to Quemoy, Wuyu 浯嶼, was the major center of pirates at the 
time. Wuyu and Quemoy were both on the outer edge of Xiamen Bay facing the Taiwan 
Strait. While Wuyu guarded the west entrance of the bay, Quemoy did so for the east. 
They were like the pair of guardian lion statues of Xiamen Bay. The Chinese navy had 
used Wuyu as their base until 1489, but thereafter pirates occupied the island in the early 
sixteenth century. Yang (2006) reported that during the years 1518-1549 Portuguese had 
also established their trading post in Wuyu with a settlement of five to six hundred 
inhabitants. The main reason for their presence was trade. Two major commercial port 
cities along the rim of Xiamem Bay, Yuegang 月港 on the west inner corner and Anhai 
安海 on the east one, provided the prospective markets for pirates and overseas 
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merchants. Due to the proximity to the markets and the convenient access to the sea, 
Wuyu became a favorable habitat for pirates. In terms of the rationale behind the 
selection of settlement sites, He elaborated on the Wuyu case (2006, 8): 
These pillagers [pirates] often selected a small island near the mainland as their 
lair . . . It often possessed multiple functions, including the venue for transactions, 
the beachhead for raid, the depository for provisions, plunder, and hostages for 
ransoms. 
As the maritime powers established their base in Wuyu for the Southern Fukien markets, 
Portuguese, Japanese, Chinese pirates, and even the Dutch in the seventeenth century 
were all active in the area. They did not limit their activities to Wuyu, but used all the 
islands in Xiamen Bay for different purposes as needed. Yang (2006), according to 
Portuguese documentation, mentioned that Portuguese traders/pirates had loaded their 
goods in Leiyu; repaired their ships and replenished provisions in Haimen 海門; and 
robbed and burnt civilian boats in a port in Amoy. Their rampant activities in the area, on 
one hand, contributed to the local prosperity from trade, but on the other hand intensified 
their conflicts with the empire. Quemoy as the gateway to the trade centers inevitably 
played a crucial role in the game of negotiation. 
The role Quemoy played was not in line with the imperial expectations. As shown 
by the Portuguese documentation, in Quemoy they had conducted trade, bought 
necessities, recruited sailors, refilled fresh water, and waited for the favorable winds for 
sailing out to the ocean (Yang 2006). Chinese historical documentations congruently 
complemented the Western documentation of the pirate activities in Quemoy. A leading 
official in the anti-pirate war had explicitly indicated that two locations in Quemoy, 
Wusha 烏紗[烏沙] and Laulo 料羅, were where pirates harbored and awaited assistance 
(Chen 2010), while a Quemoy scholar in the mid-sixteenth century bitterly stated that 
“Laulo was a pirate lair 料羅為賊巢穴” (Kuo 2008b, 184). In addition, recent historic 
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research also shows that some Quemoy inhabitants in the sixteenth century also actively 
engaged in maritime enterprises, a felony at the time. Among these people, commoners 
conducted overseas trade in Taiwan and Ryukyu Kingdom (current Okinawa, Japan) on a 
regular basis, and the gentry through their pirate kins accumulated tremendous fortunes 
(Chen 2010). Furthermore, Quemoyans did not always commit the felony for economic 
activities but also for noncritical reasons, which suggested international travel was 
commonplace in Quemoy: A married townsman who enjoy travel sold all his inherited 
properties for the hobby, eventually abandoned his wife to journey to Luzon, the 
Philippines, and died there (Chen 2010; Lee 2004b). Informed by these historical records 
and studies, it is clear that Quemoy residents had long standing involvement in maritime 
activities. They accommodated the sea rovers and had a complicated relationship with 
them far from the simple friend-foe dichotomy as the empire designated. On the other 
hand, pirates did not stop visiting Quemoy even though the island was an “imperial 
territory,” nor did the deployment of coastal defenses deter them. For the local inhabitants, 
who constantly embarked on border-crossing activities, it is doubtful how effective the 
political demarcation of the empire could severe the locals from their conventional 
lifeworld, from their ties with the sea voyagers, and from their traditional ways of life. 
The locals’ cognitive territory, in this case, obviously coexisted with the imposed imperial 
defense line, in the negotiation of forming a new territorial conception. 
In addition, some of the facts unraveled by the historical documentation, though they 
might not be representative of all inhabitants’ conduct at the time, manifested that the 
locals in Quemoy were not absent from the center stage of the nautical age albeit their 
pursuits were illegal in imperial eyes. Their involvement in the maritime enterprise 
developed the distinctive characteristic of Quemoy, which however did not signify a total 
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conversion of Quemoy into a maritime powers’ territory. The island was still home of 
imperial subjects, who however could be simultaneously maritime adventurers since their 
viking identity was undercover and fluid. The place identity of Quemoy at the time was 
neither an imperial outpost nor a pirate lair, but developed into a continuous process of 
dialectic becoming in the negotiation. The constructed social reality of Quemoy then 
articulated the hybrid and ambiguous identities of a border island. 
By the neither/nor strategy of identity negotiation, the locals in opposition to the 
binary identities of Quemoy attained control of place and developed bonding with place 
in the struggle against pirate raids. In response to the social condition, landscape in 
Quemoy changed accordingly, and the same ambiguity and hybridity showed in the 
landscape. In addition to the state fortifications, civilians constructed considerable 
defense works to protect themselves from pirates. In 1558, only in the western capital of 
Quemoy, Hopu 後浦, the locals “built a hundred and three forts 築堡百三座” (Wang 
2006, 83). Throughout this time, destruction of fortifications in pirate raids aroused 
another reconstruction with even more fortifications. These defense works militarized the 
landscape in Quemoy, and gradually consolidated the image of an imperial outpost. On 
the other hand, the number of ports also greatly increased. Among them, seven ports had 
ferries in operation to four mainland seaboard cities in the Quanzhou and Chincheo 
prefecture, while Laulo on the southeast corner of Quemoy was the major port to 
overseas islands like Pescadores (current Penghu county, Taiwan), Taiwan, the Ryukyu 
Kingdom (Xu and Tang 2009). The appearances of these transportation facilities 
emphasized the busy water traffic and the local reliance on the maritime activities in the 
nautical age. Together the development of water transportation and construction of 
fortifications revealed a weakening imperial isolationism on its maritime policy and the 
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locals’ damage control in their pursuit of the maritime activities. The both/and also 
identity of Quemoy in between an imperial outpost and a maritime adventurers’ habitat 
emerged, while the fortifications, that articulated the local everyday practice of living in 
an imperial outpost and pursuing the maritime ventures, became the landscape memorials 
which embodied the locals’ negotiation with empire and the maritime powers in the 
constitution of their homeland. 
Since the Ming Empire constructed the walled city, Quemoy in 1387, the island’s 
front reversed from the mainland and turned defensively toward the sea. In opposition, 
when the maritime powers confronting the Ming Empire captured Quemoy, they would 
deploy their front toward the mainland. The struggle between the empire and the sea 
powers had briefly affected the front-rear disposition of Quemoy a few times in the 
history. Oftentimes, due to the nature of roving bands, their occupation of Quemoy ended 
swiftly after they completed pillaging raids. Following their departure, the disposition 
soon turned back with the front toward the sea. However, anomalies did happen. In the 
seventeenth century, a maritime regime originating in Anhai held Quemoy captive as its 
capital for two generations, and changed the front-rear disposition for more than half a 
century. 
The band of rovers led by Nicholas Iquan 鄭芝龍 primarily undertook overseas 
trading, which made them wanted by the government. After consecutive victories over 
the imperial army, the emerging maritime powers overwhelmed the defensive forces of 
the declining empire in the region and gradually gained control of Southern Fukien from 
the 1620s. When Iquan’s fleet anchored on Quemoy and Amoy in 1626, thousands of 
islanders voluntarily enrolled in his gang. The expansion also helped Iquan to monopolize 
international trade, especially silk in East Asia. His power grew to the extent that 
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eventually impelled the empire to compromise, and offered him the position of a naval 
officer to nominally subsume his fleets under the imperial authority in 1629. The title 
empowered Iquan and granted his gang official support to “righteously” eradicate his 
business competitors—other bands of sea rovers. The privilege eventually made his gang 
a hegemonic power in the South and East China Sea. The Xiamen Bay area, the 
homeland of most of Iquan’s gang, was the core of this maritime regime—an area that 
had long been troubled by its ambiguous identities between a pirate hive and the nursery 
of imperial officialdom. Iquan’s success no doubt maximized the inbetweeness of the 
identity that its people incubated for centuries to liberate themselves from the dreadful 
dichotomy of the two conflicting place identities. 
In 1644, the Manchu people vanquished the Ming Empire and established the last 
dynasty of the imperial China, the Qing Dynasty. Iquan’s son, Koxinga 鄭成功, lead his 
army into battle against the invading troops of the new land regime in order to recover 
China from the non-Han rule and to restore the Ming Empire. Based in Quemoy and 
Amoy, his battle against the newly established Qing Empire lasted for thirty-four years 
until his retreat to Taiwan in 1680. During the war, the imperial troops captured Quemoy 
twice, and scorched the island during their occupation, evicting everyone on the island. 
Although the desertion consequently dissolved the six-century development in Quemoy, 
it simultaneously allowed the overpopulated environment a recess that allowed some 
natural ecosystem restoration. The evacuation of Quemoy deterritorialized the island, and 
vaporized its front-rear disposition. Inasmuch as Quemoy turned into an uninhabited 
island in the buffer zone between the two regimes, the loss of identity abstracted Quemoy 
from its historical context. Its prepositional relations—front vs. back, upside vs. downside, 
and right vs. left—largely called in correspondence only to the cardinal points on the 
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compass. The war wiped out the place identity along with its sense of places. Not until 
the Qing Empire annexed Taiwan in 1683 and returned the Quemoy natives to their 
homeland, did Quemoy regain its sense of orientation within a sound geopolitical context. 
2.6 Homeland: Diffusion of Quemoy Fraternity Guilds 
Since the mid-sixteenth century, emigration from Quemoy followed its 
overpopulated environmental destruction, the pirate war, and the economic stagnation 
induced by the Seafaring Ban. Certainly, the development of maritime navigation during 
the nautical age also promoted emigration to southeast Asia and Taiwan. During the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century, pirates and overseas merchants were the two major 
groups of emigrants. Compared with the later overseas emigration waves, the number of 
emigrants before the mid-seventeenth century was relatively small. After Imperial China 
annexed Taiwan in 1683, the geopolitical importance of Quemoy, as an imperial frontier, 
declined. The forefront of empire advanced to Taiwan, and whereby the Taiwan Strait 
became an imperial territory. Meanwhile, because Amoy Island in Xiamen Bay gradually 
developed into a major international trading port in the eighteenth century, its growing 
influence deprived Quemoy of its status as the port of embarkation for overseas voyages. 
Consequently, most Quemoy ports during the eighteenth century became facilities for 
domestic traffic (Lee 2004b). Even so, the local enthusiasm for maritime activities did not 
wither away, and the acquisition of Taiwan as the new imperial territory motivated 
Quemoyans to embark on overseas expansion through emigration. The Pescadores 
Archipelago, midway between Taiwan and Quemoy, was the stepping stone in this pursuit. 
Their expansion to the archipelago resulted in 70 percent of its current population 
originating from Quemoy (Xie, Yang and Wang 2003). Moving forward, a considerable 
number of Quemoy emigrants also settled in the major port cities in Taiwan during the 
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eighteenth century. In these colonies, they built temples for their beliefs, and, by their 
adherence to the homeland deities, organized fraternity guilds to assist each other in 
adapting to the new life. Unlike the earlier time when the emigrants from Quemoy were 
merchants or pirates, the majority of emigrants at the time were peasants. The change of 
emigrant groups indicated a different objective for permanent settlements instead of 
trading outposts. The aspiration for the fertile land and opportunities then initiated a new 
wave of emigration and subsequently set off another landscape evolution by the 
immigrant communities in Taiwan. 
Emigration from Quemoy climaxed after Amoy became one of the five treaty ports 
of China in 1842. During 1915-1929, a surge of emigration removed 40 percent of the 
population from Quemoy, amounting to roughly 30,000 people (Fan 2010). Because most 
of the young worked abroad, the economy of their original society heavily relied on their 
remittances. Via Amoy, most of the Quemoy young at the age of sixteen or seventeen 
would leave for the European colonial countries in southeast Asian countries, mainly 
Singapore, and worked there as contract workers. Some of the single men would return 
and got married after a few years abroad. After marriage, they would again head to work 
abroad, and send back remittances to support their families. Among them, a few would be 
successful enough to return to Quemoy with their savings, by which they generally would 
build a flamboyant Western-style mansion 洋樓 as the family residence and their 
retirement home. After construction, these overseas merchants would leave again to their 
immigrant countries, and worked there until retirement. For the emigrants, marriage, 
house building, and retirement were their three rites of passage known as “the trilogy of 
overseas Chinese” (Fan 2010). However, their fate, as a Quemoy proverb figuratively 
portrayed, was grim, and most of them returned home in coffins: “six die; three stay; and 
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one returns 六亡三在一回頭” (Chen 2003, 84). In reality, the proportion of returning 
emigrants was lower than one tenth; “only one or two of a hundred could return home, 
and not more than two or three of a thousand could return with gains 得歸者百無一、二
焉，其貿易獲利歸者千無二、三焉” (Lin 1987, 395). For those who could return for 
retirement, the Western-style mansions were the tokens of their success in the foreign 
countries, and also the pompous statement made to the public on the homeland (Jiang 
2003). In this sense, the construction of the Western-style mansions encompassed more 
than the functional purpose of retirement abodes but also a cultural purpose to show off.16 
As the construction turned into a customary practice for the returned emigrants, these 
mansions also became the preeminent landscape signifiers of the emigrant culture. 
In Singapore, their major colony, emigrants from Quemoy initially affiliated 
themselves to the Fukien group, but the majority of the Fukien group—emigrants from 
other areas of Fukien including Chincheo, Quanzhou, and Yongchun 永
春—marginalized Quemoyans due to their origin from a small island (Chi 2003). After 
growing in number, these Quemoy emigrants then organized their own fraternity guilds 
on the basis of common lineages, trades, or beliefs. Due to the process of chain 
emigration, the lineage-based guilds, as the infrastructural but independent units of their 
emigrant organizations, often outnumbered other guilds organized by profession and 
religion. However, neither of the two influential guilds with most members was lineage 
based because the Quemoy emigrants worked only in a few trades in their colonies but 
came from numerous clans in Quemoy. These organizations often shared similar 
objectives, such as assisting and accommodating new comers, settling disputes between 
Quemoy emigrants, gathering strength in conflicts with other ethnic groups, and raising 
                                                 
16 On the subject of showing-off, please refer to Philip Wagner’s monograph (1996) for details. 
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funds for dead members’ burials. Among these fraternity guilds, the Quemoy Association 
金門會館 was the most significant one. Quemoy migrants in Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia were all welcome to join. The guild was located in the temple of Pasture Lord 
which had the same name—Fuji Temple—as the original in Quemoy. The location and 
the naming of place both intended to construct the representativeness of the guild. “The 
Singapore Fuji Temple symbolized Quemoy,” and by the symbolization “the [founders’] 
intention to make it the supreme organization of all Quemoyans was obvious” (Chi 2003, 
3). In this view, not only the homeland culture, the Pasture Lord belief here, shaped their 
collective identity as Quemoyans, but the Quemoy emigrants also employed the culture 
as instruments to structure their power relations and hierarchy in the colony. 
The power structure in the colony was often an extension of what existed in the 
Chinese homeland. For Fukien migrants, Quemoyans from a small border island were 
marginal and insignificant. Mainland emigrants perceptually discriminated against these 
islanders in their group and marginalized them. The belittling treatment spurred 
Quemoyans to establish their own fraternity guilds, and further reinforced their 
independent group identity. The counteraction to marginalization and the 
acknowledgement of their independent group identity eventually led the overseas 
Quemoyans to appeal for the establishment of Quemoy County in 1913. The Fukien 
provincial government approved the appeal in 1915, and upgraded Quemoy from a 
neighborhood to a county. The autonomous uplift empowered the overseas Quemoyans in 
their negotiation with other ethnic groups in the colonies since Quemoy attained a higher 
status in the administrative system. The change of homeland could also influence the 
emigrant society. For Quemoy migrants, their clan-centered ideology and localism were 
how they constituted their imagined community and constructed their group identities in 
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the homeland. The chain emigration from lineage villages assured the continuity of these 
ideologies which cued the overseas Quemoyans to conventionally organize their guilds 
according to clanship. The sectionalism also prompted them to act on the benefits of their 
own clans and fraternity guilds. The reinvented simulacrum of their home society in the 
colony thereby reproduced and transplanted the power relations, especially those between 
clans, from their homeland to the emigrant societies. The politics among Quemoy 
emigrant groups certainly existed and their fraternity organizations teemed with exclusive 
sectionalism.  
Nonetheless, in the face of challenges from other ethnic groups, Quemoy emigrants 
were also able to stick together under the same flag of a common local belief. The 
establishment of the non-exclusive guilds was their strategy to coup with marginalized 
situation in dealing with others—the mainland ethnic groups and the Western colonial 
governments—while at the meantime showcasing their collective identity. Even though 
their fraternity guilds were mostly based on the homeland-bound localism, the same 
localism also facilitated them to transcend the political boundaries between Southeast 
Asian countries and to entitle all Quemoy emigrants eligible to be members of the 
Quemoy Association. The contrast between their insistence on the specific geography of 
homeland and their indifference to the colonial geography disclosed the unsettled 
geographical understanding of their residence. Deterritorialization and reterritorialization 
in this sense came hand in hand with cultural diffusion in the diaspora.  
While Quemoy exported its people and culture to southeast Asia, a backflow of 
colonial cultures also imbued Quemoy with modern exotic charm. The Western-style 
mansions were the most prominent symbol of the emigrant culture in the homeland 
landscape attesting to the cultural exchange. The two- or three-floor mansions were often 
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in a hybrid style between Chinese traditional architecture and the Western colonial one. 
They were made to be readable for the locals in Quemoy about the owners’ overseas 
success. Despite the hybridity, the architectural principles of Chinese tradition, such as 
fengshui, still overwhelmingly conditioned and contextualized these buildings in the 
traditional folk villages.17 Their layout, orientation, and interior design were all 
compromises between the two styles, while their architectural design, especially of the 
façade, comprehensively adopted the classic and Baroque architectural features, 
iconography, and ornamentation (Jiang 2003). On top of iconography (such as British 
soldiers, Indian policemen, clocks, angels, and the globe), some of the mansions also 
included owners’ Romanized names, the completion dates in Christian calendar, and even 
English idioms, like “Union Is Strength” on the façade. With their exotic elements, the 
great size of these mansions made them prominent statements in the landscape. Both their 
pomposity and heterogeneity challenged the traditional ideologies and conventions, and 
aroused another cultural adaptation. 
The overseas merchants, as the nouveau riche, formed a new class of capitalists at 
the time in China. Their rise challenged the conventional social stratification and the 
gentry’s authority in the feudal society. As nouveau riche gestures in the landscape, these 
Western-style mansions signified “the formation of a new power structure different from 
the one in the past in which clan heads and the gentry had the authority” (Jiang 2003, 
123). Heights of the mansion were often an issue between the returned emigrants and the 
authority in their home villages because the traditional architecture principles forbade 
houses standing above the ancestral halls. The two- or three-floor modern buildings 
                                                 
17 For details on symbolism, fengshui, and iconography of Chinese folk housing, please refer to Knapp’s 
book (1999) for details. 
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however oftentimes were higher than the one-story ancestor hall. In a traditional village, 
the villagers would restrain the construction of the Western-style buildings, and expected 
the returned emigrants to reinvent their inherited properties inside the village, abiding by 
the conventional construction guidelines of fengshui. Otherwise, for those with the 
intention to boast their overseas success by the flamboyant architecture, their mansions 
were rarely situated in the villages. They would need to acquire another lot on the 
outskirts of the villages to complete their pompous statement to their kins. Nonetheless, 
even a location on the outskirts could bring conflicts with conventional guidelines 
obviously when topography was involved in the site selection: As shown in most hillside 
villages, the periphery, due to its altitude, could still be higher than the ancestor halls, and 
further complicated site selection. Other than abiding by the conventions, nouveau riche 
sometimes disregarded the traditional principles, and situated their mansions inside the 
village.18 In other cases, as villagers generally well adapted to the foreign culture 
(especially in villages with a large population working abroad) they might by fundraising 
rebuild the ancestor hall in the Western style to maintain its prominent stance in the 
community. In this manner, emergence of the mansions in traditional folk villages often 
had undergone a process of adaptation and negotiation over their locations, orientation, 
and other architecture details. The negotiated outcome was “an important indicator of 
social transformation of the overseas Chinese home villages” (Jiang 2003, 169).  
These merchants’ wide adoption of the Western material culture in their everyday 
lives, such as flush toilets, western attire, and culinary fashion, was their way to 
                                                 
18 Jiang (2003) provides Chen Qin-Ji’s 陳清吉 mansion in the Bishan 碧山 village as an example of the 
disregard of conventions. His three-story mansion is located next to a two-story ancestor hall also in the 
Western architectural style after renovation. A year before the mansion construction in 1931, villagers had 
renovated the ancestor hall through fundraising (Jiang 2002). Their tolerance for the mansion might 
partially attribute to the acceptance of the architectural style since the ancestor hall had already adopted it. 
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distinguish themselves from their fellow villagers and to flaunt their life experience in 
foreign countries. Modern inventions symbolized the European colonialists’ privileges of 
the ruling class in the colonies that most of these emigrants could not attain under their 
rule in the colonial cities. By the possession of these novelties, the returned emigrants 
figuratively transferred the colonialist authority to themselves, and employed modernity 
as their cultural capital construing their social position in their homeland. The cultural 
superiority derived from the heterogeneity ultimately associating with imperialism in 
southeast Asia. Their fondness for the Western culture treated as the advanced and the 
superior inevitably discomforted nationalists and conservatives in the revolutionary era. 
The conflicts between the authority in the homeland and the overseas merchants were 
basically ideological, and fundamentally stemmed from their expressive cultural practice 
and its spatial production. As Quemoy people conventionally addressed the emigration to 
southeast Asia as “down to the barbarians’ 落番,” the out-of-placeness of these 
emigrants’ everyday practice and cultural creations against the homeland culture 
articulated the distinctness of other cultures and more importantly the struggles aroused 
by the impingement of cultural exchange. 
As the cultural transmitters, the overseas Quemoy emigrants mediated the mutual 
cultural diffusion and brought about cultural hybridity in their colonies and the homeland. 
Living out-of-place in the foreign lands, they transplanted the homeland culture to be 
being-in-the-world of Quemoy, while living at home in Quemoy, they transferred the 
colonial culture to be out-of-place. Their out of placeness and placelessness revealed their 
constantly dwelling inbetween home and foreign countries. The location of their hybrid 
culture was neither the homeland nor their colonies but intersubjectivity of its 
congregation; whereby the place-bound identity of these emigrants was fluid and unstable, 
122 
always in motion. The border-crossing activities, as the prevailing cultural practice of 
Quemoy inhabitants, emancipated their identity from the bonds to a single place. Their 
identities thus reposed in the multilocality. Through the omnipresent heterogeneity in the 
landscape, the deterritorialization at home set the Quemoy locals in travel: They were at 
home in the physical landscape of Quemoy, but were simultaneously not-at-home 
surrounded by foreign simulacra, novelties, and iconographies/ideologies. The 
ambivalence of multicultural formations “celebrates the space of margins, of 
inbetweeness and hybridity, as privileged locations from which to challenge hegemonic 
notions” (McEwan 2004, 506). For Quemoy inhabitants, the agents of hybrid culture, the 
border island was the cultural arena to perform and to negotiate with Chinese tradition. 
The ambiguity and polysemy embedded in the landscape embodied their negotiations to 
insinuate heterogeneous material culture, such as the Western-style mansions, which 
articulated their immediate experience of “travelling-in-dwelling and 
dwelling-in-travelling” (Lury 1997, 78). Their saga was seeking to locate or relocate their 
culture amid intersubjectivity, to retrieve or reinvent their homeland image in motion 
continued until the nationalist army isolated Quemoy from outside communication after 
the Chinese Civil War in 1949. 
A distinctive phenomenon in the last negotiation is worth extra attention. Since the 
sixteenth century, the locals had endeavored to mold an image of Quemoy in accordance 
with Chinese conventions and cultural norms to showcase their conformity to the 
dominant culture and to counteract its marginalization. In opposition to this intention, the 
appearance of the Western-style mansions in the landscape of Quemoy marked the 
cessation of the social construction. The introduction of European cultural features to the 
landscape of Quemoy inevitably contaminated the local Chineseness and subsequently 
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substantiated the marginality of the community. However, in constructing a homeland of 
overseas Chinese, the insular community compromised their adherence to the Chinese 
tradition and accommodated heterogenous cultures through negotiation. In this case, the 
Quemoy locals’ acceptance of Otherness, which tended to undermine their 
hundreds-years efforts of image producing, signified not only a shift of cultural paradigm 
but also their emancipation from the labor of Chineseness construction. After all, 
Chineseness was, from its beginning, a fake issue. Its construction was just a strategy of 
identity politics for lives in an imperial frontier. With the paradigm shift, when the locals 
in Quemoy switched their concerns on the clash between the Chinese and the Western 
cultures, cultural negotiation found itself another arena in the relevant discursive fields. It 
was just that, however, this time the Quemoy locals would have to negotiate with their 
own creation. 
Through my examination of Quemoy’s history, I identify three geographical 
characters that promote the occurrence of the historical events: a maritime traffic hub, a 
supply plantation, and an imperial frontier. These three characters reveal in Quemoy in a 
temporal order, but affect Quemoy interactively. In addition, all of them contribute to the 
cultural hybridity of Quemoy. From the beginning of human occupation, Quemoy 
benefited from its geographical situation and environmental condition, both of which 
make it an ideal habitat of sea nomads. Quemoy was on the migration route along the 
southeast coast of China, and more importantly was the starting point of the overseas 
voyage to Taiwan and other islands on the Pacific Rim. Its character then positioned 
Quemoy at the intersection of the maritime traffic, and later facilitated the locals in 
Quemoy to establish their trade network in Taiwan, Japan, and the southeast Asian 
countries. Due to its geographical situation, Quemoy became a favorable contact point of 
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the maritime powers with imperial China, and the genealogical origin of many inhabitants 
in Pescadores and Taiwan. Its character as a traffic node nourished its maritime 
characteristics in the nautical age and its inhabitants’ enthusiasm for maritime activities, 
which eventually made Quemoy a homeland of overseas Chinese in the modern time. 
On the other hand, its geographical location excluded Quemoy from the Han 
Chinese cultural sphere. Even long after Chinese annexed the island into its territory, 
Quemoy never shrugged off its marginal identity. The geographical marginality of 
Quemoy constantly vexes its inhabitants with consequent cultural marginality. They 
struggle against their possible identities of inferior others and alternative cultural 
practitioners, like Tan and the maritime powers. To counteract the marginalization, the 
Quemoy locals have fostered a tendency to predate their history so as to Sinicize their 
ancestors and their land as early as possible. For the same purpose, they have also 
devoted themselves to production of historical discourse that conveys an image of 
Quemoy in accordance with the Chinese core values of Confucianism. These efforts and 
the molded image consequently govern the locals’ understanding of their past. Challenges 
to the taken-for-granted understanding may trigger the defense mechanism out of their 
bonding with place and control of place through knowledge. However, their construction 
of the representative image of Quemoy does not always convince their Chinese coevals of 
their adherence to the Han-centric culture. Ultimately, some of their cultural praxes, 
especially those of their traditional ways of life, can hardly be attributed to the category. 
All the livelihoods transplanted to Quemoy by empire eventually proved 
unsuccessful and even the best adaptive land use, salt-making, degraded to merely one 
slightly better option among worse alternatives against maritime economic activities. 
Although environmental adaptation, as a necessary process of landscape evolution, 
125 
contributed to the development of a place in the end, it nonetheless connoted an 
exploitative nature of colonial enterprises during the adaptive process. The imposition of 
the livelihoods and of the market demands of the dominant society upon others in the 
colony constituted the very basis of a plantation economy. The heavy reliance of these 
colonial industries on the foreign investments in the local economic development 
explained their susceptibility to the socio-political condition in the mainland. In addition, 
the arbitrary establishment accompanying with immigration crashed the ecosystem with 
overpopulation, and the consequent environmental degradation manifested the sensitivity 
of the islandness of Quemoy. After all, its lack of land and the extra expenditure on 
shipping had preconditioned Quemoy’s development of these land-based industries, and 
was often the direct causality responsible for their unproductivity. 
Nonetheless, these experimental industries left the Quemoy community essential 
legacies of which the belief of Pasture Lord, as the genius loci of Quemoy, ranks 
foremost. The deity and its temple over time becomes one of the cultural emblems of 
Quemoy. Secondly, the environmental adaptation enabled the constitution of a stratified 
society and an independent economic network. With the success of environmental 
adaptation, the emerging local gentry kept the industrial gains within the insular 
community, and by accumulation ushered the community into its “post-colonial” period. 
The island thence no longer served as a supply plantation for the mainland market. 
However, during its development, an essential part of the economic network, the overseas 
trade, conflicted with the imperial interests. The incongruity led the empire to interrupt 
the fledging economic development by the construction of an imperial frontier. The 
coordinate system of Quemoy reversed after the construction along with the gradual 
development of southwest Quemoy into the economic and political center. Perhaps, in the 
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imperial view, the imperial frontier should be the best and conclusive environmental 
adaptation of Quemoy, but for the islanders, being an absolutely obedient subject was an 
unbearable renouncement to their collective past and future altogether. 
The character of an imperial frontier thus constantly provoked negotiation. Through 
manifold ways—knowledge production, everyday practice, economic activities, and 
armed conflicts—the locals negotiated with empire about their group identity and the 
identity of Quemoy. The negotiation brought forth an ambiguous and hybrid landscape 
that responsively articulated a both/and also identity of Quemoy in between an imperial 
outpost and a sea rovers’ home. The third-space that the Quemoy locals created then 
enabled them to resist the hegemonic dichotomy of the imposed place identities, and 
exempted them from falling into either category of the rival identities. The 
“real-and-imagined” places were where their homeland identity resided, and the 
negotiation was their continuous journey to locate the homeland-anchored identity. The 
homeland turned even more impressive and experiential when the locals in Quemoy 
initiated chain emigration to southeast Asian countries. In the face of Otherness, the 
Quemoy emigrants’ everyday cultural performance, or cultural reenactment, reasserted 
their homeland-bound identities. The repetitive construction of their group identities in 
the everyday out-of-placeness constituted the daily experience of Quemoyans abroad. To 
feel at-home, the emigrants in the colonies created a simulacrum of Quemoy to live in, 
while for Quemoy to be the homeland of its overseas habitants its landscape also have to 
shine an exotic tint. The deterritorialization injected another dimension of cultural 
negotiation into the identity evolution of the border island. The multiculturality engaged 
the real-and-imagined homeland in a continuous process of negotiations. 
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Through Quemoy’s geographical biography, a repetitive theme emerges in company 
with negotiations between the locals and empire due to Quemoy’s geographical and 
cultural marginality. After the Han settlers dislodged the sea nomads and established 
functioning colonies in Quemoy, the immigrant society, relying on the mainland 
resources and market, orientated the front toward its mother country. This front-rear 
disposition persisted till the imperial construction of military facilities along Quemoy’s 
south and east coast that moved its social center to the western half and drew the social 
attention toward the sea. The first reversal of Quemoy’s front-rear orientation greatly 
contributed to the formation of local place identity and group subjectivity, and forwarded 
the immigrant society into landscape impress stage. The formation of a local gentry class 
and a stratified society also celebrated and consolidated the Quemoy’s new disposition. 
With the developing subjectivity and identification, Quemoyans negotiated with empire 
to adopt a new evaporation method for slat-making and to permit privatization of salt 
trade so to end economic stagnation. The imperial concession of its salt policy 
nonetheless did not suffice to sustain the local economy, but allowed the locals to operate 
mercantile vessels despite the Seafaring Ban. Overseas trade thus grasped Quemoy’s 
social-economic attention. To the climax of this identity formation, Iquan and Koxinga 
led the locals to form a maritime regime confronting with the empires based on Quemoy 
and Amoy. The confrontation re-orientated Quemoy’s front as well as its social concerns 
toward the mainland for nearly six decades till the imperial annexation of Taiwan in 1683 
terminated the maritime regime and the second reversal of Quemoy’s orientation. The 
imperial military and political expansion to Taiwan ignited the local aspiration for 
overseas colonization in the new imperial territory and, later, southeast Asian countries. 
The migration waves re-directed the local social concerns outward toward the sea, and 
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incurred the third reversal. The new front remained true for 266 years till the Chinese 
Civil War cordoned off Quemoy to be the forefront of the nationalist regime in Taiwan in 
1949. The repetitive reversals of the insular dispositions in the pre-modern Quemoy 
thematized its history, and ultimately forged its border island identity. 
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CHAPTER 3  REVERSING THE GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATE SYSTEM: 
MILITARIZATION AFTER 1949 
The orientation of the geographical prepositions, the insular front toward the land or 
the sea, articulates the social condition of the insular community and its geopolitical 
relations to other groups in the vicinities. As the reversal and the dissolution of the 
front-rear disposition has shown, change in the disposition often involves critical social 
transformation, which, likewise, often brings forth overall landscape change, the 
construction of fortifications, for instance. For this reason, an investigation into landscape 
change in regard to the geographical prepositional relations will account for the social 
relations of Quemoy. This is to say that not only the geopolitical relations of Quemoy are 
embedded in its landscape, but also its internal social relations are inscribed therein. The 
prepositional relations represent a schema of social configuration, and provide a general 
reading of the social state through the landscape composition. With the prepositional 
relations as measurement, the significance of changes in the landscape can thus be 
comprehensible.  
Symbolisms of the Geographical Coordinate System 
A geographical coordinate system denotes for spatial relations generating from 
bodily experience which produces a set of dichotomous ideas about direction, location, 
and distance—front-back, up-down, right-left, and by the relative distance in-out (Figure 
3.1). Derived from ontological experience, these dichotomous ideas mean more than 
spatial indexes but also comprise symbolism associated with positive and negative values. 
Although these values are culturally bound rather than universal, Tuan indicates “certain 
cross-cultural similarities exist” (1977, 34). Concurring, Richardson further clarifies the 
value-laden symbolism of the coordinate system (2003, 34-5):  
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In this particular model, space that is ahead, above, and to the right of the body has a 
greater positive value than space that is behind, below, and to the left. Translated 
into time, the future beckons ahead and above, and the past fades behind and 
beneath. Translated into Christian cosmology, heaven rises above, hell resides 
below . . . . 
By the clarification, human structuring of their experiential world through sensory organs 
is both individual and collective. The individuality of the construct hinges up on the 
bodily engagement in the spatial organization, while the collectiveness unfolds in the 
process of ramification that culturally begets one signifier after another and another.  
The symbolic dimension of the spatial prepositions hence manifests the underlying 
intersubjectivity carrying the value-laden sense of space. Accounting for the 
collectiveness, Tuan further expands the application of this symbolism from a human 
body to a man-made environment, and proposes that “the historical movement of a 
people can give a sense of spatial asymmetry to a whole region or nation” (1977, 42). In 
other words, a geographic area, for historical or cultural reasons, can also acquire its 
value-laden spatial prepositions and together a geographical coordinate system. The 
F u t u r e  
Figure 3.1. Spatial Prepositions of Human Body 
Coordinate and Their Symbolisms [Source: Tuan 1977] 
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symbolism thus constitutes the spatial order that culturally instructs people how to 
(re)structure their landscape. In a planned environment, people tend to situate things that 
are important and engaging in the front, on the right, to the top, and at the center. 
Changes of the coordinate system often signifies a value shift that the important and 
engaging foci no longer draw social attention. Such a switch of social foci evidently and 
dramatically emerges when the geographical coordinate system reverses. 
In Quemoy, the reversal of its coordinate system has occurred four times since 1387. 
The fourth reversal of the coordinate system occurred in 1949, when the Chinese 
Nationalists militarized Quemoy against the communist military deterrence (Tsai 1999). 
The reversal resembled in Koxinga’s military resistance to the imperial rule in the second 
reversal, but went even further. Militarization in the modern total war not only induced 
the front-back reversal and the left-right relocation of the local center, but with its 
completion also produced a military landscape with rigid demarcations, pragmatic utility, 
and strict hierarchy. This chapter explores the landscape manifestation of Quemoy’s 
coordinate system’s last reversal after 1949 under militarization that has hitherto oriented 
the island to the mainland, and briefly discusses the current dissolution of the forth 
reversal under demilitarization. 
3.1  A New Front toward the Mainland China 
After China won the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the Chinese 
nationalists turned their guns toward the communists. U.S. President Truman sent George 
Marshall to conciliate the conflict between the two major parties of the Republic of China 
(R.O.C.). Marshall spent a year in China, but left in failure in 1947. Upon his return, the 
U.S. government declared a non-intervention policy toward the Chinese domestic 
situation. The Chinese Civil War quickly burst out, and resulted in the establishment of 
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the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.). The war reached a deadlock in 1949 after the 
nationalist army won the battle of Guningtou 古寧頭 in Quemoy. By the victory, the 
nationalist troops successfully stopped the communist troops from advancing further, but 
the victory also separated Quemoy from the mainland. The arbitrary separation severed 
the traditional social ties between people in Quemoy and those in the mainland, and 
ripped apart the economic networks, the religious cults, and the kindred community 
between the two sides of Xiamen Bay. 
Following the collapse of the social structure, the nationalist regime further imposed 
an antagonistic relationship upon Quemoyans toward the “communist bandits” on the 
other side of the waters. In an interview with a local historian, Huang, I asked how the 
Quemoy people today deal with the wartime memory when undertaking reconciliation 
with the people in the P.R.C., who as the former enemy had killed and injured their close 
ones in the conflicts and caused their suffering under the shellfire. To answer my question, 
Huang first pointed out a stranded community of Quemoyans in the mainland, suggesting 
the civilian impotence during the war and its arbitrariness: When the war burst out in 
1949, a considerable number of Quemoy people then travelling in the mainland were 
involuntarily stranded on the communist side.19 They generally included three groups of 
people—first, war fugitives fleeing to the mainland during the second Sino-Japanese War 
(1937-1945); second, businessmen and employees working in the mainland before the 
Civil War (1947-1950); and third in rare cases, enlistees in the nationalist army.20 Due to 
the detention, many relatives or acquaintances of Quemoyans have long been in the 
                                                 
19 Although the total of Quemoy people in the mainland today is unknown, estimates of those in the Fukien 
range from 4,000 (Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 7th Feb. 2001) to 24,000 (Quemoy Daily, 23 Sep. 2004).  
20 Several news reports concerning the reunion of people in the two sides illustrate this matter in details: 
See stories of Wu (Strait Weekly [Xiamen], 20 Jan. 2006), of Chiu (Quemoy Daily, 26 Jun. 2003), of Xu 
(Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 7 Feb. 2001), and of Lin (Quemoy Daily, 9 Nov. 2004). 
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former “enemy” side since 1949. Mentioning the situation, he then asked, “how do you 
define [who is the] enemy?” (Huang 2004b). Today for the locals freed from the imposed 
relationship to the mainlanders, the “evil communist bandits 萬惡的共匪” appearing in 
the past nationalist slogans were ideological creation of the authoritative propaganda and 
McCarthyism (Figure 3.2). Huang reminiscently concluded his answer with a proverb: 
“Being a dog in a peaceful time is better than being a man in a chaotic period 寧為太平
犬，不做亂世人. It [the war] was the great tragedy of the epoch 大時代的悲劇” (Huang 
2004b). His answer suggested the local elite’s attitude toward the past conflict and the 
local common desire for peace through reconciliation with the mainland society. In order 
to undertake the reconciliation, he attributed the past suffering to the turbulent milieu of 
the anticommunist era, and alienated himself and his fellow Quemoyans from their 
involvement, if not contributions, in the war. He further totalized all participants in the 
warfare as victims of the epoch. In so doing, the discourse exempted the past enemy from 
their responsibility for the local suffering, and emancipated the local community from the 
antagonistic relationship. The oblivion and alienation therefore assisted the locals to 
transcend the past conflict in the new age of reconciliation. 
The imposition of the binary opposition between we (patriotic civilians) and they 
(communist bandits) resembled the imperial dichotomy between the obedient subjects 
and the sea rovers in the late sixteenth century and Koxinga’s dichotomy between the 
Han nationalists and the un-Chinese invaders in the seventeenth century. As the conflicts 
constructed the group identities and vice versa the manipulation of identity politics 
sustained the belligerent condition, the similarities between these wars which caused 
reversals and dissolutions of the geographical coordinate system of Quemoy revealed a 
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Figure 3.2.  A Slogan on the Folk House. The slogan read 
as “Annihilate the Evil Communist Bandits” showed on a 
wall of the folk house at the entrance of Oucuo 歐厝 
village. When I visited the village in 2008, villagers covered 
the slogan with a new layer of white paint to disguise it, but 
the original words were still readable. [Source of the old 
photo: Firefly Image Company 1994] 
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tendency toward historical repetition. However, unlike the historical conflicts, the modern 
war did not allow the locals to simultaneously remain politically correct and exempt from 
taking one of the opposite identities. Strategic exercise of the both/and also and 
neither/nor identity in the pre-modern times was barely feasible when the involvement of 
civilians and combatants were equally necessary in the modern total warfare. Specifically 
in an isolated environment like Quemoy where the soldiers greatly outnumbered the 
civilian population, everyone in the island was under strict and mutual surveillance. The 
social Panopticon not only articulated the overwhelming totality of military rule over the 
individual and the local interests, but also ensured the locals to adapt to the identity of 
patriotic civilians manifested through their daily practice in accordance. The mobilized 
social synergy swiftly militarized the landscape in Quemoy and installed a reverse 
geographical coordinate system. The reversal, in comparison with those in the past, was 
the most thorough and readable one in terms of its landscape inscriptions as geographical 
statements. 
The thorough militarization, which engendered the clarity of geographical 
statements, largely stems from the characteristics of modern total wars. The scope of war, 
in addition to the war pattern, also contributed to its thoroughness. Starting as a Chinese 
civil war, the confrontation in Quemoy over time turned into a conflict between the First 
and the Second World especially after the Korean War dragged the U.S. into the 
anti-communist theater (Figure 3.3). Quemoy thereby became an arena of the two global 
alliances during the Cold War period. On the situation Szonyi remarked (2008, 4): 
Militarization on Jinmen [Quemoy] was closely interconnected to geo- 
politicization . . . [as] the ways in which life on Jinmen became connected to global 
politics. . . . Jinmen was affected by outside events tied to international politics. . . . 
The periodic bombings of the island were driven by issues that had little direct 
connection to Jinmen. 
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Figure 3.3.  Quemoy in the Global Disposition of the Anti-communist Campaign. 
Like a wedge in the communist bloc, Quemoy was the front post of the US-led 
campaign on the Bamboo Curtain in 1954. [Source: Time 1955] 
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As a Cold-War front, the island’s affiliation became a global issue. To stop communist 
troops from advancing, the U.S. troops supported the nationalists’ effort to maintain their 
defenses in Quemoy. The U.S. support successfully contained the expansion of 
communists, and consequently incurred a series of conflicts taking place in Quemoy 
(Table 3.1). Among them, the last three were largely the Chinese communists’ reaction to 
the international containment policy. The military operations were thus not simply means 
to occupy territory but were tied up with geopoliticization. 
Table 3.1.  The Major Military Conflicts over Quemoy 1949-1979  
  Name of the Conflict Time Forms Duration Casualties 
1. The Battle of 
Guningtou 
1949 Landing 
operation 
3 days 8,700 soldiers 
2. The First Taiwan 
Strait Crisis 
1954-5 Intermittent 
shelling 
9 months 189 civilians 
3. The Second Taiwan 
Strait Crisis 
1958 Intensive shelling 44 days 222 civilians 
4.  “Shelling on odd- 
numbered days; no 
shelling on even days” 
1959-79 Shelling on 
alternate days 
20 years 578 civilians 
[Statistics from Kuo 2010] 
 
3.1.1  The U.S. Intervention and the American Aid Programs 
After the battle of Guningtou that secured the nationalist control of Quemoy and 
Taiwan, the Chinese nationalists relocated their central government to Taipei in 1949. The 
next year the Korean War started, and completely changed the American policy toward 
Chinese Civil War. Truman issued a statement of the U.S. response to the Chinese 
communist military involvement in the Korean War (Truman 1979, 257): 
The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed 
beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use 
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armed invasion and war. . . . In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by 
Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area . . . . 
Accordingly I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. . . . The 
determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security 
in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations. 
The Truman administration stretched the U.S. defense line in the east Pacific Rim to 
Taiwan, but did not include islands along the Chinese coast. Nonetheless the American 
intervention assisted the Chinese nationalist troops in Quemoy to undertake militarization, 
and the arrival of the seventh Fleet at the Taiwan Strait efficiently deterred aggression of 
the communist army. In addition, following the execution of the Marshall Plan, American 
aid officially entered Taiwan in 1951, and stabilized the political and social unrest under 
the looming shadow of wars. American intervention directed the confrontation to an 
equilibrium, which tentatively decreased the possible strikes from the communist army. 
In the situation, the nationalist defensive strategy accordingly changed. Construction of 
temporary defenses in the coastal zone stopped, and the army started to root in the island.  
Using steel and cement provided by American aid, the soldiers in Quemoy embarked 
on construction of military infrastructures, pillboxes, barracks, and sentry posts on the 
strategic points on the island. In addition to the deployment and accommodations, 
American aid also relieved the shortage of military supplies.21 In the mid-1950s the 
estimate of nationalist troops in Quemoy amounted to 72,000, and in the late 1950s the 
total of soldiers had grown to 100,000 (Kallgren 1963, 38). As a small island with an 
approximate population of 50,000 civilians, the agriculture-based society could hardly 
provide sufficient necessities for the soldiers. The timely arrival of American aid helped 
                                                 
21 Huang (2004b) indicated the influence of the American Aid program. When the soldiers first retreated to 
Quemoy in 1949, civilians had to provide them with everything. They fed the soldiers; lived together under 
the same roof; and worked for the army in construction of defenses. However, after the supplies of 
American aid arrived at Quemoy in 1954, soldiers’ life became better than the civilians’, and some of them 
would share their provisions with the local civilians. 
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the nationalist government in Taipei solve the problem and relieved the Quemoy locals 
from the unbearable burden. 
The American Aid Program 
The Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) and the Economic 
Cooperation Administration (ECA), which respectfully managed the military and 
economic aid, were the two official organizations subjugated to the U.S. embassy in 
charge of the American Aid program. The U.S. government established the MAAG in 
Taipei in 1951 to manage the military aid provided for the nationalist troops to defend 
Taiwan, Pescadores, Quemoy, and Matsu. The MAAG mainly assisted the nationalist 
army in three ways. As the aided country submitted a list of requirements, the MAAG 
reviewed the requested weapons, equipment, and supplies, and remitted the list to the U.S. 
for approval (Scott 1951). Its veterans also assisted the nationalist army to familiarize 
them with American-supplied weapons, ranging from small firearms to battle vessels and 
aircraft and provided operational training and technical support. Its military consultants 
provided advice on the military strategy from the blueprint of the overall defensive plan 
to the tactics of a single skirmish. The MAAG had a subdivision in Quemoy—Kinmen 
Defense Command Advisory Team (KDCAT), which provided “expert advice and 
technical assistance” (Figure 3.4; Shor 1959, 420) to the stationed troops. Their tasks 
included monitoring the activities of the Communist army and reporting the intelligence 
of the troops in Quemoy to the headquarters in Taipei (Huang 2003, 70). Meanwhile, the 
ECA did similar work in the area of economic incentives. It examined and submitted a 
list of the requested aid to the U.S. for approval. The list of economic aid usually 
comprised a few major categories: first, material aid (including flour, medication, and  
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Figure 3.4. The KDCAT in Quemoy. A KDCAT officer 
in a gun emplacement lectured on shell fuses to the 
nationalist gun crew. [Source: Shor 1959] 
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fertilizer); second, heavy construction equipment; and third technical support.22 In 
addition to MAAG and ECA, the CIA also had a branch in Quemoy operating under the 
disguise of the West Enterprise Company during 1951-1954 (Weng 1991). The company 
trained and equipped the nationalist guerillas to conduct military operations behind the 
enemy lines, and to collect intelligence of the P.R.C. troops through the guerilla war. With 
CIA support, the nationalist guerillas launched a series of assaults on the southeast coast 
of China in the early 1950s. The CIA agents left Quemoy after the Korean War, but the 
guerillas they trained and equipped remained active in the 1960s. The American activities 
in Quemoy assisted the nationalist army in turning the island into a full-fledged battle 
station. 
The First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954  
As the soldiers fortified the island with American aid and advice taken from KDCAT, 
the Chinese nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, also intensively prepared to invade 
communist China. Although General MacArthur’s visit in 1950 to Taipei temporarily 
uplifted the nationalists’ aspiration for recovering the mainland China, their hopes faded 
away quickly, when President Truman dismissed MacArthur from his duty in 1951. 
Truman’s policy to retain the war inside Korea disillusioned the Chinese nationalist 
expectations to launch a full-scale general war in the mainland. In addition, Truman urged 
Chiang to surrender islands along the Chinese coast in order to neutralize Taiwan. By 
these political and diplomatic measures, the Truman administration successfully 
                                                 
22 The MAAG and ECA commonly remained on the policy-making and the administrative level, but did 
not directly involve in implementation for their policies, which relied on the assistance from the American 
private sector. For example, the Civil Air Transport Inc. (CAT) headed by Claire Lee Chennault provided 
transportation for the supplies. The J. G. White Engineering Corporation, a New-York-based company, 
constructed the majority of infrastructures and industrial facilities in Taiwan. 
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stabilized the turmoil in the Far East, and prompted a cease-fire agreement that led to the 
Korean armistice and the end of the Korean War in 1953. 
The U.S. adopted a containment policy toward the communist bloc by signing 
mutual security pacts with the free countries in Asia since the breakout of Korean War. 
The U.S. policy put the regimes of South Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan on notice 
that the global political climate did not favor their intentions to recover their original 
territories. For the three regimes, the policy solidified the political reality of the loss of 
these territories. In the meantime, the policy also secured their status quo as political 
entities. The Chinese communist leader, Mao Tse-Dong, knew that the American 
involvement had blocked his chance to take over Taiwan, and the Chinese regime in 
Taiwan would contaminate the legitimacy of his regime and the credibility of his 
leadership. As the U.S. forces were the major obstacle to his conquest of the whole of 
China, further development of the cooperative partnership between America and Taiwan 
would frustrated his master plan. As a result, while John Dulles was signing the Manila 
Pact in 1954, Mao ordered his artillery to bombard Quemoy in hopes of influencing 
America’s interests in signing a similar treaty with Taiwan. Military historians recognized 
the incident as the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, which lasted for nine months and consisted 
of several episodes (Figure 3.5).23  
                                                 
23 Military historians also mentioned other triggers for the episodic bombardment. In August 1954, 
Eisenhower, under the Anti-communist request, lifted the Seventh Fleet's blockade to allow Chiang’s army 
to invade China. Chiang soon dispatched reinforcements to Quemoy and Matsu. In response to Chiang’s 
maneuver, Mao also intended to take the chance to “liberate” Taiwan. The bombardment against Quemoy in 
September 1954 was the prolog of this incident. (Pixley 2005, 12). Dreyer (1997) considered the 
bombardment as a decoy. The operation aimed to distract the nationalist attention from the communist real 
target—the Tachen 大陳 Islands. In January 1955, the communist troops undertook their onslaught on a 
peripheral island of the Tachens—Ichiang 一江山—whose occupation extended their gun range over the 
islands of Tachen. Meanwhile, the communist navy also successfully blockaded the logistic line of the 
islands from Formosa, and the blockade forced the nationalist troops to retreat and to evict civilians in the 
islands in February 1955 (Dreyer 1997, 16). 
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Figure 3.6.  The Stalemate in the Taiwan (Formosa) Strait in 1955. After the nationalist 
troops retreated from the Tachen Islands in February 1955, Quemoy and Matsu were the 
only two offshore islands left for the nationalists. [Source: US News, 15 Apr. 1955] 
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Figure 3.5.  A Timeline of the Episodes in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis 
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In response to the bombardment, Eisenhower adopted a brinkmanship strategy to 
browbeat China with nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Khrushchev was not as supportive as 
Stalin was in the Korean War, and the Soviet indifference drove China to submit to the 
brinkmanship strategy. To express the stern American stance to defend Taiwan, 
Eisenhower asked John Foster Dulles to stop by Taipei on his way back to the U.S. from 
the SEATO meeting, and he signed the Sino-America Mutual Defense Treaty with the 
regime in Taiwan in December 1954. Furthermore, in January 1955 both U.S. houses of 
Congress approved the Taiwan Resolution, which authorized the U.S. President to 
employ military intervention to defend Taiwan. Thereby Eisenhower openly announced 
his consideration of using nuclear bombs on mainland China (Figure 3.6). Before signing 
the mutual defense treaty, the Eisenhower administration asked Chiang to agree on two 
conditions: first, to surrender the islands along the Chinese coast to communists, and 
second not to invade China without notifying America in advance. Chiang agreed on the 
second condition, but he refused to surrender Quemoy and Matsu for the strategic and 
political considerations for his government in exile.24  
Strategically, by the control of Quemoy and Matsu, the nationalists could push their 
front forward 173 miles to the mainland seaboards, and applied full control to the Taiwan 
Strait. The reins of Quemoy and Matsu therefore secured Taiwan as the rear base 
supplying the two fronts with provisions, personnel, and ammunition. Politically, the 
                                                 
24 In two interviews with American reporters in March 1955, Chiang declared his decision on the 
Quemoy-Matsu issue. In the interview with Salzburg, he stated, “In any circumstances, our troop will not 
retreat from the offshore islands. . . It will be a mistake to expect our retreat from Quemoy and Matsu based 
on our withdrawal from the Tachens. We will indeed fight for the two islands” (Kuo 2003, 49). In another 
interview with Howard, he repeated, “With or without American support, the Republic of China will by all 
means defend Quemoy and Matsu regardless of any consequence” (Kuo 2003, 49). In a later interview with 
a UPI reporter, Miller, in January 1956, Chiang revealed his reason for holding the two islands. He 
remarked, “We will resolutely defend Quemoy and Matsu till death. We will not give an inch to the 
communists because Quemoy and Matsu are a part of the overall defense system of Taiwan” (Kuo 2003, 
49). 
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value of Quemoy and Matsu signified that the governance of Chiang’s regime reached 
Fukien, a traditional territory of China, and subsequently continued Chiang’s legitimacy 
as the Chinese ruler. In other words, by the inclusion of Fukien territory under the R.O.C. 
sovereignty, Chiang defined the political reality as two regimes of one China, and 
renounced the “Two Chinas” scheme. Due to the symbolization, Chiang’s regime turned 
the two islands into its anti-communist sanctuaries, especially following its arduous 
victory in the battle of Guningtou in Quemoy. Noticing Chiang’s determination, 
Eisenhower eventually signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in March 1955, 
but the areas covered by the treaty excluded Quemoy and Matsu. The treaty nonetheless 
bought soldiers in Quemoy a few more years to prepare for the upcoming war, which was 
commonly termed as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (Pixley 2005). 
The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 
After the communist troops completed their preparation and deployment, they again 
intensively bombarded Quemoy on August 23rd in 1958 (Figure 3.7). In the first two 
hours of the bombardment, the communist artillery fired 57,533 projectiles at the island 
with an area of fifty-eight square miles. The bombardment lasted for forty-four days and 
a total of 444,423 projectiles landed on Quemoy. In a month, the artillery war caused 222 
civilian casualties and demolished 1,918 civilian houses (Kuo 2010). On October fifth, 
the communist artillery ceased fire for two weeks and announced their subsequent rule of 
engagement that they would shell Quemoy on every odd number date. The form of 
engagement, termed as “shelling on odd-numbered days; no shelling on even days 單打
雙不打,” lasted for twenty years until the U.S. and the P.R.C. established official 
diplomatic relations in 1978. Although the P.R.C. guns mainly fired propaganda shells in 
the twenty-one-year shelling on odd number days, they still caused considerable 
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casualties and destruction. Together with the forty-four-day August 23rd bombardment, 
the twenty-one-year shelling caused eight-hundred civilian casualties (162 dead; 638 
injured) and demolished 9,053 houses in Quemoy. Some folk villages, such as Guningtou, 
were nearly leveled to the ground by the August 23rd bombardment, and continuously 
exposed to the random threats of propaganda shells after reconstruction. 
Nonethless, the destruction and the casualties were not the worst consequence of the 
artillery wars, but the life under constant threat for twenty-one years mattered. The 
communist rule of engagement practically meant that their artillery would not shell 
Quemoy on even number dates, but might or might not do so on the odd number dates. 
Figure 3.7.  Deployment of the Communist Batteries during the Second Taiwan Strait 
Crisis. Unlike those in the First Crisis, the gun range of communist artillery in the 
Second Crisis covered the whole island and the Liaolo (Laulo) Bay. Consequently, 
there were no safe places in the island. The situation urged the movement of building 
underground facilities during the post-war reconstruction. [Source: Shor 1959] 
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However, after midnight of an even number date the communist artillery could strike 
anytime. As a result, people in Quemoy could only sleep soundly in the first half of the 
night on an even number date and in the latter half on an odd number day. When the 
confrontation turned intensive between the two sides, the locals would sleep in the 
air-raid shelter every night. No one knew the exact what time of the day and how many 
times a day the communist artillery would strike. The shelling then greatly affected the 
local daily life, and forced the locals to adapt to the battlefield life under shellfire. For 
example, to discern different sounds that projectiles made through the air was a necessary 
survival skill for the locals because these sounds could inform them of how near the 
projectiles might strike. With the knowledge of the potential impact distance, they then 
could decide to disregard the shelling or to rush to nearby shelters. 
The intense barrage in 1958 sought to force the nationalist troops in Quemoy to 
surrender, and the communist artillery also employed the fierce shelling as a way to 
blockade the island from the nationalist logistics from Taiwan. After the inception of the 
crisis, the Eisenhower administration promptly responded (Szonyi 2008, 71): 
President Eisenhower ordered an increase in military aid transfers to the ROC 
(including artillery capable of firing atomic weapons) and the reinforcement of the 
Seventh Fleet . . . [said as] the “largest nuclear navy” ever assembled in the history. 
With the escort of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the nationalist supply convoys successfully 
broke through the embargo barrages and supplied the troops in Quemoy. The 
American-aided heavy artillery (M115 howitzers) also enabled the nationalist soldiers to 
effectively retaliate and suppress the communist fire, and therefore the nationalists have 
often considered the American aid as the determining factor of the defense’s success of 
Quemoy in the crisis. Since the first blast of the crisis, political figures in the U.S.-led 
alliance of the First World urged Chiang to surrender Quemoy and Matsu. In the 
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international political climate, the increase in U.S. military aid was actually a trade for 
Chiang’s renouncement to invade the mainland China in a Sino-American communiqué 
(Chi and Chen 2003, 14). Achieving the diplomatic victory, Mao then ordered his troops 
to stop the intensive shelling but to shell Quemoy on alternate days to symbolically 
continue the engagement as a warning to Taiwan and the U.S. 
In addition, the international urge to neutralize Taiwan by surrendering the two 
offshore islands on the Chinese coast also influenced Mao’s ceasefire decision. In both 
Mao’s and Chiang’s understanding, the two offshore islands were the connection of their 
two regimes and “[t]he ROC presence on Jinmen [Quemoy] was a reminder that both 
regimes agreed there was only ‘One China’ that would one day be reunified” (Szonyi 
2008, 72). Consequently, either side of the Taiwan Strait would not want the connection 
relinquished, and, as Szonyi commented, Mao’s ultimate objective of shelling Quemoy 
was not to capture the island (2008, 73):  
As a symbolic link between Taiwan and the mainland, [nationalist] abandonment of 
the island would be a setback to the goal of preventing permanent separation of the 
two regimes on either side of the Taiwan Strait. If Jinmen [Quemoy] fell to the PLA 
[communist troops], “Two Chinas” would be one step closer to reality.  
The artillery war that did not aim for a military conquest became an eccentric way for 
both the regimes to maintain the integrity of their statehood against the international 
intervention. Likewise, the following alternate-day shelling, a symbolic warfare, also 
sought to employ military operations to achieve political goals. Therefore, when 
Eisenhower visited Taipei in 1960, the communist artillery fiercely bombarded Quemoy 
for three consecutive days, and claimed the shelling was their tokens of welcome and 
farewell to his visit to Taiwan (Kuo 2010). 
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Significance of War History in the Age of Reconciliation 
Recent studies of the Cold War attribute the crises in Quemoy to international, 
especially Sino-American, diplomacy and high politics (e.g. Chi and Chen 2003; Jiang 
2005; Lee 2005; Szonyi 2008), circulation of knowledge in the age of reconciliation 
avails the local society against past antagonisms. In recent years, due to the demarcation 
in the post-Cold-War period, information of the militarized past of Quemoy has become 
available for researchers. The sensitive and classified documentation in the past 
concerning the diplomacy and high politics also become accessible, and local 
interviewees are comparatively at ease and willing to relate their personal experiences 
during the time of military rule (1949-1992). The availability of these sources of 
information has initiated a trend of Cold War studies in Quemoy. From the populace’s 
perspective, these studies of Cold-War Quemoy deliberately weave a past by the 
collective memory, and challenge the conventional history that they consider serving as 
the handmaid of nationalist pedagogy (Jiang 2007).  
The shift of authorship in the historical narratives from high politics to civilian life 
brings out a contrasting interpretation of the past. The conventional narratives of the 
Cold-War Quemoy emphasize the patriotism showing in the collaborative efforts between 
the local populace and the military and how they eagerly engaged in the anticommunist 
struggle. Together, they single-mindedly defeated the national enemy and helped each 
other through predicaments under the enemy threats (see Xu 1996). By contrast, 
portraying the daily life in a battlefield where the military supremacy and the national 
hegemony prevailed, narratives in post-Cold-War studies describe the commoners’ 
powerlessness to resist the military labor levy, property requisition, and strict control over 
their daily life. While stating their involuntary compliance with the military governance 
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now, most interviewees also express their understanding of the necessity for civilian 
mobilization and the emergent measures taken on the brink or under the threats of war 
(see Xu 2000). 
Incorporating information from the two sources, studies of the Cold-War Quemoy 
(e.g. Chi and Chen 2003; Szonyi 2008) largely present participants in the 
state-orchestrated anticommunist struggle as chess pieces manipulated by an invisible 
hand of the high politics: Civilians acted upon orders of mobilization form the military 
hierarchical system, which implemented the national strategies contingent on the global 
politics. By stating that Mao did not intend to occupy Quemoy to avoid “Two Chinas” 
and Chiang had also secretly given up retaking China to trade for American protection, 
Chi and Chen comment, “The civilians and soldiers in Quemoy were involuntarily put on 
the gambling table [as bargaining chips] for the regimes on the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait to play a Cold-War game 金門的百姓與守軍被迫上了賭台陪兩岸政治體玩一場
冷戰遊戲” (2003, 16). Instead of holding everyone in the total war responsible for the 
suffering and hardships, institutionalization of the past excuses civilians and soldiers in 
Quemoy from the responsibility for their collective creations that constituted, in Huang’s 
(2004b) words, “the great tragedy of the times.”  
As the (pre)tension that the high politics between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
maintained was a carefully calibrated performance (Szonyi 2008), the efforts that the 
soldiers and mobilized civilians made to the militarization after the 1960s becomes ironic. 
Their collaborative preparation against the communist invasion is futile from the 
beginning since their anticommunist struggle could not change the political and territorial 
status quo. Likewise, due to the prearrangement of high politics, the value of their 
sacrifice, as they believed then, for their nation and other sublime causes—for example, 
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to rescue the suffering compatriots under the communist oppression—was denied 
beforehand. Even if the militarization and their praxes of the civil religion of nationalism 
are teleologically meaningless for any political and military achievement, the militarized 
past is of critical significance to the soldiers and the locals in Quemoy. Especially for the 
locals, much of their life memory is constructed upon the communal experience under the 
forty-three-year military rule in the battlefield. To rest their past in geopoliticization that 
brought the meaningless tragedy upon them is to vanish their selves in nihility. For the 
reason, it is therefore essential for the post-conflict society to redefine its past in order to 
move forward. 
By painting the past as a tragedy, the prevailing appeasement today redefines the 
significance of the Cold-War past, and proposes that the local experience of war should 
have provided lessons about its ruthlessness and the valuableness of peace (Dong and 
Huang 2007; Kinmen National Park 2005; Lee 2006). As one of the major proponents, 
Jiang remarks on the trend of the Cold-War study in Quemoy (2007, 149),  
I think it is extremely essential to advocate narrating the war memory for the time 
being. Only through the process of reinterpreting the history, the civil society in 
Quemoy can have opportunities to review their own past; to retrospect the cruelty of 
war; and sequentially to detach from the historical tragedy. 
In his view, narrating and writing about the past are ways to depart from the tragedy 
rather than to sustain it. In re-narrating the past, a new translation of the battlefield 
experience, apart from patriotism, is necessary. As the meaning of the past is now 
commonly construed as a reassertion of the valuableness of peace (see Kuo 2008a; Lin 
2005), the reinterpretation then facilitates reconciliation and assists the locals in Quemoy 
to demilitarize their past. 
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3.1.2  The Front-Back Deployment of the Militarized Quemoy 
Accounting for the militarization of Quemoy, Chang has once used a metaphor to 
describe Quemoy as a “big military camp” where the sense of place resides in (2008, 67), 
the orderly arranged roadside trees, clean streets, and straight avenues. Military 
stations guard the periphery of every village, while the interiors of villages are 
monitored [by civil defense] in the village halls. There are many things that the 
Quemoy locals cannot do nor possess. These phenomena are similar to those only 
found in a military camp. 
As described, the militarization in Quemoy appears in three elements: construction of 
military facilities, mobilization of civil defense, and regulation of daily life. In addition to 
the regular military structures, construction of military facilities includes installation of 
infrastructures that sustain the troops in Quemoy and facilitate their operation. As the 
military laid out its infrastructure, their installation inaugurated modernization of Quemoy, 
and its process, according to Jiang, resembled in the “one of ‘colonial modernity’ . . . 
established upon the structure of absolute authority of military rule” (2005, 21). The road 
network was the most palpable landscape manifestation of militarization for it connected 
military stations in the island to form a collaborative defense network, and its design 
made the transportation infrastructure a part of the defense system (Figure 3.8). To 
enhance mobility and efficiency, the military engineers designed a road network for 
Quemoy that was the densest among all counties in the R.O.C. (Yang B. 2010), and kept 
the alignment of major traffic arteries in as a straight line as possible. The intersections of 
routes often took the form of a traffic circle, at the center of which a cylindrical pillbox or 
a monument was the common visual foci. These centerpiece structures would block the 
sight of incoming traffic. In addition, to disorient intruders, these intersections often 
adopted a misaligned layout so that the avenues obliquely converged on the traffic circle 
and were not in line with one another (Figure 3.9). For the same purpose, there were no  
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Figure 3.8 (A.B.C).  The Road Network in 
Quemoy. Straight avenues and traffic circles 
are the characteristics of the road network in 
Quemoy. At the centers of these traffic circles 
were military monuments or bunkers. 
Figure 3.9.  The Misaligned 
Layout of the Traffic Circles in 
Quemoy. Avenues obliquely 
converging on the traffic circle and 
share similar streetscape. The 
centerpiece blocked eyesight of 
automobilists moving around the 
bunker. The design of traffic circles 
aims to disorient outsiders. 
A 
B 
C 
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direction signs and mileposts, and most of the street trees were monotonously the same 
species to create a labyrinth. The pillboxes were designed with a machine-gun 
emplacement atop and rifle embrasures at the eye-level aligning the axes of the 
convergent roads. The soldiers stationed in the pillboxes would monitor the traffic on the 
straight avenues heading to the intersection. By these designs, the military engineers 
incorporated the road system into the overall defense plan of Quemoy. Likewise, 
establishment of other infrastructure during the time of military rule also enhanced 
military considerations, and aimed to facilitate military operations. Through these 
constituent infrastructure elements, the military could thoroughly militarize Quemoy. 
The construction of the military facilities concentrated on the establishment of 
coastal defense and an underground tunnel networks. Since the late 1940s, troops in 
Quemoy had established and managed coastal defenses. Their long-term efforts resulted 
in a well fortified coastline. Estuaries and lagoons with their outlets sealed off by 
embankments became water reservoirs. All ports, except a few on the west and south 
shores that remained in use for transportation to Leiyu and Taiwan, were abandoned 
(Figure 3.10). Vertically from the tidal zone to the uplands, anti-landing devices, stone 
walls along the beach edges, minefields in the coastal shrubbery, and military posts atop 
the sea cliffs are common landscape features in the Quemoy coast (Figure 3.11). 
Surrounding the military positions, barbed wire, shattered glass implanted on rocks, 
thorny plants, and occasionally moats are common elements to reinforce the island’s 
defense (Figure 3.12). The vast majority of the seafront military structures were bunkers 
stationed with infantry and nearby subordinate sentry posts. These concrete fortresses, 
often designed with multifaceted walls with embrasures toward the sea and beach, 
guarded the final line of the coastal defense (Figure 3.13). They were distributed densely  
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Figure 3.10.  The Ports and Water Reservoirs in Quemoy. The military constructed 
embankments to seal off the topographical gaps, and ordered port abandonment on the 
north shore. Both the measures facilitated the coastal defense, while the construction of 
ports on the southern shore strengthened ties with Taiwan. [Source: photo by the author; 
map remade by the author; base map by Ministry of the Interior, R.O.C. 2007] 
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Fig. 3.11. A Military Post on the Sandy Beach. 
A defense wall on the north 
shore extends out from the 
ramparts of the military 
compound. It blocks the way of 
enemy marines and also controls 
villagers’ access to the sea. 
A waning sign on the barbwire 
in front of a cactus bush appears 
on the roadside. Minefields are 
common defense measures 
surrounding the military 
compound on a sandy beach 
Anti-landing sticks are also common 
defenses in the intertidal flats ideal 
for landing. They were made of 
segments of rails with one end 
sharpened and the other mounted on 
a concrete base to pierce the bottom 
landing crafts. [photo by the author] 
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Figure 3.12.  Common Defenses of Military Compounds 
on the Rocky Beaches. Shattered glass and barbed wire are 
two popular defenses on the rocky beach. Soldiers use 
cement as adhesive to attach shattered glass on the rocks 
around their compound. Behind the area of broken glass are 
obstacles consisting of layers of barbed wire. Sisals and 
cactuses growing over stone walls and surveillance posts 
form natural barriers and provide disguise. [photo by the 
author] 
Shattered Glass 
Stone Walls and Sisals Surveillance Post 
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Fig. 3.13.  Bastions of the Coastal Fortification. Oftentimes, one will 
find bastions projecting out under a seafront cliff. They guard segments 
of narrow sandy shores with their gun embrasures on the multi-faceted 
bastion walls pointing to all directions of the beach. The seafront 
military posts usually contained a squad or a platoon position to enable a 
dense disposition along the coastline since the goal is to guard the entire 
north and western shores that are mainly sandy beaches. [photo by the 
author] 
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along the north and east shore of Quemoy, while the west shore beyond Leiyu and the 
south shore facing the Taiwan Strait were less intensively guarded. 
In addition to the infantry bunkers, the north and south shore, due to their relative 
positions to the mainland, each became sites ideal for specific facilities. The north shore 
with a view of the enemy was ideal for observation and broadcast stations. On the 
northeast corner of Quemoy, the projecting tombolo, Mashan 馬山, is the closest 
location to the mainland and one of the settings for these facilities. Due to its short 
distance to the P.R.C. territory—1,800 meters on the ebb—an observation station and a 
broadcast station were located on the island. Also for the proximity to the mainland, the 
northwest corner of Quemoy was the location of the other broadcast station. The two 
broadcast stations were apparatus of psychological warfare, and through arrays of 
loudspeakers embedded on walls erected at the seaside soft female voices resonate in the 
air to the P.R.C. troops in the seaboards along Xiamen bay. To maximize the effect of 
propaganda, the military set the facilities on the forefront to allow the voices to reach to 
the mainland.  
Compared with the north shore which was heavily populated with infantry, the south 
shore of Quemoy harbored a greater diversity of troops. As materiel for the troops in 
Quemoy depended on the cross-strait transportation from Taiwan, ports and the airfield 
were all located on the south shore facing the Taiwan Strait. One of the assignments of 
the infantry stationed on the south shore was to collaborate with the navy and air force in 
Quemoy to defend these facilities and to secure the supply lines. For this purpose, these 
infantry positions were heavily armed with artillery or tanks to defend against enemy 
maritime vessels. Due to the location of ports, the logistics corps also stationed a motor 
transport company on the south shore to distribute the unloaded materiel. Besides the 
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logistics troops, the infantry, the navy and the air force, the artillery and the frogmen also 
had the positions on the south shore. Not only the distance from the mainland made the 
south shore a relative secure site for logistics troops and transportation facilities, but its 
position beyond Mt. Taiwu and Leiyu also provided geographical protection for the 
southern Quemoy to allow the deployment of the non-combat facilities and those of 
anti-aircraft artillery. For the same geographical advantages, hospitals, warehouses, 
training facilities, shooting ranges, and the bases of reserve troops were largely located on 
the southern, especially the southeastern, Quemoy. 
Behind the coastal defenses, most military facilities deployed on the second line 
were artillery troops. Their positions usually hid behind highlands near the coast so that 
their gun could reach further into the mainland while the geography concealed their 
locations from any retaliating shelling. Also on the second line were company 
headquarters occupying strategic points. While coordinating subordinate platoons and 
squads sent out to guard the coastline, officers commanded a portion of the company’s 
force to defend its own position on the second line. Further inland the higher ranking 
officers resided in central Quemoy. The general rule of deployment constituted a 
systematic defense network in Quemoy and thereby embodied a military hierarchy in its 
landscape. 
Before demilitarization, the army had stationed at least three divisions of troops in 
Quemoy besides those directly under the command of the Quemoy Defense Headquarter 
(QDH). In the western half of Quemoy, the army consistently maintained a division of 
defense forces, while in the eastern half two divisions was respectively stationed in the 
northeast and southeast Quemoy. Each of the three divisions commanded three infantry 
brigades as the defense forces and other subordinate troops of other military occupations 
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such as those in charge of assaulting operations, combat service support operations, and 
so on. The three infantry brigades dispersed in their division’s defense area each guarded 
a portion of it, while the division headquarter at the center guarded the core area. In the 
same manner, battalions under the same brigade also had their assigned areas of defense 
surrounding their brigade headquarter. The ramification of defense responsibility and of 
defense areas further applied to the military units of lower tiers, namely companies and 
platoons, and resulted in a branched structure of the defense system (Figure 3.14). In the 
structure, the military headquarters of all ranks, from the DQH to a company headquarter, 
are situated at the branching points in a manner that the higher the ranking of the 
headquarters, the further away from the coast their positions were. The QDH as the core 
of the branch structure commands all the army troops in Quemoy through the defense 
Figure 3.14.  A Model of the Defense System in Quemoy. The hierarchical system 
spreads roots into the entire island to make sure that it is well-defended, and 
meanwhile is under the total control of the military. The core and sphere denote 
respectively for the locations of headquarters and their wartime defense areas. 
[Source: by the author] 
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system. The landscape of Quemoy therefore is enforced with a rigid, utilitarian, and 
hierarchical order that articulates the military culture. 
By the deployment of troops, the military reversed the front and back of Quemoy. 
The newly formed front of Quemoy, facing the mainland to counter the P.R.C. military 
deterrence, replaced the one of the past few centuries on the south shore defending hostile 
parties from the sea. The concentration of coastal defense on the north coast blocked off 
the water traffic and the traditional connections between Quemoy and the seaboard areas 
along Xiamen Bay. In exchange, the construction of modern port facilities and the 
deployment of logistics troops on the south shore manifested the establishment of a new 
connection with Taiwan after 1949. With the reversal of fronts, the mainland became the 
outside, the territory of Others, while Taiwan across the Strait became the inside 
supporting troops and people in Quemoy to proceed with the military struggle in the 
forefront. The reposition of orientation reflected the changing external relationships 
between Quemoy and its surrounding areas, and meanwhile initiated an internal 
(re)organization of a multi-layered defense system of Quemoy. 
3.2 Construction of the Inside Quemoy 
As an island the natural settings of Quemoy predetermined its inside and outside 
demarcation along the coastline, and the defense system established after the reversal 
further consolidated the spatial demarcation. Due to the small size of Quemoy, a major 
purpose of the defense deployment was to bog down the invading enemies and logistical 
communication. The military deployment therefore formed defense lines encompassing 
the QDH inside in a hierarchical order. The arrangement produced internal layers of the 
structural defense network, and consequently highlighted the inside of Quemoy. 
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3.2.1  Reformulation of the Overall Configuration 
The application of multiple layers of defense on Quemoy was a novel praxis in the 
modern times. Previously defense forces concentrated on the coastline to form a single 
and strong front line. Implementation of the modern strategy gave prominence to the 
inside as the core of the defense system, and spurred development inside Quemoy. The 
Taiwu Range as the spine of the island stretched from central Quemoy to the island’s 
eastern end, and divided its eastern half into two quarters. Headquarters of the Eastern 
Quemoy Division were to the east while headquarters of the Southern Quemoy (aka 
Nanxiong 南雄) Division occupied the southern flank of the range. Formerly, the 
headquarters of the Central Quemoy Division was on the west end of the range before the 
military reorganization in 1984. Surrounded by these division headquarters was the QDH 
in the middle of the range. Situated on the southern hillsides of the range the command 
centers were protected from shelling, and their concentration drew clusters of military 
facilities, infrastructure installations, and administrative personnel to the highlands. 
Due to the defense buildup, the barren, rocky area that had thitherto remained 
underdeveloped turned into the political center of Quemoy, and usurped the role formerly 
played by southwestern Quemoy from 1387. In addition, militarization of Quemoy also 
influenced the pre-existing economic structure. Before formation of the defense system in 
the 1950s, the port cities, Hopu, in southwestern Quemoy was the major economic center 
because it served as the point of attachment for the prosperous treaty port, Amoy, which 
served west Quemoy. As Quemoy’s economy increasingly relied on the military after 
militarization, the economic center of Quemoy accordingly moved to the area with 
military concentration. Eastern Quemoy, with the three divisions of defense forces and 
the garrison of the DQH, accommodated a great proportion of the total troops in the 
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island. The large military population therein shifted the economic center from the 
southwest to the new town, Xinshi 新市, in southeastern Quemoy. The relocation of the 
economic center then synchronized with the change of the insular front and back, and the 
new economic center happened to be on the right (east) side of the new orientation. With 
the shifts of front and back as well as left and right, the modern precept of military 
defense brought forth an innovative configuration of Quemoy. These landscape changes 
induced by militarization thereby presented the reversed geographical coordinate system. 
3.2.2  Development of the Underground Inside 
When war consisted of intensive bombardments from 1954 to 1960, the garrison in 
Quemoy modified their defenses in response to the new type of warfare. Construction of 
semi-underground and underground defenses supplemented soldiers’ regular duties, and 
their endeavors to transfer the military facilities underground created another dimension 
of inside Quemoy. The most representative work of the sort was the DQH in Mt. Taiwu, 
where the military took advantage of its granitic geology as the natural air-raid shelter. 
The military moved all critical military facilities, ranging from small ammunition depots 
to the wartime command center with nearly eight-hundred seats into these granitic caves 
underground, and thereby constructed an underground labyrinth with few entrances in the 
mountain valleys. Numerous underground tunnels connected the excavated caves at 
different depths, and the subterranean thoroughfares penetrating though the mountain 
served as the routes for tank troops. Consequently, the militarization of Mt. Taiwu 
formed a network linking up the division headquarters around the hilly area with the 
DQH. While the QDH ordinarily collected its forces in the underground chambers, the 
tunnel network inside Mt. Taiwu enabled these forces to effectively reach out as 
reinforcements. Due to the advantages of defense and incompatibility with agricultural 
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use, the area of Mt. Taiwu that had largely remained undeveloped before militarization 
became the ideal site for military facilities. 
  In addition to Mt. Taiwu, the military also constructed underground facilities in 
the low hills on the outer rings of the multi-layered defense system. Since rocky hills 
were mostly undeveloped land outside villages, these strategic highlands became 
preferable sites for military stations, which consisted partly of underground structures. 
Their prevalence in Quemoy reached an extent that, as Huang commended, “in the early 
1960s, as long as the military stations were built in the granitic terrain, there were 
constructions of underground tunnels in the bedrock in process” (2003, 93). Apart from 
infantry stations, artillery positions were one of the common facilities taking advantage of 
the bedrock-exposed hills in Quemoy. Entrances of these underground facilities were 
generally on the inside behind the hills, while gun embrasures aiming toward the 
mainland were dispersed on the outside of the hills. Branched shaped tunnels connected 
the entrances and the underground gun emplacement chambers (Figure 3.15). By the 
design, only the gun emplacements were exposed to the threat of enemy fire, which if hit 
through an embrasure would only cost a gun emplacement on a branch of the position. 
The design therefore maximized the defense effects, and minimized the risk from enemy 
fire. Like artillery positions, landing sites for supplies on the south shore where the 
materiel arrived were the other target of enemy fire. To ensure successful delivery, the 
military embarked on the construction of underground docks (Figure 3.16), so that the 
carrying vessels (LCM or LCVP) could transport supplies from their mother ships to the 
docks in the granitic caves. From there, the garrison then moved supplies through series 
of stairways to the grounds behind the hills on the inside of the island. These facilities in 
the granitic terrain, due to their essential function, attracted converging enemy fire, and  
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Fig. 3.15.  An Artillery Tunnel. The entrance of the artillery tunnel is 
constantly on the inside behind the hill while its gun-emplacement 
chambers on the outside rim of the hillfoot. The curvy main 
(communication) tunnel and its sub-tunnels stretching outward connect the 
entrance and the peripheral gun-emplacement chambers. Both the curvy 
tunnel design and the tree-shape layout can reduce the impact and damage 
by the blast of retaliatory fire. [photo by the author]  
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Figure 3.16.  An Underground Dock for Carrying Vessels. A long 
stairway connects the underground tunnel to the ground facilities 
behind the coastal hill. The tunnel can harbor sixty-eight small carrying 
vessels (LCVP) to unload the supply along the A-shape layout of the 
channels. Due to the resonant effect in the tunnel, KNP has held a few 
concerts of classic music therein with the band playing on a barge 
drifting along the water channel. [Source: photo by the author] 
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therefore required well fortified positions to withstand the shelling. The endeavor to 
excavate and mold the granitic caves and tunnels into military use not only created a 
series of impregnable strongholds but popular tourist attractions after demilitarization due 
to their ingenuity and sublimity in construction. 
In contrast to the military facilities in the rocky hills that took advantage of the 
protective granitic chambers, installations located in other geological settings, mainly 
laterite, resorted to the thick reinforced concrete walls to withstand shellings. The military 
compounds in the areas of earthen hills were usually a combination of tunnels, 
communication trenches, semi-underground bunkers, and aboveground structures with 
camouflage. Their layout in the compound closely collaborated with the topography, and 
important structures were often partially embedded in or covered with earth.  
Application of the same defense measures also occurred in the civilian domain. After 
the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, construction of public air-raid shelters initiated the 
underground facilities for folk villages. Subsequently, the development of underground 
facilities coincided with the organization of combat villages, by which the military turned 
the folk villages into quasi-military compounds. A combat village as the basic tactical 
unit of civil defense consisted of a few small folk villages or a large single one. In these 
villages, tunnels connected air-raid shelters, folk houses, public buildings, and bunkers on 
the periphery of villages to form an underground network that enabled the efficient 
maneuvering of the militia defending their own villages, while providing shelters for the 
non-combat personnel. For this purpose, the military further commanded the militia to 
excavate underground command centers, weapon caches, food storage, and wells to 
sustain the militia in a long-term defense. Consequently, if enemy troops intended to 
capture a combat village, they would have to break through the defenses on the periphery 
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of the village; pacify the resistance in the streets inside the village; and eradicate the 
reserves underground. The combat village thereby comprised three layers of defenses 
supporting each other (Dong and Hung 2007). Through the underground tunnels, the 
militia could synchronically support the two other battle venues in the streets inside the 
village and on the village borders. The underground structures by linking up with the two 
other defense deployments considerably enhanced the defensive strength of the combat 
villages. These underground facilities were essentially the hard-core defenses of the 
villages. With the development of civil defense, the spatial demarcations of the civilian 
domain appeared, especially when the multi-layered defenses clearly separated the inside 
and outside on the ground and created another dimension of the deep inside of the folk 
villages underground. Militarization of the civilian domain thus consolidated the spatial 
prepositions by the twofold inside. 
3.3 Militia and the Civilian Life in the War Zone 
Militarization in Quemoy was certainly not limited to the landscape, but well 
extended to the brains and bodies of the Quemoy natives in the form of biopower which 
“regulates social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and 
rearticulating it” (Hart and Negri 2000, 23-4). The bio-political production in Quemoy 
mainly relied on mobilization of the civil defense and regulation of daily life. The two 
approaches to implement social disciplinarity, “[p]utting this society to work and 
ensuring obedience to its rule and its mechanisms of inclusion and/or exclusion,” (Hart 
and Negri 2000, 23) subsequently militarized bodies and minds of the population. 
3.3.1  Establishment of the Militia: Marching Quemoy to a Disciplinary Society 
The militia in Quemoy was not formally founded until the martial government 
conducted a census in the 1950s. After the military acquired the exact number of the 
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able-bodied men and women in every village, they were obligated to serve.25 The 
military government mandated men over sixteen and under fifty-five and single women 
over sixteen and under thirty-five in the combat villages to serve in the militia. Among 
them, teenagers between sixteen and seventeen and adult males over forty-five served in 
the reserve militia. Adolescents between twelve and fifteen, married women, and healthy 
men over fifty-five, although were not officially conscripted, were required to support the 
militia. As a result, the vast majority of the islanders collectively shared the experience of 
military life, and all received standard military training from veterans that the military 
assigned to their villages as drillmasters. Xu (1999) indicated that on New Year’s Day in 
1953 the chief commander of the QDH reviewed 5,000 militiamen in a parade in Quemoy, 
while in 1955 the population of the whole island totaled 40,782. By the fact, the military 
in 1953 had already turned one eighth of the local population into crack militia troops, 
and established a disciplinary society in Quemoy. 
The general training program for the militia comprised operational practice and 
political/psychological education. The former aimed to familiarize trainees with the 
military basics—making/changing formations, simple martial art moves, bayonet-fighting 
techniques, small arms maintenance, marksmanship, and so on. Besides the field exercise, 
the trainees spent an equivalent time on political education, which aimed to strengthen 
the militiamen’s anti-communist beliefs and to prevent the infiltration of the fifth column. 
The militia held the annual training twice a year with a total of ninety-six training hours 
and the regular training with two or three terms that each lasted for three months. During 
the regular training, militiamen reported to their drillmasters two days a week for four 
                                                 
25 In the early period of the militia, only parenthood could exempt women from the militia duty, but 
concomitant with transformation of the conflict into a cold war, the change of confrontation patterns 
excused all married young women in Quemoy from the militia duty (Xu 1999). 
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hours of training in the morning (Xu 1999). The drillmasters would lead the militiamen 
through drill repetitions with emphases on the defense of villages. In addition to the 
training, the military also requested that the militia participate in military exercises, 
which usually took three or four days every half a year, to enhance the collaboration 
between the military and the civil defense. Altogether, the training and the war games 
would take nearly two months from the islanders’ engagement in their livelihood. 
Nonetheless, due to the loose schedule of these militia duties, which were widely 
dispersed in a calendar year, Quemoy locals were constantly involved in the military 
activities. The military enactment gradually blended with everyday practices and became 
a fundamental aspect of the local life.  
3.3.2  Capillaries of Militarization: Regulation of the Daily Life 
Since the battle of Guningtou turned Quemoy into a warzone, Chiang’s regime 
imposed martial law on the island to maintain military rule. In the subsequent forty-three 
years, enforcement of the law isolated Quemoy from the rest of the world, but allowed 
only the military personnel and, in some cases, civilians with official permits to enter or 
leave the island. The military government ruled the insular environment for a single 
purpose: to construct the island into an exclusive military stronghold. Due to the military 
superiority, achievement on other ends along the process of militarization, such as 
socioeconomic development, were at best welcome byproducts or contingencies in 
fulfilling the ultimate purpose (Szonyi 2008, 146). Under prevailing circumstances, the 
economy in Quemoy, without foreign markets, relied heavily on military consumption 
(Jiang 2005; Yang and Hsing 2001). As the inhabitants built their lives around the military, 
it in turn controlled Quemoy’s political, social, and economic realms. More significantly, 
the militarized economy provided a cultural hotbed for the development of capillaries of 
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militarization that “fed and molded social institutions seemingly little connected to the 
battle” (Lutz 2002, 724). Drawing on Lutz’s insight into the cultural effect of 
militarization, it is possible to see that the military regulation of daily life extended over 
the surveillance and police activities, and encompassed the underlying control, grounded 
in the everyday practice. 
Battlefield Management: Indexical Performance of Militarization 
In addition to the militia duties and the shelling on alternate days, the local activities 
in Quemoy that helped to define its geographical identity as a war zone stemmed from the 
regulation of daily life. From standard measures of battlefield management (e.g. curfew, 
movement/travel restrictions, mail inspections) to miscellaneous constraints on petty 
activities (e.g. prohibition of swimming and enforcement of military etiquette), the 
military government exerted totalitarian controls over Quemoy (enforcement of military 
etiquette see Chang 2008; others see Chi and Chen 2003; Dong and Huang 2007; Huang 
2003; Jiang 2005; Jiang 2007; Xu 1999). The arbitrary power bolstered military 
supremacy and ensured the seclusion of Quemoy from outside reach. Enforcement of 
these regulations disciplined the local population to submit to the military control, and 
simultaneously imposed an authoritarian military ethos on the social mechanisms in 
Quemoy. As bodies became the depository of social orders, the disciplining/disciplined 
practice produced spaces where militarization bodily took place, and where the sense of 
battlefield experientially revealed itself in the everyday life. The omnipresence of 
militarization articulated by the daily routines, such as traffic control around bunkers, was 
largely why Chang (2008) as a Quemoy native compared her home island to a “big 
military camp.”  
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The Immanent Control: Cultural Effect of Militarization 
Nonetheless, constitution of the disciplined society also works discreetly in an 
immanent and spontaneous manner that regulates the local daily life without perceptible 
coercion and sometimes even awareness of control. The regime of power as Foucault 
indicated is Biopower (Hart and Negri 2000, 24):  
When power becomes entirely biopolitical, the whole social body is comprised by 
power’s machine and developed in its virtuality. This relatioanship [between power 
and the social body] is open, qualitative, and affective. Society, subsumed within a 
power that reaches down to the ganglia of the social structure and its processes of 
development, reacts like a single body. Power is thus expressed as a control that 
extends throughout the depths of the consciousnesses and bodies of the 
population—and at the same time across the entirety of social relations. 
From the first gunshot of the battle of Guningtou, the nationalist army unceasingly 
utilized the looming and lingering shadow of war to motivate the Quemoy locals to 
surrender themselves to militarization. Such was what the drillmasters preached during 
the militia training that militarization was the only salvation for everyone in the island 
standing in the face of war (Chen 2003). The military deterrence from the mainland 
greatly incapacitated resistance to the militarization, and the life under shellfire also 
encouraged voluntary affiliation with the military. Apparently, the voluntariness for 
military enactment presented merely an adaptive strategy to survive the confrontation, if 
one disregarded the underlying discourses prompting such an action. This is to say that 
when the nationalist regime preconditioned the binary opposition and held Quemoyan 
hostage in the same anticommunist boat, the fabrication of discourses allowing the 
“mechanisms of inclusion and/or exclusion” to work in the local social life had proceeded 
(Hart and Negri 2000, 23). The discourses of nationalist civil religion presupposed 
righteousness of its cause of war, and demonized communists as the public enemies who 
would harm not only the nationalist proponents but also the general public. It was on the 
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basis of such a priori knowledge derived from the nationalist discourses that the 
voluntariness for military enactment in Quemoy could carry any significance. 
Furthermore, it was also by identification of the apriority concealed by the nationalist 
discourses that the visage of biopower emerged like the tip of the iceberg from the 
taken-for-granted institution. 
As an observable form of biopower, militarization in Quemoy, besides construction 
of a semiotic structure to attach meanings to the military matters, culturally insinuates 
itself into the local social life to ensure its reproduction. Given the insinuation, the form 
of power “is thus expressed as a control that extends throughout the depths of the 
consciousnesses and bodies of the population—and at the same time across the entirety of 
social relations” (Hart and Negri 2000, 24). As such, militarization is, rather than merely 
bound to militia matters or to the military control on the everyday practices, much more 
far-reaching that its economic and cultural effect comprehensively integrates into all 
aspects of the social life. Thereby, militarization works on Quemoy not only by the 
hierarchical defense system in the landscape but also through its immanent engagements 
in the local society. In order to survive the warfare, the social synergy conducted by the 
biopower constitutes, in the daily life, particular livelihoods of combat economy and local 
knowledge. Development of the knowledge and formation of the economy corresponds to 
the locals’ best interests. Unlike militia duties and regular control through surveillance, 
the epistemological development and the economic formation happen spontaneously for 
the locals to better adapt to the battlefield. Inasmuch as militarization preconditions all 
social relations, their expressive performance (signifying) and the reflexive landscapes 
(the signifier)—the consequences and the venues of these performances—together 
constitute an explanatory image of the battlefield (the signified). In this light, the cultural 
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effect of militarization, founded on the collective experiences of everyday practice, and 
reinvents the local culture that resulted in the cultural hybridity. The cultural 
militarization, in other words, formation of the battlefield culture, prominently shows in 
two aspects of the daily life: first, the change of production modes and then the 
development of local knowledge. Both aspects ultimately indicate a social adaptation to 
the life in a belligerent situation. 
The Combat Economy 
After the military cordoned off Quemoy in 1949, “the situation hindered the 
development of productive forces” (Yang and Hsing 2001, 78), and the regular remittance 
from overseas Quemoy workers, which had long supported the local economy, no longer 
were within reach. Meanwhile, the great number of soldiers, retreating from the mainland 
theater and swarming into the island, brought with them chaos and demands that 
stimulated new business. In response to these geopolitical changes, islanders developed a 
new set of livelihoods that adapted to the war-zone milieu and brought about what Szonyi 
(2008) called combat economy. The state-owned enterprises and G. I. Joe 
business—another term coined by Szonyi referring to the retail and service trade with 
nationalist soldiers in Quemoy—were the economy’s major props. In the 1970s, over 40 
percent of the households in Quemoy operated a business, and approximately half of 
them were in the trade with garrison soldiers. Also, over a quarter of the work force in 
Quemoy was constantly employed in the public sector during the military rule (Huang et 
al. 2010). The two economic props, on the one hand, recruited the islanders to serve for 
the military government, and on the other through the “heavy reliance of the civilian 
populace on G. I. Joe business created an additional resource to control that populace” 
(Szonyi 2008, 145). As a result, “the reliance on G. I. Joe business made locals very 
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vulnerable to changes in the provision of service to the troops and even more to the 
overall number of troops” (Szonyi 2008, 146). By the economic activities, civilians in the 
military island tied their lives up with the military and formed an intricate 
interdependence. The relationship, as observed by Lutz, also occurred in an American 
military town that after a long history of civilian-military interaction (2001, 251-2), 
the conditions of life for [inhabitants of the town] . . . were subtly reshaped. They 
became drawn . . . into a collaborative role, though the full extent of their job 
remained camouflaged. . . . [M]any decades of a national security culture and state 
have obscured the reality that the distinction between the civilian and the military 
has worn down rather than intensified. 
The blurring of two identities signifies cultural militarization at work, and proclaims its 
mode of spatial reproduction in the military city. 
Development of Local Knowledge 
The living experience in the dynamics of militarization provided the mutual 
understanding to develop local knowledge that encompasses and interprets all cultural 
particularities contextually in situ. Some of these local “common senses” are necessary 
for survival, such as the skill to discern the target locations of shellfire by its sound. Some 
attach meanings to occurrences in the island, the polysemy of gunshots, for example. The 
military regularly held target practice for anti-aircraft machine guns (M45 Quadmount) 
emplaced atop bunkers at the traffic intersections in the island at dawn each month. All 
the guns would fire simultaneously at a signal flare in the southern sky. The loud noise of 
gunshots immediately woke up all islanders, but the persistent sounds soon put them back 
to sleep as they recognized the monthly, routine practice (Dong and Huang 2007). The 
theatricality of the event—its suddenness, intensiveness, and persistence—instead of 
signifying great danger, deprived the gunshots of such connotation. Their recognition 
displays the characteristic of common sense as “an interpretation of the immediacies of 
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experience” (Geertz 1983, 76); whereby the locals, after the first precautious moments, 
interpret the events insignificance. Without the understanding, the sound could be 
associated with massive destruction, and may well stir panic reactions. 
Oftentimes, people who do not share the local common sense found themselves out 
of place or even embarrassed in particular situations when their “normal” responses 
misconstrued the local context, and sometimes brought ironic results. An anecdote in an 
article narrated by a colonel in KDCAT about his young colleague’s fuss over 
bombardment supplied such irony. Answering a reporter’s question about casualties of 
the advisory team in the 1958 bombardment, the colonel humorously remarked (Shor 
1958, 422-3): 
“I think the worst injury any of this team had suffered was to his pride,” 
Colonel Dahl laughed. “It happened to a very young second lieutenant who was 
flown here.” 
The fledgling officer’s plane landed on a Quemoy airfield which was under 
heavy shell fire. Before the craft came to a halt, the passengers threw the door open, 
leaped to the ground, and dashed to the nearest trench. 
There had been recent rain, and the trench was a mudhole. When the firing 
ceased, the lieutenant’s new uniform was a sodden mess. He hailed a jeep, was 
driven to his quarters, and jumped into a shower. 
“He had just gotten thoroughly soaped,” the colonel continued, “when the Reds 
open up again. The shells were uncomfortably close and everyone was ordered out 
to the shelters. Our newcomer raced out of the building, struggled a hundred yards 
up the hill, yanked open a door, and plunged into our communication cave. 
“Wearing only a few bubbles of lather, he found himself face to face with a 
colonel, two lieutenant colonels, and three majors, none of whom he had ever seen 
before. He saluted, gasped ‘Lieutenant ——— reporting for duty, sir,’ and spent the 
rest of the bombardment trying to keep out of sight. 
The second lieutenant’s reflexes to hide for safety counter-intentionally made him the 
worst injured in his exhibition to the team members. His embarrassment might have 
resulted from misfortune, or from his adherence to the universal practice and his 
ignorance of the local knowledge.  
Other than downplaying, a more significant characteristic of common sense is its 
constructive end that nurtures particular associations in the local semantic system. In 
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Quemoy residents’ understanding, bullets and shell shrapnel were associated with their 
childhood memory of sweetness. Due to a great demand of metal during the wartime, 
children would forage for bullet and gun shells in the field to trade for sweets in the 
grocery store. A local ironsmith recollected his source of scrap metal (Szoyi 2008, 121):  
We’d [he and his father] buy shells from the people. Kids would collect the shells, 
and trade them for candy. You could use them in village shops to buy eggs or 
whatever, and then the shopkeeper would resell them. 
The candy trade was so central to the childhood memory of the post-war generation that it 
left an enduring impression on their lives. A local candy maker explained the design of 
his famous confection, the bullet peanut candy 子彈餅 (Zhang 2007, G-4-20):  
I wanted these peanut candies to represent peace between Taiwan and P.R.C. These 
bullet-shape peanut candies symbolise those bullets that were left behind after the 
war. We don’t want anymore conflict, so the best way to deal with these excess 
bullets, is to eat them!  
Without knowledge of the candy trade, it was hard to understand why he suggested that 
bullets were eatable and eating was “the best way” to manage them. Only by referring to 
the local children’s interpretation of bullets, can his symbolism between candies and 
peace be comprehensible. In another interview, he further explained his design by the 
personal recollections of his childhood instead of the political aspiration (Shi 2010):  
My earliest memory is that I was collecting bullets, selling them to the hardware 
store, and took the money to buy me some candies. So, I [as a candy maker] came 
up with an idea—turning bullets immediately into a gourmet food [bullet peanut 
candies] so that there is no need to collect bullet anymore. 
The statement contextualized the design with his personal experience, and regardless of 
the design intention, apolitical or not, its inspiration was clearly derived from the 
particular battlefield situation in Quemoy. Whereas bullets in children’s understanding 
had turned into, first and foremost, a trope of candies, the metonymy could be only 
possible through the engagement in the dynamics of militarization over time. The 
semantic transition and semiotic association disclosed the constructive mechanism of 
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cultural militarization, which underscored Geertz’s comment on common sense as “a 
cultural system, though not usually a very tightly integrated one . . . ; the conviction . . . is 
of its value and validity. Here, as elsewhere, things are what you make of them” (Geertz 
1983, 76). 
In addition to sweets, shells were also associated with playfulness and excitement 
for the local children. After the 1958 bombardment, the P.R.C. artillery shelled Quemoy 
on alternate days for twenty years. During the period, the major type of projectiles that 
the P.R.C. batteries fired was, instead of a lethal one, propaganda leaflet shells, designed 
to explode before landing to release the leaflets inside. Despite being non-lethal, these 
propaganda shells, due to the kinetic energy and weight they carried, also caused 
hundreds of casualties over the years. For adults, although these shells contingently 
brought them, sometimes considerable, extra income to relieve their economic 
predicaments, they were nonetheless deemed ominous and pernicious. By contrast, 
children at the time shared a more delightful perception. Foraging gun shells in the wild 
provoked a treasure-hunting excitement for children, and collecting the colorful leaflets 
with vivid illustrations was adventurous. In the article titled as “Things Accompanying 
My Childhood,” the author introduced the popular outdoor activities among the children 
(Quemoy Daily, 15 May 2005): 
Except the game of tag, the most popular activities among kids were the “great 
adventure.” Plans of the adventure were, not less than, a dare of the nocturnal 
journey to air-raid shelters, a search for shrapnel to trade for maltose, and the gather 
of propaganda shells’ leaflets for awards, prizes, and whatnot from school teachers. 
Propaganda leaflets, as a form of psychological warfare, were considered threats to the 
defense of Quemoy. The military government mobilized school children through their 
teachers to gather these “mental contaminants,” and to turn them in for honor awards, 
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prizes, or bonus points. The strategy to contain the effect of propaganda accidentally 
made the leaflets into a competing item for the local children (Lin 2006, 81): 
After a night bombardment of propaganda shells, everyone would hurry out in the 
morning to collect leaflets, and competed to see who could get the most. Later on, 
striving for winning, everyone got smarter: [We] would tear up leaflets into pieces to 
increase their number since we thought that paper carried by shells should naturally 
be fragmental [after explosion]. 
With their fringe benefits, shells in Quemoy carried complicated messages. Unlike the 
coeval adults who despised these projectiles, children in the 1960s and 1970s had a 
different point of view of shells, or even of shelling that could be a sign of the plentiful 
harvest of leaflets the following morning. As expressed in recent reminiscences, shells for 
them meant more than destruction but also self-achievement, sensual pleasures and 
entertainment. Yang, a native writer born in 1962, remembered that after the communist 
artillery ceased fire in 1978, his playmates and he distressed at the change jointly yelled 
at the night sky, “Commie! Why don’t you fire shells here anymore? 阿共啊，你為什麼
不再打炮來” (1998, 86). Their childhood memories conveyed, on the contrary to 
common understanding, an interpretation that shelling on particular occasions could also 
be desirable. Without the twenty-year shelling, people growing up under the shellfire 
could not have taken it for granted, neither could they integrate the artillery warfare into 
their daily life, so as to make the most out of it. Based on their a priori engagement of 
being-in-the-battlefield, the locals cultivated a particular set of understandings which 
through the continuous social adaptation to the war condition in Quemoy seeped into 
local knowledge. Since the war preconditioned the local life, the local knowledge that 
provided interpretations for the people’s living situations stood for the outcome of their 
negotiations with militarization. An example of the changed understanding was the local 
people’s judgment upon the propriety of certain activities to be held on certain days. 
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Chinese almanacs in a form of lunar calendar conventionally indicated a list of 
appropriate and aversive events for each day. In Quemoy tradition, people usually 
referred to an almanac beforehand to decide an auspicious day for their planned activities, 
such as a wedding ceremony or a funeral. During the twenty-year artillery war, although 
Quemoy people persistently retained the traditional belief in, as well as the knowledge of, 
the distinction between auspicious or ominous days, their praxes became simplified 
(Dong and Huang 2007, 73-4):  
In the twenty years, nearly each commoner in Quemoy would not forget what date 
the day was. Everyone firmly remembered what day the odd-number dates and the 
even-number dates were. . . . [For any kind of events], people would have to hold 
them on an even-number day, which was the most propitious day than any 
auspicious days indicated in an almanac. In those days, the [modern, solar] calendar 
dominated everyone’s life in the island. 
Even though the distinction remained, people strategically adapted the traditional practice 
to the battlefield condition, and along with the conversion reinvented an updated 
understanding of the appropriateness of event dates. The necessity of negotiation with the 
belligerent condition, which the locals dwelled in, made their cultural practice a product 
of power struggle that revealed itself as (Bourdieu 1990, 16), 
a social strategy . . . oriented towards the maximizing of material and symbolic 
profit; . . . a reproduction strategy, taking on its meaning in a system of strategies . . . 
and oriented towards realization of the same social function . . . .  
As the local knowledge, derived form the particular system of strategies, was socially 
constructed and power-conditioned, this essential aspect of cultural militarization 
function as the most subtle and elusive device of social control for reproduction of the 
power structure until peace was restored. 
3.4 Mystery Unraveled in De-militarization 
After the tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait eased, and China’s 
acquisition of sophisticated weapons devalued the strategic significance of Quemoy, the 
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R.O.C. government discharged Quemoy from its military duty, and gradually reduced the 
number of garrisons since 1992. The local quest for new place identities began. For a 
society that possessed a large service industry for the temporary emigrants—conscripts 
performing military duties mostly from Taiwan—the best strategy to continue its 
monstrous service sector in the post-conflict era was to attract foreign tourists. 
Considering the lack of potential for manufacturing and commerce, people in Quemoy 
took advantage of the legacy as a military stronghold and developed heritage tourism 
based on its fortifications. At first, tourism was a great success. Attracted by the 
mysterious quality of a war zone, tourists from Taiwan swarmed into the former 
forbidden island. The familiar political iconographies, which often appeared in the media; 
historic sites predating most of those in Taiwan; pre-modern vernacular life patterns; and 
a pre-industrial environment fascinated Taiwanese tourists. However, poor amenities and 
unreasonably high prices made a tour to Quemoy a one-time-only proposition (Huang 
2003). The climax of the tourist business took place when 531,683 people visited 
Quemoy in 1997, and thereafter the decline started. Responsive measures introduced to 
manage the stagnant situation generally fell into two categories: expansion of the target 
markets and diversification of tourist resources. 
In 2001, when the R.O.C. government declared a new China policy known as 
Mini-three Links, which allowed the inhabitants in Quemoy and the P.R.C. citizens to 
visit each other by ferries. By the policy (Mini-three Link), the mainlanders became 
potential customers to the tourist industry in Quemoy. However, the mainland tourists did 
not contribute much to the tourist business in Quemoy at this point in time. Instead, the 
policy that allowed direct transportation between Quemoy and mainland ports turned the 
island into a gateway on the border. Taiwanese entrepreneurs and corporate executives 
183 
who owned or operated their overseas establishments in China travel to the country via 
Quemoy. Since Taiwanese government prohibited a direct flight between Taiwan and 
China, the policy made Quemoy a major transit port for Taiwanese business travelers. 
The traffic route to China remained a privilege of Quemoy until the Taiwanese 
government sanctioned direct flights to China in 2008. As the Mini-three Link went into 
effect in 2001, the number of visitors to Quemoy dramatically increased. The increase 
came directly from the passage of the Taiwanese businessmen (Yang Z. 2010). The 
majority of them were in a hurry: They took a domestic fight to Quemoy; hopped on a 
bus to the ferry station; and sailed to Amoy via the first ferry they could catch. The travel 
agency would usually plan a tight schedule for them, so that these businessmen could 
waste little time waiting for their connection. The enactment of Mini-three Links was not 
of much help to the tourist business in Quemoy, but a policy opened the door for Quemoy 
to pursue another identity—a gateway city to mainland China.  
Since the 1997 decline, the travel agencies initiated a competition that in the end 
constituted a zero-sum outcome. The competitive agencies often had to offer a price 
lower than the tour budget to attract business. To cover the difference or just to earn a 
little profit, tours guides working for the agencies would take tourists to souvenir stores, 
which allied with travel agencies and paid guides and tour bus drivers commissions based 
on the number of tourists they brought in. Consequently, in the worst cases, tourists 
would involuntarily spend approximately one third of their tour shopping (Quemoy Daily, 
15 Dec. 2006). For this reason, the package tour business reached the worst situation. In 
the winter of group tours, self-guided tours germinated, and the new pattern of tourism 
slowly took over the market. The rise of self-guided tours meant more than the burst of 
the tourist bubble. Travelers’ preliminary fantasy arose from the geographic impression of 
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the mythical forbidden land, and the excitement of chances to break former political and 
social taboos in a war zone. The transition from group tours to self-guided tours also 
signified the achievement of an advanced stage of tourism, which also met the 
requirements for sustaining in-depth tourism. The prerequisites—for example, the 
implementation of a bicycle trail system, the establishment of bed and breakfast business, 
and the installation of the interpretative materials—were often the work of Kinmen 
National Park. 
Kinmen National Park (KNP) is a national bureau of the Ministry of the Interior in 
Taiwan. The Taiwanese government established the national park in 1995 to preserve the 
unique landscapes, especially the military ones, in Quemoy. Its area covers approximately 
a quarter of the island, and as a matter of course, most places with cultural significance 
and natural spectacles are under its control. In other words, the central government 
acquired a great portion of the tourist resources in Quemoy. The involvement of KNP in 
tourism contributes greatly not only to the transition in tourist patterns but also the 
diversity of the tourist resources. In addition to the installation of the infrastructure for 
tourism, the most recognizable achievement of the national park was the promotion of the 
local traditional culture. Before 1995, tourist investments mainly concentrated on the 
military landscape and historic sites. The national park renovated traditional settlements 
within its territory, and chose a few representatives as eco-museums to showcase the 
classic layouts of southern Fukien villages. In these settlements, newly-paved grounds, 
interpretive boards, manicured landscaping, and street furniture not only beautified the 
folk villages but also signified the park’s intention to promote tourism. These renovation 
projects through beautification re-structured the outdoor spaces of these compact 
settlements so that they could accommodate the intrusive, inquisitive tourists into the 
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local everyday life. To create tourist attractions, the national park at times also restored 
public buildings in these folk villages, such as an old public school or a vintage village 
hall, and reused them as KNP’s regional offices or theme museums. In addition to 
revitalization of public spaces, KNP also encouraged private parties to submit proposals 
for grants to restore and then reuse old folk houses. The restored architecture commonly 
became family second home, sometimes a future retirement home. The rest became 
tourist facilities and amenities, such as bed and breakfasts, cafés, and again theme 
museums which entice visitors into the island’s past to experience the authentic Quemoy. 
Both the renovation of village grounds and the reuse of folk houses prompted the 
settlements to open themselves to visitors and diminished the former demarcations 
between inside and outside.  
With the sociopolitical and economic changes following demilitarization and 
touristification, the former geographical coordinate system of Quemoy dissolved and the 
island seemingly had been engaging in another reversal since 1992. The rapid decrease in 
the number of soldiers caused the former economic base to collapse, and the eastern half 
with its former prosperous combat economy became a war-time relict. The businesses on 
the main streets in the villages are mostly closed with their iron curtains rolled down. 
After crowds of soldiers withdraw from Quemoy, bathhouses, pool rooms, laundries, and 
numerous service industries went out of business. Only a few service businesses which 
had local customers, such as barbershops and snack-bars tenaciously but barely hold on. 
The economic center has returned to southwest Quemoy where the native population 
concentrates, as in the past few centuries.  
The ferry station as the portal of Quemoy for the Mini-three Links is located on the 
southwestern corner. Installation for tourist facilities and modern consumption 
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industries—convenience stores, theme restaurants, revitalized historic districts, and so 
on—commonly distributed in the southwestern half of the island. The right and left as 
well as the bustling side and the sluggish side reversed again after the 1949 reversal of 
the geographical coordinate system. The regressive turnover does not happen solely to the 
left-right but also the front-rear dispositions. When nature took over the majority of the 
seafront fortifications after abandonment or destruction, smuggling from P.R.C. to 
Quemoy became rampant on the northern and the eastern shore, especially in the waters 
near the abandoned fortifications. Desperate locals smuggle low-price Chinese produce 
and merchandise to Quemoy for their own daily consumption or for retail (Xi and Weng 
2003). Based on the simple exchange of goods, the tie between Quemoy and cities on the 
rim of Xiamen Bay has grown stronger over time. This reconciliation encouraged an 
attempt to construct a “communal living sphere” between Quemoy and Amoy (Quemoy 
Daily 29 Jan. 2002). The former battlefront faces the current resource hinterland. To 
fulfill the objective of a “communal living sphere,” some Quemoyan, led by the county 
head during 2001-2009, denounced the China policy of the pro-independent 
administration in Taiwan. They considered the policy that emphasized the national 
security conservative and it neglected the local needs of Quemoy to reconcile with China 
(Quemoy Daily 15 May 2006). It furthermore tied their hands from pursuing a symbiosis 
between Quemoy and Amoy, and deprived Quemoy of a promising future. The county’s 
leader’s personal critique towards the Taipei administration spread like wildfire during his 
term of office (2001-2009), and provoked local resentment against the administration due 
to its border-crossing regulations (Nownews 30 Nov. 2005; Qyemoy Daily 14 Mar. 2007). 
By portraying the Taipei administration as an unfit authority that was marginalizing 
Quemoy, the county government made the central government an obnoxious obstruction 
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that the islanders should fight in order to win autonomy in developing desirable 
China-Quemoy relations (Quemoy Daily 27 Apr. 2007; Quemoy Daily 14 June 2008). In 
the political climate, a new front of the insular society emerged. The front-rear, right-left 
and in-out reversed again as the irony simultaneously appeared. 
The 2008 presidential election in Taiwan produced a pro-China administration, and 
brought significant influence to Quemoy. The new administration adopted a more open 
China policy. It sanctioned direct flights between Taiwan and China, and admitted 
Chinese sightseeing tourists to Taiwan. In addition, the regime revoked constraints of 
Mini-three Links so that all Taiwanese citizens could take advantage of the traffic route. 
These policies tremendously affected the tourist business in Quemoy, and marshaled 
tourist development into its third wave (2008-today; Figure 3.17). After 1992, the borders 
of Quemoy opened to Taiwanese tourists whose forays blew away the mysterious allure 
of Quemoy during the military rule era. As a journey of demystification, the military 
landscape in Quemoy was the major tourist attractions. Most military facilities were still 
in operation and thus unavailable to common tourists, which however lively displayed the 
sense of battlefield and satisfied the visitors’ expectations. When the first wave 
(1992-2000) concluded, the Chinese market was still inaccessible; the Taiwanese group 
tour market dried up; and the self-guided tour was just emerging. Also, after the military 
completed its first disarmament plan in 2000, the number of soldiers greatly decreased 
and the abandoned military facilities increased in Quemoy. With the departure of soldiers, 
the economic depression turned worse, and local ties with the mainland grew rapidly. The 
KNP had tentatively participated in the tourist development; embarked on renovating folk 
villages, historical architectures, and military facilities released from the military to 
multiply tourist attractions. The implementation of the Mini-three Link initiated the  
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Figure 3.17. Three Waves of Tourist Development in Quemoy. The implementation of Mini-three Links in 2001 CE enables Chinese 
visitors to enter Quemoy. Not until Taiwanese government granted Chinese tourists admission to Taiwan in 2008 CE, the number of 
Chinese tourists in Quemoy remained insignificant. [Data Source: Kinmen County Government and the Mainland Affair Council.] 
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second wave (2001-2007). Although the policy rejuvenated the number of visitors, 
throughout the second wave the increase in the visitor numbers mostly arose from the 
cross-border traffic. The business travelers passing through Quemoy in transit did not 
contribute to the local economy so the locals often contemptuously depreciated the 
Mini-three Link 小三通 by calling it “linking-not 通三小” (Quemoy Daily 14 Nov. 
2003). In this situation, the county government actively devoted itself to the tourist 
development by holding cultural events, war memorials, and local festivals to attract 
tourists. In the meantime, the KNP’s continuous efforts to diversify tourist resources 
eventually paid off. The installation of tourist infrastructure and promotion of the local 
traditional culture successfully invited independent tourists to visit the traditional folk 
villages. Tourists’ arrival at folk villages exposed the formerly protected interior of 
combat villages, that after demilitarization the tourist planners purposely put in display to 
attract outsiders exploring the underground tunnels, the significant public buildings, and 
sceneries behind every turn on the narrow red brick alleys. With the combat villages 
turning inside-out and their spatial demarcations dissolving, the tourist silhouettes on the 
stone walls in traditional villages thus lifted another layer of mystique of Quemoy.  
The journey of demystification reached a new climax after 2008. Since the 
Taiwanese government granted admission to Chinese tourists to sightsee in Taiwan, the 
number of Chinese tourists in Quemoy also increased. Quemoy became an important 
transitional port for both the Taiwanese businessmen and the Chinese tourists, who often 
spent a few days in Quemoy before carrying out their main itinerary in Taiwan. The 
military heritage in Quemoy is of great interest to them. However, all Quemoy travel 
agencies are specifically instructed not to take Chinese tourists to war museums or any 
politically sensitive places that may convey controversial interpretations of the past 
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causing unnecessary confusion. Notwithstanding, some Chinese tourists will still visit 
these facilities on their own. For them, it is exactly the political sensitivity about the past 
conflicts that intrigues and attracts them to visit Quemoy. In contrast to the increasing 
number of tourists, the number of soldiers has decreased to approximate 5,000 since the 
implementation of the second disarmament plan in 2003. The number of soldiers dropped 
90 percent (50,000 to 5,000) in twenty years; 50 percent (10,000 to 5,000) in five years. 
The rapid decrease soon exposed a shortage of manpower to maintain numerous military 
installations in the island, and consequently the military considered releasing installation 
to KNP or the county government for tourist use before abandoning them. Otherwise, the 
county government and KNP at times also request collaboration from the military to open 
certain military facilities to the general public. Through this approach, a few highly 
sensitive military facilities, such as the underground tunnel of the QDH, became tourist 
friendly and accessible. As the hardcore Quemoy unfolds before the world, the last 
curtain hiding the inner mystery of Quemoy thus arises. 
Inasmuch as touristification comes hand in hand with demilitarization, their 
collaboration however introduces a dilemma: For former military facilities reused for 
tourism, the further the demilitarization is, the further Quemoy is from its image as a 
battlefield, and the less attractive it is for battlefield tourism. The current remedy for such 
irony is to reintroduce military simulacra to demilitarized facilities: soldier mannequins in 
the renovated military camps or reenactors to perform gun operations in an artillery 
tunnel (Quemoy Daily 16 Aug. 2008). The dilemma articulates Quemoy’s ambiguity and 
ambivalence in transition.  
Quemoy’s geographical coordinate system, mainly its front-rear disposition, also 
shows the unsettlement in transition. With an unstable geopolitical relation in transition, 
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the front-rear disposition is swiveling back and forth. After the 2008 election put the 
pro-China partisans in power, their open policies in dealing with China eased the tension 
between the county government and the Taipei administration. Quemoy’s front against 
Taiwanese marginalization diminished, even though Quemoy as a remote island from 
Taiwan is subject to Taipei administration’s marginalization due to Taiwanese subjectivity 
and priority. With an open China policy allowing a closer relationship between 
Quemoyans and mainlanders, opportunities in the mainland became the latest social 
concerns in the border island. As shown in the back and forth swivel of the coordinate 
system, a collectively engaging goal of the insular society unlikely persists, so that a 
constant direction of the island’s front is momentarily unattainable. In fact, the current 
front of Quemoy may well face the sea and the mainland at the same time, as 
self-identification once even aroused a proposal for Quemoy independence (Quemoy 
Daily 25 Aug. 2007).26 Just as Iquan’s occupation of Quemoy four hundred years ago 
blurred the island’s identities between a pirate lair and an imperial base, Quemoy today 
revives the both/and also ambiguity. Both touristification and demilitarization are future 
directions with social consent, only that the two are ultimately at odds with each other: 
The battlefield tourism demands authentic military experience that demilitarization 
reduces. Their ambivalent collaboration brought an obscure identity of Quemoy as both a 
battlefield and a tourist island; a frontier and a gateway. In the postmodern juxtaposition 
with multivocality and multilocality, Quemoy’s both/and also identities shine through its 
terrain of babel to imbue the landscape rich with ironies. 
                                                 
26 Lou (2010) advocates Quemoiology for the purpose “to develop a cultural Quemoy nationalism, which 
through texts, turns imagination [of imagined community] into reality, through [re-narrating] historical 
narratives, evokes Quemoyans’ collective consciousness. In the process of development, [Quemoiology] 
sequentially embeds a latent seed of separatism, quietly awaiting for [favorable] changes of political 
situations in the future” (6). 
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CHAPTER 4  SUBVERTING THE CONFLICTS: LANDSCAPE IRONY 
IN DEMILITARIZATION  
One often-told anecdote highlights the tourist attraction of Quemoy to the mainland 
Chinese and is set in a popular cruise departing from Amoy. Known as “watching 
Quemoy on the sea 海上看金門,” the boat takes Chinese tourists offshore to observe the 
“nationalist” islands and the coastal fortifications. The story goes that at the finale of the 
cruise, passengers keep urging their boat master to sail closer toward Quemoy despite 
their transgression over the borderline. “Just a little more,” they repeatedly appeal. The 
boat eventually arrives at a sandbar near the heavily guarded coast. One passenger looks 
at the beach with aspiration and murmurs (Huang 2004b): “If only I can step on it, how 
thrilling would that be!” The story breaks the local people’s confidence in the tourist 
appeal of Quemoy, and more importantly their strong belief that once the central 
government removes the barriers hindering the cross-border activities, prosperous 
tourism will revive Quemoy from economic depression (Quemoy Daily 6 Nov. 2011).  
The attraction of Quemoy to the Chinese mainlanders stems from their curiosity 
about Quemoy as the nationalist territory and a battlefield of the recent wars (Chen 2009). 
For this reason, the tourist’s attention is especially drawn to the obsolete war apparatus— 
fortifications, military camps, and political propaganda facilities—of which their raison 
d'être is to deter and then to disperse the mainlanders from Quemoy. However, the 
military landscape in Quemoy has now become the most compelling tourist resource for 
the mainland Chinese. Contrary to their recently-gained popularity, the coastal defenses 
were formidable in the past. According to the rules of engagement before 1992, to deal 
with the situation as depicted in the story, the batteries and machine-gunners would have 
fired warning shots when the boat transgressed into the territorial waters (Xiao 2008). 
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Besides, in order to promptly respond to sudden occurrences, the major task for soldiers 
on their sentry duty was to closely watch the water channels between Quemoy and the 
mainland. Far from where the boat crew could clearly observe fortifications ashore, their 
transgression over the boundary would have prompted a response. The intensive defense 
mechanism made these fortifications grim repellents for mainland fishing boats, and 
prevented any possible tourist cruises in the dangerous waters. Today, like a switch of 
magnetic poles, demilitarization drastically changes the role of fortifications in the 
mainlanders’ perception from repellents to attractions. Without demilitarization, the 
mainlander tourists could not leisurely approach and appreciate the military structures nor 
could they yell at silhouettes of soldiers on guard therein (SkyBlue 2011). The polarized 
changes simultaneously stir a strong feeling of tempo-spatial displacement, as a Quemoy 
veteran remarked (Quemoy Daily 9 Aug. 2010),  
Everyday, forty to fifty tourist boats from Amoy touring “watching Quemoy on the 
sea” constantly sails to the front of the slogan wall, read as “Unify China with Three 
Principles of the People,” with full loads of tourists. Their zealous greetings to the 
garrisons on the island present another image of the peacetime. However, 
[witnessing these] one cannot help to feel a chaotic sentiment towards the 
tempo-spatial displacement.  
As the selling point of the cruise, the propaganda wall supplies the final crescendo for the 
tour, and attracts mainlanders to spend their “several days’ wages” on shooting photos of 
the slogan. Observing that, a Quemoy veteran comments on the situation (Lin 2009, 138): 
It is unimaginable that the wall of psychological warfare contrarily creates a greatly 
profitable niche for the tourist business in the mainland China, which allows the 
Chinese communists to earn a monthly revenue of twenty to thirty million RMB. 
This is absurd!  
The irony is thus perceivable to the locals by the logic that the anti-communist slogan not 
only is futile, but produces communists with a grand profit. This specific tour discloses 
multiple layers of irony. First, the polysemy of fortifications, like a sarcasm denoting 
opposite meanings (war apparatus or peace tokens), ignites a symbolic irony due to the 
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connotative contradiction. Second, the drastic change of the military landscapes from 
deterrence (as an active subject) to attraction (as a passive object) produces a historical 
irony in the tempo-spatial displacement. Last, the absurdity of the conflictual landscape 
reveals the counter-intentionality that the harmful devices turn to profit the enemies. The 
locals’ acknowledgement of the irony after demilitarization unravels the vanity of the past 
conflict, and destabilizes its significance to avail the progression of reconciliation. The 
discussion of the boat tour outlines a miniature of the post-conflict society, and reveals 
how the major social dynamics in Quemoy—touristification, demilitarization, and 
reconciliation—generally interlock with one another. Their interplay in a holistic view 
constitutes the dissolution and the ongoing reversal of the geographical coordinate system. 
This chapter examines how the change of the geographical coordinate system works in 
the ontological scale in terms of the landscape features, especially the military structures 
reinvented for tourist attractions. 
4.1 Irony and Ironic Landscape 
Irony emerges when the outer—literal—meaning introduces the inner, if not 
sarcastic, meaning (Fernandez and Huber 2001). The subject, instead of being understood 
by its literal meaning through the indexical mechanism, begets another meaning and 
begets another and begets etc., thereby carrying out a symbolic communication. In other 
words, the delivered irony, by accentuating the extraordinary voices of the mentioned 
subject, coveys its polysemic meanings to one who can simultaneously comprehend its 
multivocality. Irony in landscape does the same thing (Rodman 2003, 212). When the 
meaning of a three-foot-thick wall of a bunker departs from impregnability to the 
ferociousness of shelling, to the misery of civilian life, to the ruthlessness of wars, to the 
righteousness of peace, etc, the bunker per se draws its meaning from association. The 
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latest meaning through association justifies the locals’ present mindset of appeasement 
and renders the military structures a caveat to war in Quemoy; whereby the war apparatus 
turns into a trope against itself (Figure 4.1). 
The contrast aggravates after the authorities’ quest for the new identity of Quemoy 
as a tourist island where military landscapes become everybody’s entertainment to 
increase revenue. Their exclusivity, now as their attractive traits, invites even the past 
enemies to discover their impregnability. The local ambition of tourism unfolds in the 
sparkling look of the newly renovated military facilities. Therefore, bunkers at 
thoroughfare intersections bear welcome signs. The bastion at the end of the pier bears 
decoration of popular cartoon characters. All these changes corroborate the irony in 
landscape and dismiss the sense of battlefield. The dismissal thereby uncovers a colossal 
irony that the development of battlefield tourism in fact destroys the battlefield rather 
than preserves it. The official remedy for such self-destruction is to re-introduce military 
features and performance to the demilitarized structures to reinforce the diluted image of 
Figure. 4.1.  Semiotic Associations of Bunkers. The different social milieux in the 
wartime and the post-bellum period produce two sets of contradictory meanings of a 
bunker, while the latest meaning attached to bunkers oppose their indexical meaning. 
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the battlefield. The reinvention of military relics and the contract reenactments 
thematically deliver a verisimilar battlefield—an eclectic mosaic “made up of historical 
accretions of partial legacies superimposed in multiple layers upon each other” (Harvey 
2000, 77). As a work of the current generation, the nostalgic collage is more manipulatble 
for the demilitarized society and malleable for tourist consumption. Meanwhile, it 
pertinently accommodates the two contesting identities (i.e. tourist attractions and 
military structures) without self-depletion, since the consumption of reintroduced military 
features can bring no attrition. As reinvention proves to be an effective solution for the 
conflict between developing battlefield tourism and demilitarization, reenactments at the 
same time fetch tourists a time portal back to the “authentic” Cold-War island. As Urry 
once remarked, “the past is endlessly constructed in and through the present” (1995, 4), 
the development of battlefield simulation (and heritage tourism) in Quemoy turns the past 
into commodities. With the thematic reinvention and reenactment, the Disneyization (see 
Bryman 2004) of Quemoy enables the images sales to whoever pursues an authentic 
battlefield. The age of reconciliation then catalyzes simulacra production for tourist 
consumption. In addition to the irony thrown by the sharp contrast between symbolic 
meanings of military structures, the involvement of tourism in peacemaking hereinto 
complementarily enriches the irony in Quemoy. 
Furthermore, understanding irony demands a context, a taken-for-granted structure 
to produce the contrast with which the inner meaning of the subjects can emerge. Irony 
depends on negotiations with conventional understanding, and sequentially destabilizes 
the structured system of dominance (Smith 1997). Considering the Quemoy case, when 
demilitarization tarnishes the military structures, their decay, incompleteness, and 
disjuncture affiliate them with stories that open a window of imagination to define these 
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ruins. Since the relics cannot axiomatically reveal themselves, spectators are invited to 
fill in the absence with narratives that complete the meanings of these structures with the 
viewers’ reflexivity: “Each spectator is forced to supply the missing pieces from his or 
her own imagination and a ruin therefore appears differently to everyone” (Woodward 
2001, 15). The military structures thence migrate from a place of being effective, where 
effectiveness of offense and defense takes priority, to a place of being poetic, whose 
meaning is open, polyvalent and fluid in the viewers’ imaginations. “The very lineaments 
of the tangible past,” as Lowenthal argues, “should arouse a sense of uncertainty, the 
same presentations should provoke divergent insights. Otherwise the past is too static to 
be credible” (1975, 26). The military structures in Quemoy, as hinted by its geographical 
narratives, march into the past, or precisely into a timeless, poetic country where “Time is 
suspended, or reversed, or erased; it is hard to say which, but . . . as dusk fell it was the 
end of the world” (Woodward 2001, 39). 
The atemporal disengagement of ruins from the daily bustle of ordinary life explains 
what exactly a reconstruction project imposed upon the historic heritages: It “fixes and 
freezes a particular image, short-circuiting the imagination” (Lowenthal 1975, 27) to 
create a modern simulation for tourism. Historic buildings in Quemoy suffer such a 
destiny. In contrast to the military structures dispatched to the past, the locals restore old 
buildings into the present. The restored buildings in the folk villages are valued for their 
aesthetic and authentic visages in the state of ruins, but lose both the cherished qualities 
after reprocessing. The refurbishing projects not only replace the evocative images of 
these relics with anachronistic verisimilitudes, but also deny the reasons for these 
buildings to be chosen for preservation. Reconstruction deprives of the aesthetic 
incompleteness of the historic relics, and alienates these restored works from the 
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incentives and goals for their reconstruction. Consequently, their poetics out of 
imaginations vaporize when these historic buildings reveal their full splendor. In 
Fernandez’s classification, such “successful failure,” analogized to Foucault’s concept of 
prison, is “the irony of structural reproduction,” upon which he further remarks “[i]t is 
this counter-intentionality, this contradictoriness of structural reproduction, that is so very 
ripe for irony” (2001, 91). 
The irony in landscape underscores the polarized changes of the military landscapes 
from war apparatuses to tourist attractions, and accentuates the critical role that human 
agents play in defining a place by attaching different meanings to the landscapes (often 
displaced ones in Quemoy and therefore ironic). “Irony” thus properly addresses the 
landscape changes in Quemoy. However, this overall representation, despite a summary 
of the phenomena, provides no explanations to shed light on these ironic changes. What 
shines through the ironies in the landscape then requires further discussion. 
The human perception of irony is uncanny that for most of the time the delivery of 
irony follows an alternative circuit of semiotic associations. In another words, irony is in 
the eye of the beholders, as the meaning of words is in the ear of the listeners. The 
perceived irony can rely on an over-simplified causality, an anachronistic comparison, or 
even the inconsequent incongruity as long as the juxtaposition of associated 
interpretations can cause a contrast great enough to unbalance the given, assumed 
interpretation. Irony thereby as an instrument of destabilization attains the subversive 
power from its results which introduces a sense of lightness to the discussed matters, and 
consequently shakes their significance. In this light, the meanings of the landscape 
changes in Quemoy should most likely reside in the very matters whose significance 
diminishes after ironies appear. Since the significance of the conflicts between the R.O.C. 
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and the P.R.C. suffers discredit most, irony is the mechanism of cultural demilitarization. 
Commenting on the issue, an official of the Quemoy county government professes, “the 
banter and the irony against war is nothing else but to profoundly embody peace 戲謔戰
爭、反諷戰爭，無非是深刻的體現和平” (Quemoy Daily 16 Feb. 2005). In this sense, 
ironic trivialization of past conflicts enables the locals to usher peace into the place, and 
simultaneously to shed Quemoy’s identity as a battlefield. The polarized changes in the 
landscape explicitly keynote the salience of a post-military society, where the past 
confrontation constructs a battle station for exclusion while the backfire in the aftermath 
urges reconciliation through the construction of an emerging tourist destination. 
  According to Smith, “as a new society takes place, or existing society takes a new 
place, it is the symbols of reference that suffer and work change” (1997, 87). The change 
in the military structures and the historic buildings in Quemoy reveals what the identity 
reformation—from a battlefield to a tourist and a gateway island—may bring about in the 
post-conflict society. Through the interplay of touristification, demilitarization, and 
reconciliation, irony in landscape emerges as the cultural mechanism of identity 
reformation. I discover four types of irony in the landscape in Quemoy. “When things 
seem misaligned, disproportionate, unexpected, and out of place,” spectators often 
witnesses the most common irony in the daily life, namely the immediate irony 
(Fernandez and Huber 2001, 1). The immediate irony, as known as intuitional irony, is 
often bound to the flash experiences of random happenings and therefore intuitive, 
ephemeral, and circumstantial. Although the type of irony shows in the landscape in 
Quemoy, the basic requirement to trigger the irony is common sense which however does 
not necessarily concern the identity reformation. For the reason, I will let alone the 
specific irony from the following discussion. The symbolic irony requires the sharp 
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contrast between the “inner” and “outer” meanings of the discussed matter in the form of 
a pun, which is why it demands symbolic communication as its premise. The semiotic 
referentiality and the semantic migration are by far socially constructed and, too, 
zeitgeist-conditioned. The meanings that the natives presently attach to their material 
settings can explain their specific treatments applied to the settings to possibly maximize 
their social utility. When the reinvention is greatly at odds with the conventional utility, 
the spatial incongruity for either practical uses poses questions of properness, and 
embodies symbolic irony. The bunker bearing welcome signs on the outskirts of the 
county seat speaks such irony. 
From a diachronic contrast that oftentimes amplifies human futility on the certain 
social movements, historical irony unravels. Anthropologists consider the type of irony 
“having to do with contacts between people greatly unequal in power and wherewithal: 
people in the center and on the margins of history” (Fernandez 2001, 85). Obviously 
perception of the irony requires knowledge of the history. I will exemplify the irony by a 
historical issue of Quemoy. Since its earlier history, the contest between the seafarers and 
the land-dwellers has repetitively taken place in Quemoy, and echoes through the 
repetitive reversals of the insular coordinate system. During the contest, the maritime 
power, despite having its moments, has seldom gained the upper hand over the 
continental regimes, to which the official histories overtly evince predilection. The 
discourse normalizes the social condition of Quemoy to be affiliated to the continental 
regime despite its marginalization; otherwise the temporary, “anarchic” condition of 
Quemoy is, as official history often declares, destined to return “normal.” In this view, the 
reiterative struggles made to switch the direction of the coordinate system of Quemoy 
eventually end with meaningless futility. In the historical discourse, the activities of 
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seafarers have been largely dissipated or defamed in the history, until Iquan eventually 
left a formidable mark for the maritime powers. Ironically, his successor, Koxinga, 
identified himself with the continental regime, leading his army and pursuing a recovery 
of the lost territory of Han Chinese from the Manchurian invaders. Due to his exploits in 
the battles to recover the mainland China, the modern Chinese nationalists, who 
empathized with and suffered similar predicament, highly praised the historical figure, 
and made him, a half Japanese in fact, a hero of the Chinese nation. However, Quemoy 
people have never restrained their dislike for the nationalist role model, who in their view 
brought only war and misfortune to Quemoy (see Cai 2008; Quemoy Daily 22 Jun. 2003; 
Yang B. 2010, 53).  
Even though the modern nationalists in a similar manner also imposed an 
“eccentric” social condition on Quemoy to confront the mainland regime, the islanders 
today in the pursuit of reconciliation have mixed feelings about the military rule (see 
Huang 2003). They on one hand mourn their bereft days dedicated to and sacrificed for a 
void cause, one that is meant to be futile against the wheel of history; while on the other 
hand long for the return of the prosperous and vigorous old days based on the military 
protection and patronage. With the ambivalent mindset, the Quemoy locals today when 
looking back at their own past in which they strived at all cost for the anticommunist 
cause helplessly perceive a tempo-spatial displacement and the mockery of fate. It is in 
their Sisyphean efforts against all odds in the history and the displaced sentiments in the 
pursuit of reconciliation that historical irony blossoms. 
The last type of irony found in the landscape of Quemoy is the structural irony 
which often appears in the “counterintentionality” and the “contradictoriness of structural 
reproduction” (Fernandez 2001, 91). In fulfilling the identity reformulation of Quemoy 
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from a battlefield to a tourist island, the interplay between touristification and 
demilitarization discloses the necessity for reproduction of military simulacra, so as to 
embark on the demilitarized battlefield tourism. The excessive reproduction of military 
virtuality nullifies the local renouncement of the battlefield identity; yet insufficient 
military representations cannot sustain a sense of battlefield nor tourist attraction. 
Ultimately, the images of Quemoy must be always in between an authentic battlefield 
replica and a typical tourist island of sun, sand and sea. This constant landscape evolution 
means that the identity reformulation will never fully situate Quemoy into either identity. 
Moreover, as more tourists visit Quemoy for the battlefield image, the work to repudiate 
the battlefield identity will never end. Quemoy people must keep reproducing military 
replicas to trigger landscape irony, to repeat cultural demilitarization, and to purge the 
land full of military image. The structural impossibility of reformulating identity through 
the identity reformulation is therefore tragically ironic. 
4.2 Developing Battlefield Tourism and Developing Peace 
During the military rule (1949-1992), the military government in Quemoy had 
shown little interest in encouraging private sector economic development, nor had 
capitalists felt comfortable investing the warzone. As a result the economic activities in 
Quemoy were mainly the primary and service sector businesses before 1992. According 
to the county censuses between 1972 and 1994, the local labor force in industry was 
constantly under 15 percent. During the same period, the rate of governmental employees 
fluctuated around a quarter of the work force. Inasmuch as more than six out of ten 
persons in Quemoy were peasants, fishermen, or government employees during the time 
of military rule (Huang et al. 2010), the economic underdevelopment was obvious. The 
small number of industrial workers in Quemoy indicates a sluggish economy with a lack 
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of capital investment from the private sector. This economic condition left Quemoy a 
handful of choices to turn to when the combat economy eventually faded away. Tourism 
was among the few choices, perhaps the best, which however was presented as an 
economic solution. That said, its intricate entanglement with demilitarization and 
post-conflict reconciliation came later. Even though the locals commonly agreed about 
replacing the combat economy with tourism, at the beginning, battlefield tourism was not 
the core of the development plan (see Yang 1996), particularly since the military facilities 
were still highly sensitive and omnipresent. Besides, the forbidden, ubiquitous sights of 
military structures luxuriously catered to the tourists’ appetite for the sense of battlefield 
with voyeuristic pleasure at their convenience. Tourists breathed the sense of the 
battlefield regardless of which type of tourism the locals were undertaking. 
In developing tourism, the conservative attitude of the QDH against the open-door 
policies became the major obstacle to the new Quemoy. After the abolishment of Martial 
Law, the county government restored its autonomy and was no longer subordinate to the 
QDH. Its new autonomous status enabled the county government to negotiate with the 
QDH to loosen its grasp on civil issues. One often-mentioned example was the 
installation of the streetlights. The military considered streetlights harmful to the defense 
of Quemoy, since lights exposed the military installations at night and therefore during 
the period of military rule the whole island was darkened after sunset. As the former 
county head during 1990 to 1991, Lee once commented (Lee 2003, 29-30),  
We [people in Quemoy] often made comparison between the mainland and Quemoy, 
in the early days we said, “the base of Free China is the base of light, while the 
mainland is the dark continent”; however nowadays [ca. 1990] the situation reversed 
in the evening that “the mainland is the land with lights, and Quemoy is the dark 
island.” 我們常將大陸和金門作對比，早期常說：「自由基地是光明的基地，大
陸是黑暗的大陸」；但現在到了夜晚反而顛倒過來，「大陸是光明的大陸，金門
是黑暗的金門。」 
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For local development, Lee argued with the QDH authorities to break through the 
conservative policy, and install streetlights. He poignantly satirized in front of the QDH 
authorities (Lee 2003, 30),  
If Quemoy does not allow streetlights, this [the prohibition] means that, Quemoy 
should not have daytime because after sunrise under the daylight all the military 
positions in Quemoy have already been under Chinese Communists’ surveillance. 
And so, the deprival of lights from Quemoy at night shares the same logic as 
prohibiting one from seeing the Sun in the daytime. 如果金門不能有路燈，那就是
表示金門不能有白天，因為天一亮，太陽一照，金門所有的據點都被中共看到
了，所以晚上不能點燈和金門白天不能看到太陽是同樣的道理。 
Lee’s successor, Chen (2003), still dealt with the same issue of streetlights during his 
term of office from 1992 to 2000. However, with the abolishment of Martial Law, he 
managed to convince the military to reluctantly agree to installing lights. While the civil 
government still had to haggle with the military over various trivial civic issues, mass 
tourism was a remote luxury. The attraction of tourism stood in opposition to the military 
which sought to exclude unnecessary personnel from the defense area. Besides, the 
tourists’ hedonic gaze upon the battlefield imbue it with lightness that “can make farce of 
any represented pretension” (Smith 1997, 86). According to Smith, pretension is “a claim 
to distinction, either from the phenomenal and ordering principles of the natural world, or 
from other humans” (Smith 1997, 83), the authority (and uppityness) of the QDH, as well 
as the characteristic military culture—such as the trained patriotism, the absolute 
hierarchy, and the formalistic rigidity—were all at risk in front of the tourist’s playful 
gaze. Under this circumstance, tourism was not only considered harmful to the military 
dispositions but also to the reproduction of Quemoy culture of militarization. Accounting 
for these disadvantages, the QDH clearly expressed its uncooperative stance on the tourist 
development at first (Lee 2003), but concomitant with the initiation of the national 
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disarmament plan in 1993, the military conceded and agreed to gradually loose its control 
over Quemoy (Kuo 2010). 
When tourism eventually gained support from military leaders, their concession 
signified the initiation of demilitarization in Quemoy. Even though demilitarization was 
never a choice of the Quemoy people who could only passively cope with the national 
project, some of them did urge the removal of military rule and the abolishment of 
Martial Law, which in fact coincided with demilitarization. The abolishment actually 
ended the legal status of Quemoy as a battlefield and the necessity for large military 
deployment on the island. The democratization in the short term devastated the local 
economy despite the benefits in other social aspects, such as the return of the civil 
autonomy, release of military properties, and freedom. After its autonomy returned, 
Quemoy therefore had to stand on its own feet without support from the military, and 
consequently locals placed even greater expectations on tourist business. Apparently, 
demilitarization stimulates tourist development. The reduction of restricted military land 
opened access for tourism or other development. These restricted areas had been under 
strict control with only limited access for forty-three years, and the ecosystems had been 
well preserved and with little industrial disturbance. After disarmament, the natural 
environment, especially the crescent sandy beaches, offered an alternative military legacy 
and tourist capital for Quemoy. In addition, the grandiosity and the sublimity of military 
structures stemming from the long-term battlefield management also supplied 
extraordinary spectacles for tourists. Hence, even if Quemoy did not direct itself 
specifically toward battlefield tourism, demilitarization was still a necessity for general 
tourist development. In this light, demilitarization, democratization—i.e. demilitarization 
of the everyday life—and touristification in Quemoy went hand in hand together. 
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As a fledgling industry, tourism supported only a small portion of the local 
population, but economic stagnation affected all in the private sector, including peasants, 
fishermen, and the retail businessmen. For them, to survive after demilitarization often 
involved a change in economic activities. From 1992, due to the withdrawal of troops 
from the coastal defenses, smuggling activities between the mainland and Quemoy began 
to appear (Xi and Weng 2003). The P.R.C. authorities encouraged the smuggling 
activities which in their definition were legal “small-amount trade 小額貿易” (Weng 
2002). With trade under way, civil reconciliation ensued. In response to the skyrocketing 
number of smuggling cases from twenty-seven in 1993 to 1,364 in 2001 (Xi and Weng 
2003), the vigorous cross-border activities obliged the Taiwanese (R.O.C.) government to 
devise a policy to decriminalize the small-amount trade. The policy designed for this 
purpose was Mini-three Links, by which the direct postal, transportation, and trade links 
between Quemoy and the mainland China were allowed with few restrictions. With the 
policy in effect, economic interaction between Quemoy and Amoy emerged. If there is 
anything Quemoy people learned through these intense cross-border activities was that 
Quemoy must rely on the mainland China rather than Taiwan (Chen 2008). To reconcile 
with the mainland China is therefore the foremost priority of the local development, 
which is why the Quemoy county government has often taken on the position to 
challenge the China policy of the Taipei administration. 
The reconciliation with China was also an urgent issue for the tourist development. 
From 1992, the local tourist business boomed by sales of group tours to Taiwanese, but 
soon reached its climax in five years. Even in the stage of decline, the tourism business 
had grown into the largest industry in Quemoy to an extent that the county head in 1998 
clearly announced that “not a single developing project in Quemoy did not aim at tourist 
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development 金門的建設無不是針對觀光發展” (Yang Z. 2010, 418). Besides the 
country government, the KNP also contributed to the development from its inauguration 
in 1996. The KNP had painstakingly diversified tourist resources to include the 
traditional culture and natural landscapes, while at the same time inheriting restricted 
areas from the military to develop attractions of battlefield tourism. Nevertheless, the 
self-guided tourism that the KNP promoted was of little help to the withering tourist 
business. The economic mainstay of Quemoy demands group tours to rejuvenate, and the 
mainland tourists’ zeal for Quemoy, as shown in the cruise “watching Quemoy on the 
sea,” has readily pointed out to prospective customers. For the mainland tourists, the 
mysterious battlefield atmosphere of Quemoy is the major motivation for the tour in 
which the military landscapes, according to questionnaire statistics, are the most 
satisfactory attractions for the mainlanders (Chang 2010). Hence, to attract mainland 
tourists, Quemoy has to develop battlefield tourism on the premise that the reconciliation 
work with China carries on; whereby the porosity of borders with China can form and 
provide an intense cross-border exchange. Making peace and making a fortune; 
developing tourism and developing trade, to this point, are all tangled up together with 
demilitarization to forge the economic prospects of Quemoy. 
In addition to an economic drive, the development of battlefield tourism also 
functions as an instrument for cultural demilitarization. Since the military landscapes are 
the most competitive tourism resources with product differentiation from other tourist 
islands, for the locals, making battlefield tourism the pillar of tourism merchandise 
appears to be a sound judgment and a wise marketing strategy. In carrying out battlefield 
tourism, the local practitioners—guides, bus drivers, interpreters—are the first to discover 
that their simple means to monetary reward actually create more than what they expect. 
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When they interpret the landscape change—transformation of war apparatus from places 
of exclusion to places of attraction, and war memorials from shrines of patriotism to 
tokens of peace—they are performing (acting out) the inscribed irony in landscape. In 
contrast to the ongoing tourist consumption, their interpretations about the past conflicts 
implicitly mock the meaninglessness of war outlined in the landscape change, while at 
the same time they celebrate the arrival of peace.  
An often-said and well-known irony concerning the famous Quemoy knives should 
illustrate such an effect of tourism. The culinary knives are one of the special products in 
Quemoy and are popular memorabilia for visitors. The knives are famous for their 
allegedly high-quality steel forged from the propaganda shells bombarding Quemoy. 
Since military rule, conscripts before their return to Taiwan would often buy Quemoy 
knives as gifts or mementos. Such practice builds up the reputation of the knives among 
Chinese people around the world, and group tours in Quemoy today usually include a 
stop at the knife factory to let tourists watch the process. After Quemoy admited 
mainland tourists, they were surprisingly zealous for the knives. In a newspaper article 
reporting popularity of the knives, a mainland tourist simply stated, “this [knife] is made 
from our shells. I think [it] has much historical significance” (Nownews 14 Jul. 2006). As 
the mainland tourists attribute the historical significance of the knives to their source of 
materials, the knife-maker, Wu Zen-Dong 吳增棟, also commented on the subject 
(Chinanews 6 Dec. 2008), 
sometimes, when I encounter the mainland tourists, I will make a joke and said, “by 
those shells you guys gave to me for free in the past, I make them into culinary 
knives now, and return back to you 遇到大陸游客，我有時會跟他們開玩笑：當年
你們送來的炮彈，現在我打成菜刀還給你們.” 
The thought about mainlanders buying back their own shells at a high price amuses 
Quemoy people, even though they doubtless appreciate the priceless peace. By contrast, 
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knowing the diachronic exchange, mainland tourists tend to make a more serious 
response. They prefer to summarize Wu’s livelihood in a poetic idiom “melting swords 
into plowshares 鑄劍為犁,” which metaphorically means “ending the war and starting 
the peacetime” (Chinanews 6 Dec. 2008; Want Daily 17 Mar. 2011). The culinary knives 
thus become a token of peace, cast in and by the presence of the mainland tourists, since 
their sightseeing in Quemoy axiomatically represents peace today (Luo 2010). For these 
mainlanders in the factory, bringing the Quemoy knives home means more than a simple 
gesture to remember about their trip in Quemoy but also one to figuratively undo the war 
by returning shells to the mainland. The return then is where the historic significance 
resides in their purchases. In the face of the interpretation of these knives, a Quemoy 
veteran, while recalling the absurd engagement of shelling on alternate days, sarcastically 
remarked (Quemoy Daily 29 Mar. 2012),  
mainland tourists rush to buy the specialty that [our predecessors] bartered with their 
flesh and blood [under shellfire]. Isn’t this another irony and joke made by history? 
陸客爭著購買這血肉之軀交換來的特產，這豈非又是歷史的諷刺和玩笑。 
As the mainland tourists feel obliged to buy back the “war trophies” (Quemoy Daily 
15 Sept. 2005), which cost lives of the garrisons and the civilians who once fought in 
Quemoy, to celebrate the newly reconciled peace that denies their cause for fighting, the 
former combatant finds irony: One that subverts the binary opposition in the past 
meanwhile serves cultural demilitarization today. As the antidote to the political 
pedagogy inculcated during the Cold War, the irony counteracts constructs of the enemy 
constructions, the political correctness, and the nationalist cult with inconsequential 
lightness. The light attitude that equates the past conflicts to a joke, as the one the knife 
master told, dissipates the wartime metanarratives tied to and propping up the belligerent 
condition. 
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Due to the symbolism of the knives and the purchases, battlefield tourism in this 
particular case brings forth heavy irony. Although irony in other cases may not be as 
prominent, they nonetheless can subvert other aspects of cultural militarization, such as 
the historical discourse about the war justification. With the discovery of the contingent 
functionality of battlefield tourism, the local society, craving peace and an economic 
boost, further strengthens its resolution to follow its economic course. Correspondingly, 
the county government of Quemoy employs tourist development to urge the central 
administration in Taipei to act according toward the local interests which fundamentally 
depend on reconciliation with China. In the circumstance, battlefield tourism not only 
spotlights the contrast in landscape change to foreground irony, but also accelerates the 
progress of reconciliation. The simple economic solution for Quemoy to this point has 
been tinged with much political intention.  
4.3 Re-editing the Military Inscriptions upon the Landscape 
The development of battlefield tourism and reconciliation assist each other 
reciprocally to form a new place identity other than a scene of military conflict. The 
incorporation of the two social dynamics shapes the landscape in Quemoy which can 
provide insights into identity reformulation. Military structures, as the material 
incarnation of the past, become the features inviting place identity reformulation. In turn, 
reinvention of the military structures reflects how the local people deal with the changing 
identity of their homeland, and more practically reveal how they ingeniously and 
simultaneously develop battlefield tourism and achieve demilitarization. In addition, 
although symbolic structures, such as war memorials and slogan walls, are 
non-combatant facilities, their articulation of the zeitgeist during the Cold-War era makes 
them especially significant to identity reformulation. Their use as attractions of battlefield 
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tourism represents refigured local understanding of the conflict in the past. As cultural 
geographers often see landscapes as human inscriptions in the environment, the changes 
occurring to these structures foreground an ongoing process of reediting the embedded 
militant texts in the landscape through the landscape management and treatment. 
The management methods of military structures in Quemoy generally fall into three 
categories: abandonment, destruction, and reinvention. The first two are common 
practices applied to the military structures today, while reinvention occurs less frequently. 
Reinvention is exclusively applied to military structures designated for tourist facilities, 
and therefore cases of reinvention can provide more information about the interrelation 
between the landscape change and identity reformation. The three major treatments that 
the locals in Quemoy employ to reinvent military structures are disguise, remodeling, and 
rehabilitation. The three treatments are each designated for specific types of military 
structures converted to tourist facilities. Rehabilitation often occurs to the structures 
released from the QDH after demilitarization as prospective tourist attractions; 
remodeling the wartime tourist facilities and war memorials from the Cold War era; 
disguising the defenses occupying strategic positions with panoramic views. Following 
the implementation of these management methods, a great proportion of the military 
structures in Quemoy have disappeared, collapsed, and transformed; only a few of them 
under rehabilitation can retain their original features. 
The abandoned military structures are most frequently dispersed in remote areas, 
such as seafronts and hillsides, on the periphery of the branch-shape defense system. 
After the withdrawal of troops, the QDH cannot afford to sustain the operation of all 
posts by the limited manpower. At one end of the defense hierarchy are the numerous 
guard posts. Too numerous to maintain following troop reductions, they have become the 
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primary structures suffering abandonment. Most beachfront posts are forgotten 
monuments of this sort (Figure 4.2). The QDH closes up these posts, but keeps some of 
them intact in case of war. Such management plan is termed as “sealing up during the 
ordinary time; opening up during the wartime 平封戰啟.” In fact, these abandoned 
military structures now are subject to decay. Since war is hardly possible in Quemoy, they 
simply disintegrate and drown in the rampant subtropical vegetation. Although the locals 
complain about the messy eyesores and public safety blind spots that these unused 
structures may have become, abandonment only troubles the locals except as a waste of 
potential battlefield tourism resources (Quemoy Daily 21 Sept. 2008).  
By contrast, cases of destruction often take place when the unused military 
structures impede daily civilian practices or future prospects. In these cases, destruction 
may befall civil defense structures. These defense works in the civilian domain were 
often compromises of convenience for former military necessity. With the military 
priority fading, the locals desire to remove these obsolete and inconvenient defense works. 
Thereby bunkers at the village gateways are bulldozed (Chinatimes 30 Dec. 2009); 
trenches and moats surrounding the villages are filled up (Huang 2003). On some of these 
tracts recovered through destruction, the village installs pagodas, trails, plants, and street 
furniture to build a neighborhood park for public recreation (Figure 4.3). Otherwise, if the 
structures are located on private property, owners can simply remove them to facilitate 
their current land uses. The anti-parachute stakes in the fields represent this category 
(Figure 4.4). To defend against paratroopers, the military erected regiments of concrete 
stakes at an equal distance in open fields, and topped each of them with interlinking 
barbed wire. From a distance these stakes looked like vineyards, and therefore some 
international visitors when viewing the fields in Quemoy mistook them for grapes arbors  
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Figure 4.2.  Abandoned Military Structures. The hillside positions [A and B] are 
under the sealed-up management plan indicated by the warning signs of military 
reservations [highlighted by dotted lines] in front of them. In some of these 
abandoned military structures [see the cannon in C], the QDH discard obsolete 
weaponry and let them rust into junk in situ. [photo by the author] 
A
B
C 
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Figure 4.3.  Recreation Areas Built on Leveled Military Compounds. The military 
station outside the Anqian village was under construction and turned into a neighbor- 
hood park in 2008. The air-raid shelter [the bottom right] and the bunker in the grove 
[the middle left] survived the renovation. [photo by the author] 
B
A Figure 4.4.  Remnants of Anti-parachute 
Stakes. Only a few arrays of the stakes 
remain today, and are all incomplete. Many 
in an array have been taken down, and the 
rest lost their spikes [A]. Even the array 
being closest to its original condition [B] is 
missing the barbwire web atop the stakes. 
[photo by the author in 2009] 
A 
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(Dong and Huang 2007). Planting these stakes hampered farm work, and their dangerous 
design has only injured the resident farmers, who willingly remove these stakes when 
allowed. That is why these stakes appear only sporadically in the open fields today. 
Another sort of destroyed landscape feature is what the locals consider a nuisance. 
The anti-communist slogan signs are the representative of this sort (Figure 4.5). Since the 
nationalist troops retreated to Quemoy, soldiers living among civilians in their villages 
made slogan signs on folk houses. The anticommunist signs, such as “Eliminate the Evil 
Communists,” manifest an aspect of the psychological warfare to bolster morale and to 
instill determination (Zheng 2006). After the implementation of Mini-three Links, the 
locals considered these signs as obstruction of reconciliation and repellent to mainland 
tourists (Lihpao Daily 9 Jun. 2001):  
The islanders for their livelihood [tourism] continuously ask the Ministry of Defense 
to demolish these political slogans, such as ‘Repel Communism and Resist Russia,’ 
or ‘Kill Zhu [de] and Mao [Tse-tung],’ to avoid the awkwardness mainlanders may 
feel during their visit in Quemoy. 島上居民為了求生存，紛紛要求國防部剷除這
些「反共抗俄」、「殺朱拔毛」等政治標語，以免造成大陸人士參訪的尷尬 
The demolition was soon brought to the public’s attention and suffered criticism. In an 
investigation report of the execution of cultural preservation in Quemoy, the investigation 
committee denounced the demolition, and explained its opinion on these slogans (Taiwan 
the Control Yuan 2001, 88-3): 
The psychological slogans were the wartime products as the anticommunist and 
anti-Russian symbols in the past. However, in an alternative view, they are exactly 
what remind us of the importance of “peace” and point out the significance to avoid 
other wars 反共精神標語是以前戰爭時代的產物，是反共抗俄的標誌，可是反
過來看，它正提醒我們「和平」的重要，及避免再發生戰爭的重要意義。 
The reading of these symbols of conflict ironically turned them into caveats to war and 
tokens of peace, so that preservation of these landscape features from demolition was 
urgent and just. As to the motivation and the planner of the demolition, the report 
indicated that “some governmental organs 有些機關” instructed the removal of slogans  
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Figure 4.5.  Slogan Signs on Folk Houses. By the remnants [A], the incomplete slogan 
sign on the wall is read as “Clear Our Name; Recover Our Country 雪恥復國.” Its 
incompleteness however is simply a result of weathering that the reliefs fall off from 
the walls over time. In other cases [B], their anticommunist messages beckon 
vandalism for reconciliation and cross-border activities. [Source: photo by the author] 
A
B
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as their gestures “to express goodwill 表現友善” (Taiwan the Control Yuan 2001, 88-3), 
or to avoid “bringing about a mutual uneasiness 彼此會產生尷尬” (Huang 2007, 156). 
However, for mainland tourists, these anticommunist slogans are not just about hollow 
threats or empty offenses from the past, but rather one of the most intriguing and 
battlefield-specific spectacles in their journey in Quemoy (Chinatimes 8 Jun. 2011): 
The mainland tourists show intense interest in these remnants of the battlefield 
culture [slogan signs] from the time of armed confrontation across the Taiwan 
Strait . . . . Some will even ask the guide in private to tour these signs, taking photos 
in front of them for memory. 對岸遊客對這些兩岸軍事對峙時留下，屬於「戰地
文化」的產物特別有興趣……還私下要求導遊安排參觀，在標語前拍照留念。 
Consequently, the threats and menaces in the past articulate “peace” today, and attract the 
past enemy whom these signs confronted to consume the exclusive culture of the former 
battlefield. The contradictory situations are exactly how the development of battlefield 
tourism adds to the irony in demilitarization, while the counter-intentionality and futility 
of the demolition brings forth another irony: In the end, these slogans have not eliminated 
any communists whose presence in Quemoy however led to the elimination of these 
slogans. 
Concomitant with the withdrawal of troops from 1992, the re-empowered civil 
government led “a movement of full-scale destruction of battlefield relics 塗銷戰地遺跡
的大動作” (Chinatimes 7 Jun. 2011). The government on one hand incited civilians to 
remove the miscellaneous military features in their surroundings; on the other squeezed 
to restore the antebellum landscape of Quemoy by erasing the military structures from the 
civilian domains (Chinatimes 7 Jun. 2011):  
The QDH under the pressure of the county government and the county council 
destroyed bunkers, defense positions, and air-raid shelters to satisfy their policy of 
“returning properties to civilians.” 軍方也在縣府、議會壓力下，陸續敲毀碉堡、
據點和防空洞，遂行所謂「還地於民」的政策 
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The re-editing of the syntax of everyday landscape was described as “an overwhelming 
mission of mass destruction 鋪天蓋地的毀滅行動” (Chinatimes 7 Jun. 2011). Smith 
provides a possible explanation for the magnitude of destruction: “as a new society takes 
place, or existing society takes a new place, it is the symbols of reference that suffer and 
work change” (1997, 87). In this view, destruction of military structures announces an 
undergoing process of power adjustment and transitional justice. In the attempts to 
persuade his countrymen into preserving the slogan reliefs on the exterior walls of their 
houses, Huang recalls some complaints he has encountered that may explain why some 
Quemoy locals feel the urge to erase these slogan signs (2007, 350):  
A brand new house was taken for years, free of charge; now the military has no use 
of it. Why on earth cannot [I] just take off these words? Does even that [removal] 
break the law? 一棟新新的屋子被毫無條件強佔了幾年，現在軍方不用了，難道
把這些字拿掉也不可以？也犯法嗎？ 
Why should [I] keep [the signs]? Are there subsidies for keeping? Or, compensation? 
為什麼要留下來呢？留著有補助嗎？有賠償嗎？ 
After the abolishment of Martial Law restored the lawful status of citizens and autonomy 
of the civil government, the empowered populace and administration wield their newly 
attained power to “correct” the military wrongdoing, such as the property requisition. 
Some locals, like the complaining property owner, aggressively destroyed the military 
features due to the mindset of transitional justice that simultaneously bestowed them 
rights to control their surroundings and to claim monetary returns. Destruction of military 
structures matters, not for the sake of tourist development, reconciliation, or 
demilitarization—all of which oftentimes were only the nominal causes to justify sheer 
desire for destruction—but more as demonstrations of freedom emerging in the cleansing 
of stigmas of military repression. 
Although military structures in the civilian domains often faced destruction and 
those in the remote areas are largely abandoned, the locals nonetheless reinvented some 
219 
of them for non-military use. Among them, those released to private citizens and 
surviving the destruction mostly integrate into the local daily life. Their civilian owners 
reused them as auxiliary spaces of everyday life in various ways—barns, garages, 
workshops, to name a few (Figure 4.6). Otherwise, military structures in the public 
domains, now under the stewardship of the county government or the KNP, will usually 
turn into tourist facilities. The transformation is completed through the three treatments. 
Among them, rehabilitation is the most aggressive one that may introduce the full-scale 
constructional intervention into the target structures, and is practically turns a military 
facility into an attraction for the battlefield tourism. Sites selected for rehabilitation stand 
out due to their potential as spectacles, and therefore are usually large in scale and unique 
in style to attract the tourist gaze. Rehabilitation subsequently demands more investment 
of resources than the other two treatments. By contrast, remodeling comprises only 
partial constructional intervention. It however emphasizes replacing interior interpretive 
materials about the past conflicts. The remodeled cases, like those of rehabilitation, are 
major attractions of the battlefield tourism in Quemoy. Unlike rehabilitated structures, 
remodeled ones are capable of enunciating a solid statement about the past conflicts 
through their spatiality of commemoration. 
The disguise treatment scarcely involves architectural mediation in the original 
structures but commonly uses exterior camouflage to reinvent these structures. The 
disguised structures often serve as auxiliary and infrastructural features for both the 
battlefield tourism and the local public affairs, and often occupy strategic points— 
intersections of arteries, a centerpiece of vistas, gateways to villages. They are ideal 
positions for panoptic observation and vice versa focal points to be observed from their 
surroundings. Due to their particular locations, these structures sequentially become  
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Figure 4.6.  Manifold Reuses of 
Military Structures Released to Private 
Citizens. The QDH gradually returned 
lands requisitioned for military 
reservations to their private owners 
since they carried out the disarmament 
plan. In a trip in 2006, my host, Chen, 
the owner of Mingyuan 明園 B&B, 
informed me of that, at the beginning, 
the QDH when retuning the lands did 
not take down the military structures 
therein but only vacated these 
buildings. Some property owners did 
not know what to do with these sturdy 
military buildings, and to have them 
torn down cost these owners a fortune. 
As they file complaints, the QDH 
decides to indiscriminately remove all 
structures before the land release. 
Some of these military structures 
bulldozed down were actually newly 
built at the time, and even some local 
witnesses considered the removal 
wasteful of useful structures. As a 
result, most military structures 
integrating into the civilian daily life 
today were transferred to the land 
owners in the first few years after the 
abolishment of Martial Law. Some 
locals put them to diverse uses, for 
example, a storage [A], a basement of 
their house [B], a auto-repair shop [C], 
and a barn [D]. [photo by the author] 
A
B
C
D
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appropriate carriers of outdoor advertising and public bulletin boards. The bunker at the 
gateway of Jinchen Township 金城鎮—the most developed urban area in Quemoy—is a 
representative of the disguised structures (Figure 4.7). At the main entrance of the town, 
the bunker stands at the center of the traffic circle, literally welcoming travelers from the 
east with the welcome sign on its wall. Nevertheless, the bunker was an anti-parachute 
fort stationed with a handful of soldiers who in addition to the defense duties were also 
responsible for the traffic control during the curfew hours. As a defense facility, the 
bunker guarded the main entrance of the township from outsiders until the abolishment of 
Martial Law. Before 2003, the military had withdrawn the soldiers stationed at the bunker, 
and installed a flower bed circling its base that separated the structure from hand 
engagement but maintained the eye contact. The structure, partially covered by the county 
logos—a simplified gable of the traditional folk house—as ornaments, carried a bulletin 
board with a neon dragon figure, “Quemoy County” in Chinese and English, and another 
county logo atop. With these ornaments, the county government attempted to turn the 
bunker into the centerpiece for the entrance into the county. Even so, the visitors could 
clearly tell the origin of the structure as a bunker by its appearance. In 2008, the county 
government repainted the bunker with a new coat of military camouflage, and upon the 
painted surface installed seven golden characters read as “Welcome to Jinchen 
Township.” The renewed appearance conveyed a mixed message, for on one hand the 
military camouflage strengthened the military connotation; on the other the characters 
turned the bunker into a welcoming sculpture. Although the renovation intended to 
accomplish the development of battlefield tourism and reconciliation at the same time, 
the resulting mixed message however rendered both meanings out of place. The 
displacement then posed a question: Which one, a bunker or a welcome sign, is proper?  
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
From 2004, the Kinmen 
Kaoliang Liquor Inc., a 
county controlled 
business, used the bulletin 
board for advertising; 
therefore the liquor bottle 
atop the bunker. 
In 2008, a new China 
policy brought a surge 
of mainland tourists to 
Quemoy, and the local 
added the characters to 
the bunker to welcome 
visitors. 
Figure 4.7.  The Bunker at the Gateway of Jinchen.  The serial photos show the bunker under disguise during 2003-2011. The 
transition reveals a tendency to cover up the military structure more and more permanently from public view. [photo by the author] 
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The locals answered the question in 2011 by another renewal of the structure in which 
horticultural decorations and photographs of local landscape covered up the entire 
structure. The renovation therefore concealed the original use of the structure from view. 
Even with the dramatic change of appearance, the welcome sign remained prominent on 
the structure. By disguise, the locals then erased the military structure from their 
everyday landscape. 
Through this discussion, one general principle for reediting the post-conflict 
landscape seems clear: For military structures to continue their existence, they must not 
hinder the ongoing pursuit of the local society. For those that do, they soon face 
destruction like the slogan signs on the folk houses. For those do not, the locals disregard 
them like the military structures in remote areas. Otherwise, the locals expect that some 
of these structures can assist in the cause of tourist development after reinvention. Even 
in these cases, reinvention is not always compatible with the continuity of military 
structures. Reinvention thence appears to be an alternative way to conceal and to erase 
the structures from the landscape; whereby they can silently support tourist development 
without bringing up contradictories that the locals strive to avoid. The only treatment 
aiming to re-present the image of military structures in operation is rehabilitation, and its 
primary goal is to create attractions for battlefield tourism upon the authenticity of these 
reinvented military structures. 
4.4 Mashan Observation Station: Transferring Meanings of a Bunker 
Not all the rehabilitated military structures recently underwent the transition from a 
defense post to a sightseeing spot. Some military structures have functioned as tourist 
attractions since the time of military rule: the observation stations in Quemoy serve both 
functions. These stations opened a few windows for people to peep into the Red China 
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behind the Bamboo Curtain. From their construction, they inherited the availability and 
readiness for visual consumption. In an ordinary setting, the scenery of beaches, bunkers, 
and enemy soldiers viewed through binoculars meant nothing more than what they were 
in eyes of the observer. For soldiers, seeing these scenes meant performing everyday 
surveillance. However, the same scenery could carry distinct meanings to visitors from 
distant places for it crystallized the exotic, unusual, and mysterious image of the others’ 
side. The extraordinariness of the scenery, stemming from its distance from the Free 
World, made the image metaphorically more significant than what they appeared to be, 
and presented the imaginative geography of a communist reality. Seeing these scenes 
therefore sets off a hermeneutic journey for the visitors to validate their knowledge about 
the imagined realm in its authentic form.  
The two ways of seeing articulated the everydayness and poetics of place. In 
contrast to the routine observations that soldiers carried out everyday, the tourists’ 
attempt to let the communist world reveal itself pinpointed a moment of truth that 
rendered the station a venue of authenticity and poetics. As the soldier’s everydayness 
concealed authenticity and poetics of place with the routine surveillance, the tourist 
poetics nonetheless made authenticity stand out to challenge the taken-for-granted 
understanding of the communist reality. In the everyday setting, the observer was the 
subject, the only actor that mattered in completing the daily errands, while in the poetic 
setting the observed became the leading role with which the truth might then reveal itself. 
After the development of battlefield tourism, the role of the observer and the observed 
reversed; the everydayness and poetics of place concomitantly moved along. Although 
the duality of the observation stations remained, the development had transferred the 
meaning of the military structures away from their original utility. When tourism 
225 
becomes the everyday practice in these stations, the authenticity what these stations 
concern the most will repose on their military past rather than the scenery in the lens.  
On the northeastern corner of Quemoy at the tip of the Mashan 馬山 peninsula, 
Mashan observation station occupies the location with the shortest distance to the P.R.C. 
The station is 1,800 meters from the P.R.C. controlled island, Jiaoyu 角嶼, on the ebb, 
and the geographic proximity makes the strategic point a proper site for an observation 
station and a broadcast station, let alone a certain coastal defense post. The peninsula 
projecting into the waters is actually a tombolo where one of the four citadels of the Ming 
Empire was built in the fourteenth century to defend the island from pirates. Upon the 
same site, the nationalist troops constructed modern defense works and underground 
facilities when they retreated to Quemoy in 1949. After years of military construction of 
underground facilities and earthworks, the elevation of the tombolo rose to thirty-two 
meters above sea level, and earthworks enabled thick vegetation cover to grow on the 
barren rocky tombolo. When the construction of the observation station was completed in 
the 1981, the military named the place “Mashan,” which literally meant the “horse hill” 
in Chinese. Thence, Mashan became the foremost post against the Bamboo Curtain, and 
the northernmost sentry post in Mashan was known as “the first post of the world 天下
第一哨.” 
As a critical military post, the QDH deployed an infantry company in Mashan and 
the small islet on its east, Hoyu 后嶼, to guard the water course between them and the 
Mashan cove on their southeast. The observation station was only a portion of the 
Mashan military complex which was mainly a coastal defense post but also 
accommodated a broadcast station for psychological warfare. Normally, the observation 
station was a surveillance center for the enemy activities, but during the wartime it would 
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assist artillery units improve their accuracy by reporting where their projectiles landed. In 
addition to the military use, the observation station was also a showcase for politicians, 
journalists, and international guests. For these visitors, the military built a modern 
restroom with hand dryers that the soldiers in the Mashan nicknamed “a million dollar 
restroom” and believed to be “the highest class in Quemoy” in the early 1980s (Quemoy 
Daily 24 Jul. 2004). The main attraction of the Mashan complex was the observatory in 
which soldiers using binoculars could watch the military activities on the communist 
controlled islets (Figure 4.8). When tourists visited the observatory, soldiers would 
explain the scenery visible through binoculars, while demonstrating their comprehensive 
knowledge of the enemy islands.  
The observatory and the restroom were on opposite ends of an underground tunnel 
(Figure 4.9). On the two pillars of the entrance was a couplet: “Manage the battlefield and 
train for combat strength, [so that] the whole army will defeat enemies and consolidate 
our territory 經營戰場培養戰力，全軍破敵永奠金甌.” The exit connected to a sunken 
square flanked with wall reliefs of battling soldiers on both sides, and the building on one 
side was a presentation room to introduce the complex to visitors. On the opposite to the 
tunnel entrance, a sunken path carved into the earth mound, and turned perpendicularly 
toward the gate of the military complex. On both sides of the path were two retaining 
walls; two lines of mature banyan trees, growing on the slopes behind the walls, covered 
the path from above. Seen from the gate, these trees formed a vista, and the centerpiece at 
its end was a slogan wall with four characters read as “Recovering My Rivers and 
Mountains 還我河山” (Figure 4.10). The entrance of the broadcast station was on one 
side of the sunken path, and there was also a couplet on both sides of the entrance: 
“Crumble the morale of the rebel army; amplify the heavenly voice of the great Han 弘揚 
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Figure 4.12.  The Mural of Armed Soldier  Figure 4.13.  The Wall of Old Photos 
Figure 4.10.  The Vista, the Slogan Wall, 
and the Sunken Path 
Figure 4.11.  Entrance of the Broadcast 
Station.  
Figure 4.8.  Interior of the Observatory Figure 4.9.  Entrance of the Observation 
Station.  
[photos by the author in 2008, 2009] 
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大漢天聲，瓦解匪軍士氣” (Figure 4.11). In the past the station was another tourist 
attraction in the complex. From the entrance of the underground station, a tunnel led to 
offices and broadcast rooms, where the broadcasters announced propaganda with their 
soft voices. To broadcast the audio propaganda to the mainland seaboards, the garrison 
built two towers facing the mainland on the sea cliff, and installed a total of fifty-six 
loudspeakers on their façades. With these characteristic facilities and the foremost 
location of the Free World, the showcasing and symbolic attributes were inherent in the 
Mashan military complex. 
In 2002, the QDH transferred the observation station to the KNP that reused the 
place as tourist attractions. As rehabilitation aims to re-present the image of the military 
structure, the KNP does not significantly alter the observation station. Today, tourists can 
follow the right fork from the complex gate to the sunken path, passing by the broadcast 
center to the entrance of the observation station, which is the only facility open to the 
general public. The left fork leads to the coastal posts and the soldiers’ quarters in the 
military reservation, and its gatekeepers’ post moves inward from the complex gate to the 
middle of the left fork. Tourists can linger in the open space behind the complex gate for 
photos or gathering. Also, military personnel maintain the broadcasts, but, instead of 
propaganda, it plays pop music for entertainment. Most changes noticeable after 
rehabilitation are cosmetic to highlight the sense of a military base: for example, adding a 
coat of military camouflage paint on the green retaining walls along the sunken path; or, 
decorating the tunnel entrance with a mural of a faceless, armed soldier guarding a costal 
sentry post beside a binocular (Figure 4.12). The decorative treatment also appears in the 
observatory. By a wall of monotone photographs of Chiang Kia-shek inspecting military 
facilities in Quemoy during the wartime, the KNP endows the space with a museum 
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quality, and evokes a reminiscent association with the past (Figure 4.13). To constitute 
battlefield tourism, the KNP exaggerates the military motif by introducing military 
accretions to the original military settings. The faceless solider guarding the tunnel 
entrance offers a chance of reflexivity for tourists, especially the veterans among them, to 
establish personal connections to the place through their memory and experience. With 
these additions enhancing the awareness of the military settings, the rehabilitation is thus 
conceived as remedies for the absence of soldiers, defenses, and conflicts, all of which in 
one word are demilitarization. 
In addition, rehabilitation is also means to adapt the military structures to mass 
tourism. The overt demonstrations are the construction of the parking lot for tour buses 
adjacent to the complex gate and the public display of the Mashan map including the 
layout of the military complex. They are both amenities to create a tourist-friendly 
environment. Likewise, to create such an entrance, the KNP tore down the iron gate to 
allow a view into the military complex, and repaved the entrance to mold an entrance 
concourse with a direction sign of the interior facilities in the pavement. Without soldiers 
on guard, the exclusive military base now opens to the public, and the exposure attracts 
vendors to take on soldiers’ position, preying on people coming close to their stands. 
Moreover, the line of facilitation work can sometimes get subtle and discreet that one 
without prior knowledge of the place cannot tell the difference, such as erasing the two 
militant couplets from the entrances of the broadcast station and the observation station. 
From the alteration and accretion of the structures, two purposes of the rehabilitation 
emerge: first, to highlight the military sense of place and second, to facilitate mass 
tourism, and if conflict occurs, the first will be sacrificed for the second as obliteration of 
the two couplets. The spatial affinity to mainland tourists—that the locals consider as 
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their main market of mass tourism—therefore outweighs the articulation of spatial 
specificity of the military structures.  
In addition to soldiers and couplets, another missing component from the landscape 
in Mashan is the thick vegetation on the coast after mine removal. To perform the mine 
clearance, the QDH clear-cut the vegetation in the minefields around the complex, and 
exposed its exteriors and all the seafront posts originally hidden in the woods. Due to its 
proximity to the mainland, Mashan happens to be the turnabout point and the finale of the 
famous cruise, “Watching Quemoy on the Sea.” During the Cold-War period, soldiers 
guarding the coastal sentry posts had to fire warning shots at vessels transgressing the 
midline of the waters, and if the vessels disregarded the warning soldiers had to fire shots 
to expel them. Otherwise, the soldiers on guard would face trials in a court-martial. After 
the abolishment of Martial Law, the withdrawal of troops weakened the coastal defense 
in Quemoy, and soldiers in the remaining coastal posts received instructions to hold their 
fire against transgression. Instead, they are encouraged to use alarm sirens or megaphone 
loudspeakers. Under the circumstances of demilitarization, the cruise boats carrying 
mainland tourists to Quemoy need not worry about transgression over the marine border. 
Unlike the situation in the famous story, these boats today would approach directly unto 
the Mashan seafront at a distance close enough for the tourists to start a quarrel with the 
soldiers in their sentry posts. Thence, the tour boats slowly cruise through the 
watercourse between Mashan and Hoyu for photo shoots, and then return to Amoy from 
the Mashan cove (Chang 2008). As nationalist garrisons are the major scenic attraction of 
the cruise, the clear-cutting for demining coincidentally facilitated the visual consumption 
for the mainland tourists. The observation station is now observed, and the observer and 
the observed also exchanged their places. 
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China is open to travelers from around the global to travel freely, and the scenery 
viewed from Mashan does not have the significance as before, no longer does it represent 
the communist world. The landscape in the binoculars displays nothing but everyday life 
in China. In contrast, as the Mashan station turns into a tourist attraction, it is the focal 
point of the tourist gaze whether from sea or land. Inasmuch as its attraction stems from 
the connection with the past conflict, the tourist locale means more than a cluster of 
former military structures, and stands a monument to the yesteryears. The historical 
association of the observation station renders it an evocative stimulus to nostalgia, and 
opens up the poetic dimension of the place. In the poetic setting, the garrison in Mashan 
is thus the past in the present. Thereby the rehabilitation introduces the camouflage paint, 
the soldier’s mural, and the wall of wartime photographs to strengthen the spatiality and 
to spur personal connection with the place.  
From another standpoint, sightseeing naturally becomes the everyday practice after 
the touristic turn, and a part of the goal of rehabilitation is to facilitate mass tourism. To 
fulfill this goal, rehabilitation embeds a new set of underlying discourses through the 
spatial rearrangement that in the meantime encourages ritualized practice. For example, 
participants in the group tours will normally get off their buses in the parking lot; pass by 
the map of Mashan on the corner and the vendors’ booths across the street. They will 
gather in the entrance concourse to hear their guides’ interpretation or to take photographs 
of the stone tablet with inscriptions of Mashan. Another example is the course of the 
cruise boats that usually stop briefly near the Mashan station for photographs, and then 
sail into the cove before turning back to the Amoy docks. Soldiers on guard will not 
mistake the approaching boats as threats, for the routine of the cruises has rendered them 
taken-for-granted objects to the soldiers. Likewise, on the trip taken on the land, tour 
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guides and vendors also find a fixed vantage point to embark on their regular business, 
and tour guides will usually share a similar itinerary to lead their groups through the place. 
Aside from the human effect, the tourist pilgrimage is a combination of improvisational 
reenactments according to the spatial choreography embedded in the place through 
rehabilitation: The concourse suggests lingering; the tree vista and sunken path hints 
“keep walking”; and the slogan wall calls for a photo shoot. In other words, the 
institutionalization originates from the spatial orders that hint to visitors to perform 
certain acts in the designed environments. Since rehabilitation has inscribed the 
pilgrimage ritual on the sequent spaces, the amenities of mass tourism in Mashan thus 
embody the everydayness of the sightseeing spot. In the ordinary settings, the spatial 
practice in response to the embedded spatial orders articulates the meaning of place, and 
the everydayness of place depends on the users’ conformity to the spatial suggestions. 
Either challenging or neglecting the suggestions leads to improper conducts and makes 
the user out-of-place. As a result, in an everyday setting, the spatial practices create 
meaning rather than the spatial orders or the spaces. In this mode of understanding, the 
material settings in Mashan, namely the representation of the Cold-War past, are 
insignificant, but only the present tourist activities matter. 
The role exchange of the Mashan observation station from the observer (signifier) to 
the observed (signified) reveals a change in its meaning: In the past, the station provided 
access to the social foci—life on the communist side—but now it is, or strictly speaking 
its past self is, meaningful as the social focus—the observed observation station, not just 
an everyday tourist spot. The semantic transformation results from the human attachment 
of historic significance to Mashan, while the attached significance in fact comes from, but 
is not limited to, the past use of Mashan as an access to the social focus. If so, the identity 
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change of Mashan can clarify its semantic change, as spatial practice defines identity and 
identity endows places with meanings. From an everyday military station/a poetic tourist 
spot to a poetic military station/an everyday tourist spot, the exchange of the 
everydayness and poetics of place between the place identities present few leads. The 
historical significance of the place comes from the soldiers’ everyday practice in the past, 
and yields poetics of place today based on its authenticity of a Cold-War apparatus. Due 
to the poetic evocation, Mashan metaphorically means more than a battle station from the 
moment of demilitarization, and symbolizes the nationalist ideologies, the anticommunist 
conflict, the military life, and associations with the Cold War. As a trope of the past, the 
station departs from an entity for combatant use to a symbol for cultural interpretations. 
As such, its meaning is constantly referential to itself as a signifier (e.g., a military relic 
today) pointing to another signifier (e.g., the observation station during the Cold War) to 
another (e.g. the life in the communist side in binoculars) to another. Mashan figuratively 
turns into a vessel accommodating different, given meanings that however are not 
concerned with its entity—Mashan as tourist amenities. The semantic transfer of Mashan 
thence declares a symbolic communication with an absence of essence in its meanings 
that dreadfully hinge upon one attached referent and another. Sequentially, the attached 
meanings in the present, such as the one of a war memorial, become the dominant 
definition of the place, and alienate other meanings of Mashan from the public. The 
usurpation of meanings is exactly the purpose to perform rehabilitation in the military 
relics, by which the locals may dispatch the conflicts to the past, and promote battlefield 
tourism. 
During the Cold-War period, Mashan as “the first post of the world” was especially 
heavily garrisoned with crack troops, and the military only assigned its loyal champions 
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to command the position, who could constantly meet with and therefore establish 
relations with elites in the world, when they visited Mashan to watch the Red China. In 
another word, whoever commanded the post would have a promising future (Quemoy 
Daily 17 Apr. 2012). The arrangement constituted the specificity of Mashan that was full 
of pride, feeling of superiority, and responsibility. As a veteran recalled, the experience on 
sentry duty at the nearest post to China provoked a poetic, gallant feeling, “as if I alone 
can shoulder all the responsibility to protect our country and all its families” (Huang 
2006). Due to the geographic proximity to P.R.C. territory, Mashan was commonly 
construed as a highly sensitive position under strict security control to prevent infiltration 
(Quemoy Daily 24 Mar. 2004). Subsequently, the military structure like a border sign in 
the landscape conveyed a crystal-clear message: “Keep Out, Red China Ahead!” For 
most people, propaganda demonized communists and guns in the beachfront validate the 
warning of border-crossing. However, for one looking for a way to the communist side, 
the geographic statement of Mashan offered a convenient indication of the ideal departing 
location. Given that, in 1979 the commander of the Mashan position swam to the P.R.C. 
islet from his post. Inasmuch as the short distance was the primary factor in favor of his 
trip, the “first post of the world” was simultaneously the most convenient spot for 
defection. 
The dual meanings of Mashan are a direct product of the borderland effect that 
grants two opposite ways of viewing a place. The geographical characteristics of Quemoy 
repeatedly induce social constructs appearing as a pair in the history about who the locals 
are and what the place is. Therefore, no matter the Han or non-Han, a gang of maritime 
powers or obedient imperial subjects, and even nationalists or communists are 
dichotomous social constructions without essential meanings. What matters is practice, 
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especially those concerning struggle. For livelihood, e.g. plantation or overseas trade, the 
local social focus switches toward completely opposite directions a few times in history. 
The struggles for living thus constitute the several occasions of what I term “reversal of 
geographical coordinate system,” of which the embodiment in landscape presents 
polarized contrast to the former settings. The sharp contrast after the shift manifests the 
social engagement in a new paradigm revolving around another pair of dichotomous 
constructs that “strive to usurp each other’s meaning” (Smith 1997, 90). In spite of the 
paradigm shift, the contest between the previous pair however remains undetermined and 
inconclusive, but fades away from the center-stage of the social concerns. The role that 
Quemoy locals played in the anti-pirate war in the seventeenth century is still very much 
controversial today. In light of this, even though the binary constructs change, the 
underlying chassis causing the primary social issue and its corresponding categories is 
still the borderland effect. That said, studies of Quemoy tourism also consider the 
borderland effect as the key parameter of its tourist attraction (Chien 2004; Chang 2008). 
As tourists from China and Taiwan contest over the meanings of the military relics, the 
battlefield tourism arouses other dialectics of the identities of Quemoy and its people. 
Considering the management methods of military structures as embodiments of the 
landscape dialectics, it then reveals the local viewpoints on the identity issue. The 
reediting of the military landscape represents not only the local reinterpretation of the 
past, but also a crucial step to remold their homeland into a preferable image that 
articulates who they are and where they are. The reinterpretation and reconstruction are 
therefore both parts of efforts for the identity reformulation. 
Mashan presents the semantic contrast of a place between the opposite viewpoints of 
nationalist and communist regimes, the landscape change after demilitarization in 
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Mashan, that delivers an “observed observation station,” reveals the contrast between the 
two paradigms of the Cold War and the current reconciliation. The irony, generated from 
the sharp contrast between meanings attached to places in Quemoy, is therefore two-fold: 
one regards the borderland characteristics while the other regards the paradigm shift. As 
the mechanism of cultural demilitarization, the latter irony keynotes the landscape change 
after the reversal of the geographical coordinate system. When the entertaining aspect of 
battlefield tourism continuously consumes the nationalist meanings of individual bunkers, 
the irony in landscape also downplays the dominant discourses in the militant society (e.g. 
patriotism, anticommunism, etc.). To express goodwill, the Quemoy locals have to 
continuously reinvent military relics, the authentic representation of the past, to produce 
simulacra for tourist consumption. By so doing, they then can continuously disarm the 
past through the reiterative creation of simulation for entertainment. Until another 
paradigm shift, the meaning of the Sisyphean task should constantly rest in the recurrent 
process instead of the repeated, futile result. In this light, the retention of the military 
structures for rehabilitation signifies the local practice to inscribe geographical 
articulation of reconciliation with China. By comparison, destruction and abandonment of 
military structures would be less effective in expressing their peacemaking intention. The 
maneuver not only dissipates the dilemma of developing battlefield tourism and 
demilitarization, but also makes them essential to each other. The three social dynamics 
in Quemoy merely come as a bundle. 
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CHAPTER 5  REINTERPRETING LANDSCAPES:  
A JOURNEYTO HYBRIDITY 
In celebrating its ninetieth anniversary in 2005, Quemoy County issued a declaration 
and officially repudiated its past identity as a battlefield and the associated geographical 
marginality (Quemoy Daily 1 Jan. 2005):  
Our determination and will to seek peace will never change. Kinmen [Quemoy] is 
the bridge of friendship over the two sides of the Strait, not a battlefield. Kinmen is 
no longer an offshore island but the center with an ocean and a continent as its 
hinterland. . . . Let us . . . built Kinmen into an [special] economic zone of peace . . . . 
We will endeavor to push Kinmen on to the global stage. 
To accomplish the goal, the county government set its cardinal development policy to rely 
on “tourism as foundations of this county and [local] culture as representation of Quemoy 
觀光立縣，文化金門” (Luo 2010, 472). By the policy, the county government intends “to 
switch the geographic impression of ‘battlefield Quemoy’ into the one of ‘cultural 
Quemoy’ 把「戰地金門」的形象扭轉為「文化金門」” (InfoTimes 20 Jun 2007). To mold 
the new impression, the authorities incorporated “the traditional Southern Fukien 
architecture and the military relics into the local culture 整合金門特有的閩南傳統建築
及戰役史蹟，融入地方文化.” The effort will hopefully “enrich the tourist resources; 
animate the tourist industry; and promote the comprehensive development of Quemoy 豐
富觀光資源，活絡旅遊相關產業，促進金門整體發展” (Luo 2010, 472). Through the 
policy, the promotion of the local culture fundamentally serves two purposes for Quemoy: 
first, to buttress heritage tourism, and second, to reformulate place identities. Except for 
the battlefield culture, the cultural heritage in Quemoy generally refers to the southern 
Fukien culture and the Chinese emigrant culture, of which the material representations 
are the traditional settlement and folk housing in the Southern Fukien style and the 
Sino-occidental hybrid architecture owned by overseas Quemoyan (Figure 5.1). In a 
tangible sense, to supplant the impression of the battlefield Quemoy by one of the cultural  
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Figure 5.1  Traditional Folk Villages in Quemoy. Although the traditional layouts of 
most villages remain, the Sino-occidental buildings and modern architectures have 
blended in their skylines. [Source: Google Map, photos by the author in 2008 and 2010]
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Quemoy means to maneuver identity reformulation through obliteration of military 
structures and revitalization of the antebellum landscape. Provided the two approaches 
proceed smoothly, the geographic impression formed after 1949 should no longer 
represent Quemoy. However, the identity reformulation brings more complications than a 
declaration. 
First of all, to obliterate all monumental military structures from the landscape is 
unfeasible. When military structures assist tourist development, the locals exempt them 
from annihilation (Quemoy Daily 12 Feb. 2012). Since military relics remain the most 
characteristic landscape of Quemoy, some of them have survived the demilitarization to 
serve as tourist attractions in the post-military era. In addition, these military structures 
after reinvention can mostly showcase the local intention of disarmament and 
reconciliation. For this reason, the post-conflict society continuously reuses these 
structures for peacemaking purpose. Consequently, reinvention of the military landscape 
often comprises cultural sanitization to pacify their militaristic connotation. The most 
illustrative exemplars of the sort of reinvention appear in the cases where remodeling 
enables reuse. War museums, memorials, and commemorative sites were once essential 
propaganda that aroused patriotism and anticommunism during wartime. Due to their 
capability to indoctrinate the meaning of anticommunist struggles, these places have long 
been essential destinations on the battlefield pilgrimage, and over time have developed 
into iconic places of Quemoy. In the age of reconciliation, most of these iconographies 
however engage in a process of remodeling their interior exhibitions. Remodeled as they 
are, they become ideal places to propagandize the present reinterpretation of the past 
conflicts. For assistance in peacemaking, these monuments become an integral part of the 
tourist Quemoy, and are more valuable to the post-conflict society under reuse than 
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destruction. By reinterpreting meaning of landscape, the remodeled military structures 
then become the best instruments for demilitarization. 
Provided the post-war society successfully nullifies the battlefield identity, to fulfill 
the identity reformulation nonetheless requires construction of the “cultural Quemoy.” In 
other words, the management of military landscapes—through destruction, abandonment, 
and reinvention—are merely half the work of identity reformulation, while the other half 
relies on historical preservation. Their collaboration signifies two-way traffic that while 
dispatching military structures to the past, the local society simultaneously brings the 
historic landscape to the present. The exchange of representative images of Quemoy 
generally sums up the mechanism of landscape change after demilitarization. 
The construction of place image results in the ahistorical juxtaposition of multiple 
cultures in the landscape that consist mainly of three themes: the Cold War battlefield, the 
southern Fukien folk settlements, and the homeland of overseas Quemoyan. The 
reinvented and reconstructed spaces of these cultures scattered over the island lead 
tourists jumping from one time portal to another, and constitute a quixotic journey of the 
surreal, poetic Quemoy. The poetic effect of heritage tourism on tourists is especially 
conspicuous on group tours: As the tourists travel among historic sites, military relics, 
and scenic spots by bus during the day, hotels cater to most of their needs in the evening. 
Even when spontaneous excursions are possible, they have little chance to make in-depth 
observations on the local ordinary life. In consequence, their busy itinerary overloaded 
with Quemoy cultures inversely conceals the mundane Quemoy from them, and their 
Quemoy can thus be aloof from the day-to-day reality.27 Whereas the “cultural Quemoy” 
                                                 
27 In the summer of 2008, I attended a five-day workshop held by Taiwan Historica and the Quemoy 
County government in Quemoy. After several days of field trips and lectures, I overheard a Taiwanese 
participant commenting in the tour bus: There seemed to be no 7-Eleven convenient stores in Quemoy. At 
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pervades tourists’ ontological experience in their quest for the “authentic” image of the 
tourist destination, the reinterpretation of Quemoy is in effect working in the landscape to 
contest for the dominant place image, a Cold-Was battlefield. Consequently, the 
multiculturalism, as the outcome of the contest, reveals the underlying culture of 
postmodernity, which conjures the ahistorical juxtaposition of historic simulacra to serve 
as the local cultural commodity for mass tourism. Based on the landscape change in the 
post-conflict Quemoy, this chapter explores the construction of a homeland image for 
identity reformulation and its resulting cultural hybridity that bespeaks the overlapping, 
contesting, and polyvalent meanings of place. 
5.1 The Other End: Preserving Historic Sites for Tourism 
In comparison with Taiwan, Quemoy has a much longer history. For the reason, 
some of its historic sites have long been popular sightseeing spots for Taiwanese tourists 
since the Cold-War period. Until 2012, the county government has designated a total of 
twenty-three historic sites and 145 historic buildings to secure the resources of the 
heritage tourism. Due to the policy of tourist development, the number of designated 
historic sites increased 110 percent in the last twenty years in Quemoy. In addition, since 
the amendment of the Cultural Heritages Preservation Act enabled the registration of 
historic buildings in 2000, the number of historic buildings in Quemoy skyrocketed and 
amounts to 14 percent of the national total.28 Among these historic buildings, 71 percent 
                                                                                                                                                 
least, she did not see any. In fact, there were four in Jinchen near where we stayed, and we passed by some 
of them a few times a day on the bus. As the county government strived to show participants in the 
workshop as many cultural sites as our time allowed, the tight schedule however alienated us from the 
everyday life. Likewise, the alienation is a common condition for group tourists who usually will only stay 
in Quemoy for two evenings, as indicated by the best-selling tour package (Chang 2011). 
28 Before the abolishment of Martial Law in 1992, the total of historic sites in Quemoy was twenty-one, 
among which six were designated on Nov. 23 1991, and thus could also be a part of the local efforts for the 
tourist development (Huang 2008). According to the statistics provided by the Ministry of Culture, R.O.C., 
the total of registered historical building is 1,031 in 2012. The number of historic buildings in Quemoy is 
the second most among the twenty-two counties and cities in R.O.C., just a few less than the 163 buildings 
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(103 of 145) are residences including traditional folk houses and the Sino-occidental 
hybrid architectures. The intention to preserve the local vernacular culture is obvious. In 
addition to the designation of historic sites and buildings, the preservation movement 
further expands its horizon to protect houses that disqualify for historic designation in the 
two architectural styles. The ambitious expansion of coverage protects the integrality of 
traditional settlements (their layouts, skylines, etc.) when there is no strict military 
regulations to constrain the rampant housing development. For preservation purposes, the 
county government and the KNP both offer subsidies as financial incentives (with a 
maximum of two million Taiwan dollars, ca. $67,000 USD) for private owners to restore 
their old houses back to mint condition.29 Furthermore, the KNP also restores folk houses 
and historic buildings for their owners if they will let the KNP use the properties for thirty 
years. After restoration, the KNP subleases most of these properties to the private sector 
through public competitions, by which they then fulfill the goal to rehabilitate historic 
buildings. Since 1999, the KNP has acquired the utilization rights of seventy-seven 
buildings, and completely restored sixty-four until 2012. Among restored buildings, 
except for seven kept in the KNP as museums and on-site offices, private tenants operate 
bed-and-breakfasts in forty-nine of them and retail stores in five (Kinmen National Park 
n.d.). Whereas the majority of these fully-sponsored restoration projects become tourist 
amenities afterwards, their use suggests that a practical cause of historic preservation in 
                                                                                                                                                 
registered in the Taipei City. 
29 According to the Quemoy County Autonomous Regulation of Preservation Incentives for Traditional 
Architectures 金門縣維護傳統建築風貌獎助自治條例 amended in 2006, the county government will 
subsidize a maximum of 1,600,000 TWD (ca. $53,000 USD) for restoration projects in the county but 
outside the national park areas. The KNP also decrees a similar regulation, the Implementation Guidelines 
of Preservation Incentives for Traditional Architectures 金門國家公園維護傳統建築風貌獎勵補助實施
要點, which subsidizes a maximum of 2,000,000 TWD (ca. $67,000 USD) for the general restoration 
according to the latest version amended in 2011. Up to 2009, the KNP has subsidized 237 buildings 
(Kinmen National Park n.d.), and the county government has done the same for 347 buildings (Kinmen 
County Government n.d.).  
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Quemoy is to produce handmaids of cultural tourism. Under the influence of the 
development policy of the Quemoy County that promotes incorporation of tourism with 
reinvention of cultural landscape, a massive movement of historic preservation came into 
being. Consequently, the total number of buildings under preservation has exceeded 850 
in Quemoy in 2012. With the movement flourishing, the cultural landscape of Quemoy 
thus retains a reminiscent tinge. 
Through the preservation movement, the governmental agencies revive the image of 
antebellum Quemoy in the present landscape. According to the cultural policies of the 
county head (2001-2009), the historic preservation purports to “mold Quemoy into a 
multicultural museum island so as to constitute the burgeoning cultural industries 塑造
金門成為多元的博物館島，再造新興文化產業” (Lee Zhu-Fong Election Campaign 
Headquarters 2005, 23). By retaining, restoring, and reusing buildings in the traditional 
Southern Fukien style and the Sino-occidental hybrid style, the preservation movement 
re-presents a historical Quemoy in a golden age that in fact has never existed in its history 
due to the anachronistic juxtaposition. The “museum island” policy attempts to deliver a 
“hyperreality,” in which “[s]imulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or 
a substance. It is the generation of models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal” 
(Baudrillard 1988, 166). The products of “historic preservation” in this view are thus 
contemporary creation of hyperreal verisimilitudes. Since most landscape features under 
preservation belong to the local traditional culture, their general distribution in the whole 
island urges the formation of a nexus of eco-museums to turn Quemoy into a site of 
hyperreality. Toward this end, the chairman of the national council of cultural affairs 
suggests that the construction of “cultural Quemoy” should rely on a public-participatory 
process to establish a solid ground for community development. Furthermore, by 
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spontaneous public participation, the construction can bring out the local distinctiveness, 
and increase the local identification with the place (Chen 2004). In this view, the 
construction of “a multicultural museum island” attempts to produce a representative 
image of Quemoy, which communicates how the civil society in the post-conflict era 
prefers its homeland to be recognized by others, and how the locals consider that their 
ideal homeland should be. The preservation movement is thus an opportunity for the 
locals to realize their homeland reformation. In other words, historic preservation 
embodies locals’ intention to retrieve their homeland lost in militarization. Through the 
localization, they demonstrate their control of place and again leave the group impress in 
landscape. The place and identity reformulation motivate them to stride over the 
transition towards peacetime. 
Practically, historic preservation produces attractions for heritage tourism and 
amenities with local specificity, such as the old-house bed-and-breakfasts. As declared by 
the core development policy of Quemoy County—tourism is the county’s foundation and 
culture is its representation, accordingly the heritage tourism and multiculturalism are 
two sides of the same coin. Culturally, the preservation of these traditional buildings 
arouses a renaissance of the immaterial cultures, by which the post-military society 
revisits the local conventions and reinterprets their meanings and values that strongly 
connected with the local group identities. Meanwhile, the cultural renaissance also stirs 
the production of knowledge forming a discursive field that establishes the connection 
between the local vernacular culture and the hegemonic culture in traditional China. The 
emphases on the genesis of the island, which starts by a group of Han elites from the 
Chinese cultural hearth in the northern plain, and on their role in the anti-pirate war, who 
as pious Confucianists were the loyal supporters of the empire, are both historic 
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discourses serving for the connection. Such historic discourses aim to consolidate the 
legitimacy of the local culture to portray it as the paradigmatic type of the Han Chinese 
tradition, which then transcends the insular time-space limitation, and is applicable to a 
broader geographical area and an eclectic ethnic group. The knowledge of the traditional 
settlements in Quemoy produced in the recent research is an example. To increase the 
cultural value of the folk settlements, a catchphrase repeatedly used by preservationists to 
stress their significance is a metaphor of Quemoy as “the gene pool of the Southern 
Fukien culture 閩南文化的基因庫.” The metaphor comes from an architecture 
historian’s research published by the county government (Jiang 2002, 15): 
The traditional settlements in Quemoy embody the harmonious relation among the 
“universe, earth, and humanity” in the Han people’s ideologies. In addition, their 
interior layouts articulate the social relations of the traditional patriarchy . . . . It is 
pertinent to say that they are the gene pool of the Southern Fukien culture and the 
Southern Fukien architectures. 金門的傳統聚落是漢民族「天、地、人」和諧思
維的再現，內部的配置更反映了宗法倫理的社會關係……可說是閩南文化與閩
南建築的基因庫……。 
The (re)appraisal of the material culture attaches great significance to the folk villages, 
which then hold extra cultural value to inspire heritage tourism. While reconstruction of 
historic simulacra as tourist spots demands further research, production of knowledge 
reciprocally contribute to the discursive field. Ultimately, the cultural renaissance avails 
reconciliation. Whereas the maritime powers have only been capable of overwhelming 
empires in several, comparatively ephemeral time periods, Quemoy in its long history has 
usually been an inseparable part of the mainland China. Due to historical geopolitics, the 
cultural renaissance supplies an essential cognitive footing to justify the political cause of 
reconciliation by convention; thereby rekindling the local social and cultural connection 
with the mainland. After all, as the Quemoy County declared during the celebration of its 
ninetieth anniversary, to remove the battlefield identity for peacemaking is the collective 
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aspiration of the local people. For this purpose, the preservation movement is the local 
quest for new place identities, and leads to a rite of passage to re-inscribe the landscape 
impress of the post-war society. Whereas to create new often begets oblivion, the 
preservation movement begets the cultural renaissance which flourishes at the cost of the 
battlefield culture. In contrast to preservation applied to the traditional structures, 
destruction and desertion await military relics. Although the waning of battlefield culture 
signifies the achievements of demilitarization, more importantly it brings forth the 
cultural hybridity in the landscape mosaic of the post-conflict society. 
Maoshan Tower 矛山塔 is one of the three pagodas built with the coastal 
fortifications and the walled city in the fourteenth century. In the folklore, the general 
ordered to build these pagodas for fengshui considerations (Tang 2006), but recent 
research propagates that it functions mainly as a navigational reference (Huang et al. 
2003). Maoshan Tower stands atop a hill, currently known as Maoshan 矛山, rising from 
the rocky coast on the southwest corner of Quemoy. In a lithograph landscape of Quemoy 
in the 1630s from a viewpoint on the sea (Figure 5.2), the elaborate portrayal of Maoshan 
Tower suggests a clear, conspicuous view of the pagoda during seaborne navigation. Due 
to its prominence, Maoshan Tower over time became a local landmark, and for villagers 
in Shuitou 水頭, the settlement adjacent to Maoshan, the pagoda is the iconography of 
their village (Quemoy Daily 22 May 2004). In the 1930s, to report the local news to 
villagers working overseas, the elementary school in Shuitou issued a periodical, the 
Tower Hill Monthly 塔峰月刊, which used the image of Maoshan Tower on the cover of 
all issues (Huang et al. 2003). In 1961, the troops in Quemoy dismantled the pagoda 
because it provided a geographical prominent targeting reference for the communist 
artillery. Afterwards, the military built a faux radar station on the hilltop site as a decoy  
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Figure 5.2.  Quemoy in the 1630s. The pagoda on the right is Maoshan Tower. The Fort Quemoy at the center is where 
the island gets it current name. [Source: Lee 2004b] 
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for the enemy shells (Quemoy Daily 13 Jul. 2005). Right after the military released the 
island from its rule in 1992, the villagers in Shuitou immediately appealled to the county 
government for the reconstruction of Maoshan Tower. The villages provided a photo of 
the pagoda found in the old periodical as the model for reconstruction (Huang et al. 2003). 
After the reconstruction of Maoshan Tower was completed in 2004 (Figure 5.3), the 
county government erected a stele with inscriptions about the vicissitude of the pagoda. 
The inscription specifically points out that the purpose to re-erect the pagoda is “to fulfill 
the goal to construct—tourism as the county foundations; culture as Quemoy’s 
representation 以實現觀光立縣文化金門之目標.” Along with the return of the cultural 
landmark, the military facility on the hilltop thus ceased to represent the place, and since 
passed into oblivion.  
In contrast, the villagers’ urgent aspiration to restore the symbolic landscape reveals 
their regret of its loss. On its destruction, a local preservationist sarcastically remarked, 
“This pagoda was built for the military purpose [as a part of the coastal defenses] but was 
also destroyed for the same 此塔因軍事需要而建，也因軍事因素而拆” (Huang et al. 
2003, 35). Living under the military hegemony during the wartime, the oppressed 
villagers reluctantly abided by the defense considerations that the military insisted upon, 
which not only destroyed the pagoda but subsumed the area of Maoshan into military 
reserve. As a result, the military deployment segregated the villagers from the landscape 
feature central to their collective memory and identity. After the abolishment of Martial 
Law returned the control of place, the villagers immediately wielded the newly gained 
power to reshape the landscape. They intended to revert the surroundings to their 
homeland in the memories by removing the military landscape that was not in the  
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Figure 5.3.  The Reconstructed Maoshan Tower and the Stele for it Dedication in 
2004. [photos by the author] 
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antebellum landscape. In the discussion on the cultural repercussions of militarization, 
Huang confesses the mentality of iconoclasm (2011, 147):  
With the resistance to and the desire to be released from [the military hegemony] . . . 
the Quemoy locals [after demilitarization] often reckoned that many unreasonable 
controls and restraints in the past were the most resentful objects that must be 
destroyed or even completely eradicated from the landscape in no other way can 
their anger vent sufficiently. 存在著欲求解脫與抗拒的心理……金門百姓，面對
許多往日不合理的管制與約束，往往視其為深惡痛絕的對象，非加以破壞甚至
連根拔起不足以洩憤 
As the precondition of the historic reconstruction is the destruction of military structures, 
the trade-off in this case is an advanced version of demilitarization, which in addition to 
destruction reconstructs the cultural landscape central to the Shuitou villagers. Similarly, 
the reconstruction of monuments originated from the mentality of transitional justice that 
urges the locals to leave their cultural impress in their homeland. After Maoshan 
reopened to the public and the villagers witnessed the remnants of the Maoshan Tower, 
the ruins evoked memories about the pagoda in their daily life, and “stirred an intensive, 
historic nostalgia 勾起一股強烈的歷史情懷” that drove them to appeal for the 
reconstruction (Huang et al. 2003, 42). The appeal for reconstruction articulated their 
bonding with place, and the consequent recurrence of Maoshan Tower in the landscape 
demonstrated the exertion of control of place by the locals today. Thereby, the 
demilitarization and historic preservation in Quemoy represented a constituent process of 
homeland (re)construction. 
5.2 Representations of Quemoy: Dialogue between Reinvention and Reconstruction 
By reshaping landscape, the construction of new place images to replace the one of a 
battlefield engages the civic society into a dialectical process of place representation. The 
collaboration to cast a destination image of heritage tourism through reinvention of 
military relics and historic preservation discloses the dialogues among the cultural/tourist 
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Quemoy, the battlefield Quemoy, and the everyday Quemoy. The contest for the 
representative image indicates a shift in the local power structure in the post-military era. 
Whereas the wane of nationalism unveils the colonialist tinge of the modern military 
culture, the military past is now construed as a totalitarian imposition on Quemoy, 
sequentially making it the “the great tragedy of the epoch” (Huang 2004b). Following the 
development of democratization, the transplanted, hegemonic military culture of the 
nationalist army declined into an inferior status to other local(ized) cultures—of the Han 
in North China or of the European in Southeast Asia. The rising awareness of local 
cultures gradually suppressed the world of modern military culture (battlefield Quemoy), 
and increasingly appreciated the vernacular cultures (the cultural Quemoy). Aside from 
the fact that the alienation from the military past facilitated the pursuit of reconciliation 
with China, the local people in fact have an estranged relation with the Cold-War military 
landscape. As the military rigorously forbade civilian access to military reserves, 
inhabitants have long excluded these military enclaves from their daily life since the 
military squatted on these lands. With the return of the lands from the military to the local 
lifeworld, the civil society has embarked on relocating these former military sites in the 
post-military societal structure. Meanwhile, by reinterpreting their meanings, these 
military structures also partake in the reformulation of place image under negotiation, 
resistance, or selectively appropriation. 
Through reediting the syntax of landscape, the municipal intention to create 
“cultural Quemoy” for tourist consumption and self-reinvention has brought about the 
dialogue among representations of place and the existing material settings of Quemoy. As 
shown in the case of Maoshan Tower, its reconstruction reveals the local eagerness to 
return the space to a heritage site; meanwhile conceal the former use of the place as a 
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military facility. The case of Maoshan Tower demonstrates the dialogue in two ways. 
First, it provides illustrations of how the “representation is created from a place and, in 
turn, contributes to the reproduction of that place” (Hanna 1996, 637). The effect of 
representation on “real” spaces unravels, especially when the county government actually 
relied on the photo of the pagoda in old periodicals as the model for the reconstruction. 
The repercussions of representations on the landscape encapsulate and reify the dialogue 
between the representation and reality. With the re-erection of Maoshan Tower, its 
representations, namely the periodical photos and the seventeen-century lithograph 
landscape, become cultural capital of the place. Second, although nostalgia is the major 
factor prompting reconstruction, concealment of military uses suggest a contest for the 
dominant representation of Quemoy. However triggered by the social memories, the 
reconstruction aims to constitute the tourist/cultural Quemoy, as indicated on the stela to 
celebrate re-erection of the pagoda. The reconstruction reveals that the social memory is 
actually less about the past, but “involves interpreting or remembering the past in ways 
relevant to the present” (DeLyser 2003, 886). Through the presentist lenses, the 
reproduction of place to resurrect the antebellum landscape discloses the dialectics 
between the cultural Quemoy and the current landscape under demilitarization.30   
Politically, the contest for the representative image of the island often results in 
re-inscription of landscape, of which “the patterns of destruction [of monuments] offer 
                                                 
30 After its completion, authenticity of the new pagoda was called into question. Some villagers of Shuitou 
overtly expressed their discontent with the “falsified reproduction.” A councilwoman from the village 
displayed an old photo of the pagoda, and complained that “the current [re-erected] Maoshan Tower is too 
far from the original landscape 現在的茅山塔與舊有景觀相差太多.” In her view, the discrepancy 
stemmed from the county government’s disregard, and thus disrespect, for the local voices (Quemoy Daily 
28 Nov. 2004). As indicated by her opinion, the authenticity of the reproduction actually hinges upon 
whether the county government asked villagers’ opinions. As their involvement stands for the villagers’ 
control of place, the disregard stimulates the issue of authenticity. To this point, the reconstruction has 
become a means for the villagers to bargain political leverage; which illustrates that the recurrence of the 
past actually has more to do with the present situation. 
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insight into how nations interpret highly contested political places and events” (Foote et 
al. 2000, 307). Furthermore, concomitant with the destruction, “new monuments were 
erected and damaged monuments restored if they celebrated the ideology of the new 
government” (Foote et al. 2000, 307). Based on their observations, it is clear that the 
re-inscription comprises a goal to reshape landscape toward the current social quests. The 
necessity of congruence with the dominant discourse may also explain why the 
re-inscription more often than not disadvantages the continuance of military structures, 
but prioritizes historic preservation in Quemoy. Cultural prejudice occurs alongside the 
discrimination. Lowenthal offers his insight to this process (1975, 31): 
[Cultural prejudice] affects what is preserved, what is suffered to vanish, and what is 
deliberately destroyed. Features recalled with pride are apt to be safeguarded against 
erosion and vandalism; those that reflect shame may be ignored or expunged from 
the landscape. 
Reminding of the military oppression, the military facilities in Quemoy are under threat 
of effacement also for their obstruction of reconciliation. The military remnants in the 
peacetime have become monuments, which from time to time conjure up bitter memories 
of yesteryear under military rule, about the strict control, the heavy levy, the property 
requisition, and the service in the militia. Such symbolism undoubtedly accelerates their 
destruction. Even so, the iconoclasm cannot bring all the military structures to extinction. 
Neither can the construction of cultural Quemoy syncretically expunge military 
landscapes. On the contrary, the pursuit of a new representation does not produce a 
hegemonic image to replace the battlefield Quemoy, but counter-intentionally results in 
an ambiguous image of the island with cultural hybridity. Hanna comments on this 
seeming contradiction: “It seems that the very process of representation that is necessary 
in the definition of place is the same process that replaces certain knowledge of what 
place is with unavoidable ambiguity” (1996, 633). As such, the attempt to supplant 
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battlefield Quemoy with cultural Quemoy dialectically produces a collage offering 
cultural diversity for heritage tourism. 
As the mosaic representation unfolds, both a total demilitarization of the military 
landscape and a comprehensive reversion to the antebellum landscape are impractical and 
unfruitful. Some military structures, like Mashan Observation Station, have turned into 
battlefield tourism destinations through rehabilitation. By and large, despite their physical 
retention, the place identity of these former military structures has changed, and they 
subsist in a different manner from their initial purpose. The material and immaterial 
changes have disarmed their martial connotation. In other cases, when both the physical 
structures and their place identities remain intact, reinvention usually changes their 
meanings in the post-conflict era. The semantic transformation often happens to 
commemorative spaces.  
During the Cold-War period, monuments, museums, or public artworks of 
anticommunism functioned as instruments for political warfare to uplift the social morale. 
Due to their national significance for patriotic propaganda, some of these symbolic 
structures assumed unique iconographies of Quemoy. These sites became sacred places 
for nationalists, bundled with the identity of Quemoy. Their images were basically what 
Quemoy was known for when landscape in the frontline was highly sensitive and 
confidential. These nationalist sanctuaries have since represented Quemoy. Today, 
although the local people resist the battlefield identity, they keep these structures 
undisturbed under demilitarization. In addition, the government continues to use these 
places as battlefield attractions. Nevertheless, changes have been made to assimilate these 
iconographies to the political weather of the post-conflict Quemoy. The most discernable 
adaptation to the zeitgeist occurs in the remodeled interior of the memorial halls and their 
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renewed interpretive materials. Through renovation, the museums now narrate old stories 
afresh in two tones that, in addition to celebrations of the military victory, the governance 
success, and the nationalist doctrines, the museums also comprise discourses from the 
civilian viewpoint and thematic displays on local subjects. 
Politics of representation often emerge concomitant with shifts in the power 
structure. By referring to the evolving signifying system, the post-conflict society 
reinvents meanings of its monuments for the new age, and their redefinition subsequently 
follows reproduction of place. In a constructivist view, meanings of monuments in 
commemoration of the past stem from “how they are conceived in retrospect, and our 
conception of the past derives entirely from the condition and concerns of the present” 
(Boholm 1997, 266). Thereby, “negotiation, resistance, or selective appropriation” 
(Hanna 1996, 633) are dialectics between the present and the past, the cultural/tourist and 
the battlefield Quemoy. The dialectical process most obviously takes shape in the 
memorial halls, which convey the redefined meanings of the commemorated subjects 
through their remodeled interior and their renewed interpretive materials. By the 
treatment of remodeling, these nationalist scared grounds as well as iconographies of 
Quemoy survive the post-conflict iconoclasm, and integrate into the new power structure. 
The appropriation through reinterpretation suggests a “semantic flexibility that enabled it 
[a monument] to remain a focal point of commemorative activity” (Stangl 2003, 213). 
Due to the flexibility, the meaning of monuments becomes ambiguous and eclectic. Their 
change from a showcase of anticommunist achievements to a kaleidoscope with 
heterogeneous mnemonics of the wartime past for the locals reveals such flexibility. With 
reinterpretations, meaning of these memorials expands and becomes multivocal. 
Observing the spatial trait, Till (1999, 251) defines a memorial as 
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both a material object and a site of negotiation; it remains “entangled” with the 
ongoing creation of historical narratives, official visions, local memories and 
cultural productions. 
Notwithstanding the flexibility, reinterpretations do not come into being unconstrained, 
nor are they completely presupposed by history. As each specific milieu strategically 
produces different interpretations of monuments for its time, they share an interlocked 
semantic relation between one another (Boholm 1997, 267): 
[t]radition and innovation should be understood as complementary and 
interdependent. . . . [traditions] modify and change through time as a result both of 
their internal dynamic and in response to external demands. The present is informed 
by the past and the past is reconstrued by the present. 
As the interpretations call upon each other to compete for the dominant paradigm, the 
invention of interpretation is purported to conceal its immediate predecessor, which in the 
Quemoy case oftentimes refers to anticommunism. Nonetheless, the concealment of these 
inherited iconographies does not always rely on physical operation on the landscape.  
The cultural demilitarization for these iconographic structures can also proceed through 
selective appropriation, so that their recognizable and constituent image for battlefield 
tourism and self-identification may remain. With only partial modifications applied to 
these structures, their meanings, as the remodeled interior transpire, are anachronistically 
tangled up in between the present and the past. These cases of remodeling consequently 
become places that Foucault terms as “heterotopias” where “all the other real sites that 
can be found within the culture are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” 
(Foucault 1986, 24). The memorials, as heterotopias of time, juxtapose a constellation of 
phantoms that each responsively evokes another, and all together form a Babel in the 
contest for the dominant representation of the past. 
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5.2.1  The Juguang Memorial: Desacralization of a Nationalist Shrine 
The most renowned case of remodeling in Quemoy is the Juguang Memorial 莒光
樓. (Figure 5.4) In 1952, the QDH mobilized both troops and civilians to construct this 
building to celebrate the military feats of the servicemen during the past few battles 
(Chang 2003). The commander of QDH, General Hu Lian 胡璉, asked a young 
solider—the first “Combat Hero” of the Chinese Nationalist forces—to write down 
“Juguang Memorial” in calligraphy as the characters on the nameplate of the building. 
The gesture of writing on the building façade is said to dedicate the memorial to ordinary 
people as heroes (Chang 2003). The memorial is located in the southern outskirts of 
Jinchen against the Mt. Fonglian; nestled on a steep slope rising from the southern rim of 
the estuary of the Wujiang Creek. The straight avenue running down from its foundation 
forms a vista with the Juguang Memorial at the center. Its location and designed 
surroundings bring forth the building against its background as the visual focus for the 
vicinity. Additionally, an observer at the building has an unobstructed and far-reaching 
view and can skim over the influx, the sea, and the scattered isles dotted in between, and 
fix on the mainland on a clear day. The memorial is in a Chinese revival style mimicking 
bastions of the Forbidden City (Jiang 2002). The adoption of the Chinese “national style” 
to the memorial attempts “to erect a spiritual symbol of the battlefield Quemoy by the 
image of conventional, classic architecture 以正統的、古典的建築形象，豎立戰地金
門的精神象徵” (Chang 2003, 41). On the hillside by the estuary, the prominent structure 
in the flamboyant style stands out from its monotone surroundings. By its geography and 
architectural style, the Juguang Memorial is able to draw attention from afar and hence 
stands as a prominant landmark. The name “Juguang,” translated as “the glory earned in 
recovering the lost land,” has predetermined the symbolim of the building as “a space to  
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 The Juguang Memorial in the 1960s-1970s. 
As a nationalist shrine, the memorial was 
the locale for masses to perform rituals of 
the civic religion during the military rule. 
[Source: Lee 1996] 
Figure 5.4.  The Juguang Memorial in 2004. 
The memorial is located on the high ground 
adjacent to the estuary (a). The topography 
enables visitors a panorama of landscape below, 
and renders the memorial a landmark (b). The 
different spatial performances in front of the 
monument indicate its identity change after 
demilitarization. [photo by the author] 
a 
b 
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indoctrinate patriotism 愛國主義教化空間”(Jiang 2002, 153). By celebrating the 
ordinary people as patriotic war heroes, the memorial conveys the notion that everyone in 
the nation should look up to, and behave as the heroic role models. For this reason, the 
memorial in the frontline, where the patriotism runs high and is most in need, functions as 
a sacred shrine of nationalism, which over time turns into a token of all the ideologies 
relevant to the civil religion. 
Due to the symbolism of the Juguang Memorial, the R.O.C. government in Taipei 
started a campaign baring the building’s name in 1964 to strengthen the resolution of the 
general public to recover the mainland China from communists. Thence, “Juguang” 
became a popular name among public organs nationwide (Yan and Chen 2007, 128-9): 
Since the beginning of this campaign, all the works set to restore the regime of the 
R.O.C. in the mainland [turned and] centered on this campaign. Back then, crack 
forces were called Juguang Company; military heroes were called Juguang Model; 
and a [television] program of political indoctrination was called Juguang Corner. 
Even schools, buildings, roads, trains, and whatnot were all fashionably used 
“Juguang” as their names. 自此運動後，中華民國的復國工程無不以此為主軸。
那時，績優部隊叫做莒光連隊，國軍英雄喚為莒光楷模，政治教學裡有莒光園
地，就連學校、大樓、道路、火車等等，都時興以「莒光」為名。  
With the name widespread, its image followed. The most influential application of the 
image was in the 1960s to a series of commemorative postage stamps with a total of 
1.822 billion in circulation around the world (Huang 2003). Contingent to the political 
purpose of the campaign, the omnipresence of its name and image in Taiwan sequentially 
impressed an inseparable bond between Quemoy and the memorial on the public 
understanding. As the direct result of the campaign, the Juguang Memorial became the 
unique iconography of Quemoy, and reciprocally only in Quemoy, the nationalist 
frontline, could the Juguang Memorial maximize its significance. A Quemoy local, who 
has participated in construction of the memorial, related the memorial to his life, and 
sentimentally remarked after the recollection (Quemoy Daily 22 Oct. 2003), 
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Without the Juguang Memorial, the greatness of Quemoy, testified by the suffering 
and difficulties, cannot shine through. Likewise, without Quemoy, the extraordinary 
splendor of the Juguang Memorial would be dimmed with dust. 沒有莒光樓，金門
顯不出艱辛苦難中的偉大；沒有金門同樣讓莒光樓發不出耀眼驚世的光芒   
Their interdependency made the memorial a nationalist sacred place and, for the Quemoy 
people, an honorable symbol of their homeland. 
As a shrine of the civil religion, the interior of the memorial was a commemorative 
space to glorify the nationalist accomplishments both in the military and administrative 
aspects in Quemoy. There are three floors in the memorial, and each consists of different 
media to showcase the accomplishments: The lobby at the ground level is a convention 
and presentation space. Therein, presenters in the military costume would introduce 
visitors the military defense and the governmental accomplishments in Quemoy with a 
detailed model of Quemoy and slide shows or documentaries on the screen at the end of 
the lobby. Above the screen was a marble tablet inscribed with Chiang Kai-shek’s 
calligraphy of the famous anticommunist slogan: Lest We Forget [our exile] 毋忘在莒.  
The second floor was an exhibition space displaying sundry materials related to political 
warfare, including elaboration of the psychological operations, the nationalist propaganda, 
and the communist counterparts. On the third floor, a series of war heroes’ portrayals and 
texts describing their feats were on display “to set the paradigmatic models 樹典型之榜
樣” (Quemoy Daily 22 Oct. 2003). Along with these were photos of Chiang inspecting 
the military and the local establishments in this frontline. On the balcony of the floor, 
views of the mainland China often evoked nostalgia for Chinese in exile. The images of 
the benevolent war leader and the beloved homeland both incite the Chinese nationalists 
to devote themselves to the campaign of recovering the mainland. Although portions of 
the exhibition in the memorial had changed during the years, the displayed materials 
constantly served the purpose of political education. The memorial for its function and 
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fame, was oftentimes the first stop of the visitors’ itinerary in Quemoy. By a visit to the 
memorial, visitors would acquire the general understanding of the military stronghold. 
Therefore, when the county government decided to make tourism its economic mainstay, 
it remodeled the memorial to “strengthen its role as the first stop greeting visitors, and [to] 
enrich it into a ‘tourist service center’ 強化莒光樓作為金門迎賓第一站的角色，充實成
為「旅遊服務中心」” (Jiang 2002, 127).  
When I interviewed Ms. Song, an official in the Transportation and Tourism Bureau 
in Quemoy, about the renovation project of the Juguang Memorial in 2003, she repeatedly 
stressed that the memorial’s external structure was undisturbed during the renovation. It 
was mainly the interior displays and the outdoor landscaping had been altered. Her 
emphasis on the conservativeness of the treatment applied to the building suggested the 
local awareness of its symbolic significance, which may well insinuate into the local 
semiotic system. According to the local rumor, both the memorial and the Maoshan 
Tower were the communist batteries’ calibration references, which is why the military 
destroyed the latter (Quemoy Daily 22 Oct. 2003). However, due to its symbolic value, 
the memorial was untouched neither by the nationalist army nor by the pouring shells 
during the ferocious bombardments and the eccentric twenty-year-long shelling (Huang 
and Chen 2009).31 Against the nearly miraculous survival, it would be a sheer irony if 
                                                 
31 Although another account indicates that “the wall of the Juguang Memorial has also been pocked with 
shell holes 莒光樓牆上也曾彈痕點點” (Quemoy Daily 22 Oct. 2003), the significance of the claim that 
the enemy fire has never hit the memorial resides in its resemblance to another legend. As the religious 
center of the Guningtou village, the Temple of Emperor Guan 關帝廟 is a landmark located right next to 
an artillery position, which was a major target of the enemy fire during the war. Villagers shared a legend 
about the temple to account for how it could soundly survive the furious bombardment: “According to the 
gun crew, they had seen a general in green robe, standing on the roof of the temple, wielding his blade [to 
protect the building] . . . 據砲兵傳述，他們曾看到一位綠袍將軍，站在廟宇頂上，揮舞著關刀” (Lee 
2009, 27). As in the locals’ belief it actually takes a god to perform the miracle to protect the building from 
being hit, the claim that the same miracle happened to the shrine of the civil religion suggests its place in 
the local signifying system. 
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the renovation practically destroyed the memorial; however it did not, but merely gelded 
the “spiritual symbol of the battlefield Quemoy” (Chang 2003, 41). 
In performing demilitarization, the county government removed the former political 
display that might provoke future inconvenience for the building to be the visitor center 
of Quemoy. For this purpose, the display of the political warfare disappeared, and so did 
the celebration of the war heroes’ feats on the third floor. Instead of presenting the 
political and military achievements of the nationalist regime, interpreters today play a 
twenty-minute film, titled as “Introduction to the Tourism in Quemoy 金門觀光簡介,” 
four times a day in the lobby. For visitors to attain a general understanding of Quemoy, 
according to Ms. Song, the display in the first floor presents a concise introduction of the 
local customs, cultural characteristics, and special products. Filling the lobby in between 
the movies was the melody of a ballad, titled as “Affection for Sweet Potatoes 蕃薯情,” 
in which the native songwriter used the plant, being the mainstay of Quemoyan for 
centuries, as a metaphor of the local people.32 His lyrics referred to the tenacious vitality 
of the plant to suggest the fortitude of Quemoyan, which sustained them through flames 
of war: “Even though shells penetrate my dreamland, they cut off no vines of sweet 
potatoes spreading over the hillsides 夢鄉穿砲彈，滿山的蕃薯藤切不斷” (Lee 1999). In 
addition, the exhibition in the second floor consists of two themes—the natural 
environment of Quemoy and the cult of the city god 城隍信仰. Special emphasis is put 
on its annual carnival, which is the most important religious activity in Quemoy, and the 
majority of islanders spontaneously participate in the celebration. The main exhibition on 
the third floor was dedicated to the modern patron saint of Quemoy, General Hu Lian, 
                                                 
32 After its introduction to China in the sixteenth century, sweet potato soon became the major staple food 
for the southeastern Chinese. See Mann’s (2011) book for details regarding the introduction. 
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who received the title for his contribution to the island in his term of office. Furthermore, 
a brief review of the Cold-War history and the history of the memorial were also on 
display. By the modifications of exhibition, the remodeling deconsecrates the nationalist 
sacred place; instead produces a pacified museum with its theme centered on Quemoy. 
Although most features constituting the nationalist shrine has gone with the lost 
cause of recovering the mainland China after the remodeling, the memorial retains a thing 
or two to substantiate itself as a renowned anticommunist symbol. Both the photos of 
Chiang taken in Quemoy and the tablet born his calligraphy are soundly in situ. Like the 
Mashan Observation Station, the memorial demands a dual identity to maintain its 
attractiveness as a historic landmark and its current function as a visitor center. However, 
the change of place identity seemingly endures with extra convenience for reinvention to 
take place. The new exhibition marches right in without complications of incompatibility. 
The reinvention is similar to reusing a glass milk bottle as a flower vase: There is nothing 
inappropriate about the recycling, but one can easily tell that the bottle is not made for 
flowers. However, what if a dairy filled the reused milk bottle, i.e. the flower vase, with 
chocolate milk, and repacked it as if it was naturally a bottle of chocolate milk? The 
renovated condition then partially conceals its past from us, through a socially 
constructed system, as the dairy (the institution) and the practice of recycling (the 
institutional practice) in this case. A situation like that is where a reinterpretation 
(chocolate milk) comes into play on request. The renovation of the August 23rd Battle 
Museum is just the case of selective appropriation through reinterpretation. 
5.2.2  The August 23rd Battle Museum: Cultural Appropriation for Localization 
In commemoration of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis on August 23rd 1958, the 
military built the museum on the thirtieth anniversary of the artillery war (Figure 5.5, 5.6). 
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The dedication, as inscribed on the stele on a museum wall, is to “carry forward the 
honorable war history of our nation’s military 發揚國軍光榮戰史.” Thereby, “all we 
soldiers should learn from the models . . . ; commit and devote to the great cause of 
recovering the mainland China under the Three People’s Principles [the nationalist 
ultimate doctrines] 凡我軍人當知見賢景法……矢志以三民主義統一中國大業奉獻奮
鬥” (see He 1999, 78). For the objective, the military dedicated two walls, on both sides 
of the museum gate by inscribing the names of soldiers who died in the artillery war. In 
the outdoor plaza, the military displayed a fighter plane, a landing vessel, a few tanks, 
and howitzers that served in the battle. When visitors entered the museum, the “Blue Sky 
with a White Sun 青天白日” emblems of the Chinese nationalist regime occupied their 
view. Against a marble wall, two rows of military flags with the emblem flanked a 
portrait of Chiang who stood in front of the inscription, “Lest We Forget [our exile],” on a 
monolith on Mt. Taiwu. Hovering over the lobby, a large nationalist emblem seemingly 
bathed all entering visitors with its glory from the ceiling (Figure 5.7, 5.8). The emblem 
and flags were a common design of the nationalist commemorative spaces that also 
appeared in the martyr’s shrine in the valley of Mt. Taiwu, the Battle of Guningtou 
Museum, and the Hujingtou War Museum 湖井頭戰史館 in Leiyu. Inside the museum, 
the exhibition included “pieces of historic shots of the battle 一張張歷史性的戰爭鏡頭” 
regarding supply operations, tragic incidents, and feats of the great war leader (Quemoy 
Daily 24 May 2003). In addition, the display also contained (Huang 2003, 232) 
various battle flags and ensigns of different corps, photos of the military 
commanders in all ranks in the battle, significant documents, all types of shells 
[projectiles], simulative models of the aerial, naval, and artillery battles, and so on. 
[The museum] is an archive of historical materials of the battle. 各軍種軍旗、戰役
期間各級將領照片。重要文件、各型砲彈、還有海、空、砲戰場面的模擬模型
等，是記錄該戰役的史料庫。.  
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Figure 5.5 and 5.6.  The August 23rd Battle Museum in 2004. The renovated 
museum retained its original architectural design. On the façade of its two wings, 
the military inscribed names of soldiers who fought and died in the battle to 
perpetuate the memory of their patriotism. [photos by the author] 
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Figure 5.7 and 5.8.  Exhibition of the August 23rd Battle Museum before 1992. 
The lobby of the museum displayed a photo of Chiang Kai-Shek in the middle of 
two rows of battle flags. [5.7 Source: Lee 1996] Behind the lobby wall, the 
exhibitions conveyed three themes: (1) Chiang Kai-Shek’s involvement in the 
battle, (2) his son and successor, Chiang Ching-Kuo’s involvement in the battle, 
and (3) the process of the battle [5.8 Source: Jiang 2007] 
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During the military rule, the museum was only open to certain personnel with the QDH’s 
permission and with reservation (Quemoy Daily 2 Mar. 2004). As a military facility to 
uplift morale, the museum interpreted the past from the military and national perspective. 
Witnessing this, a local historian, Chang Huo-Mu 張火木, appealed to add the civilian 
side of the story into the museum displays. “The national battle history and the local 
civilian history should be treated with equal significance”; with a clarification, he 
continues, “[the latter] is exactly where the value of carrying forward the battlefield 
culture resides in” (Quemoy Daily 24 May 2003). Having said this, he implied that one 
should learn the true value of war commemoration from civilians’ miseries during the war. 
However, the museum neglected “the behind-the-scene distress of locals who died under 
rubble of their destroyed houses 地區民眾屋毀人亡背後心酸的故事” (Quemoy Daily 
24 May 2003). In 2001, the QDH transferred the museum to the KNP, which soon 
updated the museum with exhibitions including civilian war memories. 
After completing the renovation in 2003, the KNP opened the museum to the public 
on a daily basis. The outdoor weaponry display and the memorial walls generally 
remained the same, so did the structure’s architecture. The major change occurred to the 
interior exhibition. First of all, the battle flags and Chiang’s portrayal in the lobby 
disappeared, and in their place now is a wall with a light box showing images taken 
during the artillery war: villages destroyed into debris by shellfire, piles of materiel on the 
beach, and a close shot of the barrel of a M115 howitzer. Over the top of the light-box 
wall is a panoramic photo of the after-bombardment ruins of the Guningtou village. 
(Figure 5.9) Even with all the changes, the nationalist emblem sternly remains on the 
ceiling. The new exhibitions in the museum introduce three stages of the artillery war, 
including the pre-war situation, the progress of the war, and its aftermath. The displays of  
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Figure 5.9.  The Entrance of the August 23rd Battle Museum in 2004. The realism in the 
renovation today conveys the grimness of war rather than the symbolism in the previous 
settings of civic religion. [photos by the author] 
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the pre-war stage explain the international condition between the communist bloc and the 
free world, as well as the domestic situation about how the two Chinas prepared 
themselves to conquer each other. The militarization of Quemoy such as the construction 
of infrastructure and underground facilities happened in this stage also appears in the 
exhibition. The next section pertaining to the progress of war emphasizes how the 
nationalist forces broke through the communist embargo by bombardments and thereby 
obtained their final triumph. The interpretive boards cover the civilian contribution to the 
tragic victory, for which the army conscripted local males to serve mainly as porters on 
the beach unloading arriving supplies from landing vessels under shellfire. 
In the exhibition titled “Life during the War,” the museum remodels the room to 
mimic an earth tunnel where many islanders hid during forty-four days of the artillery 
war. The whole section occupying a third of the museum is dedicated to the civilian 
memories of the war. To portray the conditions, the exhibition shows the ferocity of 
bombardments by a model of a destroyed village, the civilian circumstances in a 
hand-dug bomb shelter, and through audio recording of psychological operations calling 
for surrender (Figure 5.10). Through these media, the exhibition intends “to return the 
locals and visiting veterans once serving in Quemoy back to the past time and space and 
to evoke their memories of those days 讓地區民眾和曾在金門當兵的遊客回到過去時
空，喚起那一個年代的記憶” (Quemoy Daily 22 Jan. 2003). Furthermore, as the 
crescendo of the museum, the Shocking Theater 震撼劇場 leads visitors to a 
three-minute simulation of bombardments constituted by a documentary film played on 
surrounding screens and a quaking floor driven by machines underneath. The bodily 
experience of the flashes, thunders, and vibrations invites visitors to relive the local life 
under the long-lasting air strikes. The rest of the exhibition concerns the aftermath of the  
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Figure 5.10.  Exhibition of 
“Life during the War.” 
Simulations of the 
underground caves that 
civilians dug under shellfire 
as air-raid shelters keynote 
the motif of this exhibition 
(A). In addition to the 
interpretive boards, the 
museum also displays shell 
fragments and a loudspeaker 
used to make propaganda 
calls (B). The audio records 
of these propaganda calls 
made from the both sides 
alternately resonate in the 
tunnel. Under the continuous 
bombardments, the battle 
completely destroyed a few 
villages, and the museum 
recreates the catastrophe by a 
model of the post-war 
Donglin village 東林 (C).   
[Source: photos A and B 
courtesy of Kinmen National 
Park; photo C by the author]
B 
C 
A 
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artillery war, including the exchange of fire on alternate days, the psychological warfare 
through airborne and waterborne propaganda, and the militarization of daily life through 
battlefield regulations. Also in the exhibition are displays of the exploits of specific 
troops during the war, and a glance at soldiers’ life outside their camps in the local 
villages. The section epitomizes the public life under military rule, and concludes the tour 
with the last exhibition, “Passing through the Historic Memories,” which proclaims the 
end of the anticommunist struggles by putting it to the past and the hope that “the war 
never recurs and [Quemoyans’] descendents can enjoy peace forever 烽火兵戎不再，子
孫永享安平” (Quemoy Daily 22 Jan. 2003). 
Through these renovated exhibitions, the KNP intends to “integrally present the true 
visage of the history and the fortitudinous strength of Quemoyans in their valiant 
involvement in the artillery war 完整呈現歷史原貌，以及金門百姓堅韌的生命力在砲
戰中英勇的表現” (Quemoy Daily 22 Jan. 2003). For multiple purposes, the remodeled 
interior inevitably encompasses collective memories of the commoners and soldiers in 
Quemoy. While in the past the museum exhibits lingered on the national point of view of 
war history, the renewed materials today narrate the past in a hybrid fashion that 
constitutes both sides of the story. However, even if the eclecticism is the way to “present 
the true visage of the history,” the major concern in this case is not authenticity, but 
rather incorporation of the masses’ view into the reinterpretation of the past. In fact, when 
the KNP brags about its adoption of the late multimedia in the renovation project for their 
mutability, it also claims (Quemoy Daily 28 July 2002),  
[The adoption] would hopefully fulfill the goal to comprehensively present the war 
history and moreover to enable [future] renewal of the contents [of museum] in 
correspondence to the change of the Cross-Strait [China-Taiwan] relations. 以期達
到戰史完整呈現之目的，更可因應兩岸情勢轉變而更新其內容 
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As long as the “true visage of the history” in the museum is set to change following the 
future political weather, the current adoption of the masses’ viewpoint may well result 
from democratization, due to the museum’s transformation from a military facility to a 
tourist attraction for the general public. The case of remodeling manifests the dimension 
of social construction in representing the past, and how the present-day dominant group 
selectively appropriates the historic monument into its favor through reinterpretation. 
From the first sight of their tour in the museum, visitors witness no pride, honor, or 
loyalty to the country that the former setting may seek to evoke, but rather the price of 
waging war that inflicts a calamity on the masses, arrested in the photos on the light 
boxes. The opening statement of the museum keynotes its current definition of the 
artillery war, and the viewpoint is substantiated by the simulation in “Life during the 
War” and “Shocking Theater.” The last exhibition eventually puts straight the antiwar 
purpose of the remodeling to steer visitors passing through the past, stuffed with 
insufferable experience of war. Due to the insinuation of this message, meaning of the 
commemorative space becomes complicated. On one hand, the antiwar utterance in the 
virtual tour turns the current interpretation of the battle in opposition to the former one, 
which was to uplift morale and provided a rationale for the museum to exist in the first 
place. As a mental instrument to sustain the anticommunist struggle and the nationalist 
cause to recover mainland China, the museum is currently renovated to do just the 
opposite—to promote reconciliation. However, the pacifying voice of the museum is 
simultaneously half-muffled by its dissidence. The reinterpretation of the past, on the 
other hand, alternately coexists with memorabilia inherited from the former settings and 
re-disposed to celebrate the military exploits and the national victory in the war. The 
incongruent sets of displays, although each may lead to distinct and opposite conclusions 
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of the artillery war, together form a heterogeneous remix, “blurred to become mutually 
constitutive as a new” (DeLyser 2003, 886).  
Although the commemorated past in the museum is construed from two angles, the 
military and the masses’ sides of story stay consistent with each other in a general term 
that however is contrary with the P.R.C.’s side of story. For the reason, the P.R.C. 
administrations approve travel permits for mainlanders’ group tour to Quemoy under an 
unofficial condition: Their itineraries should not include war museums (Jiang 2007, 143).  
The exhibitive politics of the war museums in Quemoy and even the rhetoric therein 
(such as the phrase, [Mao’s] “bandit” army, or accusations against its atrocities) 
indeed conflict with the historical discourses of the P.R.C. It is then understandable 
why the Chinese authorities constrain mainland tourists to visit the war museums. 
The blurring, double vision of the past in the remodeled museum can neither clearly utter 
the anticommunist advocacy, nor can it successfully avert the political offense to the 
P.R.C. authorities. By contrast, the Juguang Memorial, as a former nationalist shrine, is 
bustling with mainland tourists and did not provoke any bans from the P.R.C. authorities 
after remodeling. The different spatial reception stems from the applied methods of 
renovation, which also sheds light on the continuance of the place identity of the two 
former commemorative spaces: The museum persists in the identity but the memorial 
forsakes it. As the Juguang Memorial is turning into a visitor center, the spatial ambiguity 
caught in the becoming clouds its monumentality as a nationalist sanctuary. The 
reinvention therefore dilutes the dominant voice by arousing a Babel where sundry and 
piecemeal information on Quemoy confuses the visitors’ perception of place identity. 
Otherwise, keeping the identity of a commemorative site, as the August 23rd Battle 
Museum does, despite conveying an inarticulate new message of peacemaking, is still a 
sterile product, boycotted by the mainland market. In its case, the remodeling is intended 
more for the domestic audience than the Others formerly inside the Bamboo Curtain. 
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Regardless of their contents, the renovations applied to both the Juguang Memorial 
and the August 23rd Battle Museum profoundly localized the two former shrines to 
nationalism. The localization of the iconographies into the local material cultures utters 
the local people’s intention to justify the historic significance of their participation in the 
national history. So while the purpose of renovation is to show “the fortitudinous strength 
of Quemoyan in their valiant involvement in the artillery war” (Quemoy Daily 22 Jan. 
2003), localization happens. It becomes a cultural instrument which appropriates the 
historical significance of the war to buttress the significance of the local history. To put it 
plainly, the localization enables Quemoyans to take credit for the military and political 
gains from the conflicts and the containment policy. With the nationalist shrines turned 
into a museum of Quemoy and anticommunism converted to the battlefield culture of 
Quemoy, the cultural appropriation manifests the dialogue between the battlefield 
Quemoy and the cultural/tourist Quemoy.  
When the dialogue actualizes in the landscape, the localization of the nationalist 
monuments occurs with variations, for example, in the degrees of thoroughness or, as 
noted, the methods of renovation. The inconsistency or messiness of localization in 
practice essentializes its dialogic quality in reediting the landscape. Accounting for 
localization, an local architectural historian, Jiang, recognizes its variety, and comments 
that, in comparison, the Guningtou Battle Museum it is less localized for “a lack of 
interpretations from the masses’ angle 缺少人民觀點的詮釋” (Quemoy Daily 18 Apr. 
2006). As such, the locals’ concerns for the monuments center on their localization that 
makes these commemorative spaces apt to present the collective past of Quemoyan from 
their point of view. As the blurred identity of these monuments is the outcome of 
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localization, the establishment of the local connections with these former national spaces 
through remodeling is a form of homeland reconstruction. 
Similar to the appropriated monuments, the reconstructed historic sites and buildings 
are also manifestations of homeland reconstruction. Beyond the purpose of developing 
tourism, the policy of “cultural Quemoy” eventually lead to a restoration of the local 
material cultures, after demilitarization makes room for the reconstruction to take place. 
The localized landscape articulates the inhabitants’ understanding of how Quemoy ought 
to be like as the locals regain their control of place. Based on the dialogue between 
battlefield reinvention and historic reconstruction, localization blurs the demarcations 
between the battlefield Quemoy and the antebellum Quemoy; whereby it forms a new, 
hybrid image of Quemoy. Due to its eclecticism, most mainland tourists who are attracted 
to the stereotyped impression of battlefield Quemoy (Chen, Chen and Lee 2010) 
nonetheless find the “warfare relics and reserves” in the disarmed island satisfactory 
(Chen, Chen and Lee 2009, 277). The eclecticism meanwhile enables the locals to fulfill 
their aspiration for home reconstruction with the demonstrative localism that engineers 
rival cultural images against the battlefield Quemoy through historic preservation. As a 
result, the new, hybrid image of Quemoy is capable of conveying the local understanding 
of their homeland image, while meeting others’ expectation to the destination image of a 
battlefield. The juxtaposition of multicultural landscapes provides a likely solution for the 
conflict between demilitarization and tourism development; yet over time it wears off the 
distinction between the two representations of Quemoy. After the twenty-year 
development of tourism, the locals have appropriated the military heritage as an integral 
feature of Quemoy culture by reinvention. Besides, the most attractive tourist resources in 
Quemoy for Taiwanese tourists have changed from battlefield experience (Ou 2005) to 
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local traditional architecture/culture (Chang 2011). The change of attractions indicates 
that the identity reformulation in effect works in the landscape and Others’ recognition of 
Quemoy. As such, the cultural hybridity created by the identity reformulation serves both 
as a showcase of the ambiguous local identity and a false front for tourist consumption. 
The fusion of cultures in the museums exemplifies the synecdoche of the landscape 
localization of the whole island. The KNP and the county government by enforcing the 
policy of cultural Quemoy intend to collaboratively build a museum island. The 
reinvented military landscape and the reconstructed historical landscape together 
constitute the major exhibitions of the eco-museum. The pre-industrial natural landscape 
and ecosystem conserved in military reserves over the island is often a backdrop for the 
cultural landscapes. As a result, there are three types of tourist attractions of the cultural 
Quemoy, and its two pillars, the military and historical heritages, are grounded on the 
natural spectacles. In contrast to the hyperreal verisimilitudes of historic reconstruction 
and military reinvention, the natural attractions are the earthiest type of the three. Instead 
of simulations of other time and space, the spectacles of borderland scenery, 
bird-watching, and crescent beaches are all natural blessings of Quemoy. As the tourism 
development demands the locals to erect a false front for visual attraction, it 
simultaneously segregates the everyday reality from most tourists.  
Due to the underdevelopment of Quemoy, in spite of a satisfactory tourist 
destination, the locals often ironically refer to their homeland as “pretty mountains, pretty 
waters, and pretty boring [places] 好山、好水、好無聊” (Quemoy Daily 19 June 2011). 
The backwardness however facilitates the comprehensive preservation of pre-modern 
settlements and the large-scale reinvention of military relics, both of which require a 
land-use pattern of low-intensity development. That is to say, the repercussions of the 
277 
museum island confine Quemoy to somehow stay on the path of underdevelopment to 
maintain its attractiveness to tourists. By the allelopathic effect of heritage tourism, the 
elite in the new power structure of the post-conflict society can maintain the tourist 
industry as the mainstay of Quemoy, and pass down the genes of the cultural/tourist 
Quemoy. The institutionalization of the new identity through the hybrid cultural façade 
and its segregation from the backstage then continue to reproduce the pre-modern and 
pre-industrial place image. 
5.3 The Everyday Poetics: Reusing Ruins as Leisure Spaces 
The alienation of the reformulated representation of Quemoy from its day-to-day life 
has its reciprocal effects on both tourists and the locals. While the constructed image of 
the museum island constrains the tourist understanding of Quemoy, to a different degree 
it also distances the locals from the reinvented cultural image of their homeland. The 
cultural alienation increases when the elites attempt to repackage the local cultures as a 
high culture through reinvention. Gentrification of the underdeveloped island into a 
museum circumstantially gentrifies culture as the elites repack the local cultures to 
elevate its value and attractiveness of heritage tourism. The cultural reinventions attach 
new interpretations to the taken-for-granted material settings, and translate the life 
cultures to academic jargons that are unfamiliar to residents. On one hand, 
preservationists and architectural historians impose their disciplinary knowledge 
(typologies, iconographies, etc.) upon material settings of homes and folk villages. The 
governmental apparatus on the other hand circulates the academic terms and knowledge 
through publications, public lectures, and workshops to reproduce the discourse. Besides, 
the county government regularly holds training programs for local interpreters and tour 
guides (Quemoy Daily 3 Mar. 2004) 
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to consolidate interpreters’ knowledge of the history, culture, customs of Quemoy so 
that guests [especially the mainland tourists] can return full-handed from our 
treasure island [with rich cultural experience]. 充實解說員的金門歷史、文化及風
土人情等知識，才能讓賓客入寶山而滿載回。 
As such, the production and circulation of local knowledge achieves internal control and 
external exhibition. The “boosterism” owes its success to militarization that bequeaths the 
mobilizing mechanism and “strong community-rooted organizations” to propagandize the 
products of cultural industries (Yang and Hsing 2001, 78). These reinterpretations 
ostensibly add cultural richness to the constituent simulacra of the museum island and 
therefore the destination attractiveness of Quemoy in the tourist market. However, the 
cultural gentrification simultaneously displaces some locals from their homeland by the 
abstruse and abstract knowledge, where there comes the necessity to educate and 
discipline them about their own culture. 
Due to the spontaneous segregation of tourist activities from the local everyday life, 
the everyday Quemoy and the cultural/tourist representation coexist like two parallel 
universes with only a few portals to communicate with each other. The gap between the 
commoditized cultural representation and the local everyday landscape is not usually 
noticeable until certain events nudged the two worlds to collide. The art festival, Bunker 
Museum of Contemporary Art, in 2004 was one of such occasions exposing the gap 
between the cultural Quemoy and the locals’ everyday Quemoy. In order “to rehabilitate 
the battlefield relics and to promote the tourist development in Quemoy 為了活化這些
戰爭遺跡，為了促進金門觀光發展” (Quemoy Daily 30 Aug 2004), the county 
government held the art festival, and commissioned foreign artists to create artworks in 
the derelict military structures. The county commissioner Lee claimed the purpose of the 
art festival was “to stress the people’s aspirations to avoid war and to pursue peace 凸顯
全民「遠離戰爭，迎向和平」的渴望.” Thereby, the artistic transformation of military 
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relics through the festival would “let Quemoy become a silent monument to record the 
memory of the Cold War 讓金門成為記錄冷戰記憶的一座無聲紀念碑” (Quemoy 
Daily 25 Feb. 2004). The art festival successfully attracted ca. 880,000 visitors around the 
world, and made the headlines of several major international media, including the New 
York Times, BBC, and NHK (Quemoy Daily 1 Mar. 2005). The festival received wide 
applause from art critics and the general publics; and thereby restaged Quemoy under the 
global spotlight for a reason other than war. The local media considered that the latter 
effect of the festival would assist Quemoy to “switch the place image from the former 
one about national defense and a battlefield to the current one prone to military relics and 
cultural tourism 地區從以往的國防、戰地印象，轉變為現今的戰地史蹟及文化觀光
導向” (Quemoy Daily 23 Apr. 2005). Due to the effect of the festival on boosterism, the 
county head remarked that the locals should be proud of this successful event; however 
the comment was made in the context to argue against critiques on his Laputan 
governance of the county (Quemoy Daily 30 Nov. 2005). 
From the preparatory stage, the event was under attack. The county government 
commissioned no native artists to create artworks for the festival, and was criticized for 
squandered money on famous foreign artists for vanity (Quemoy Daily 26 Feb. 2004). 
After the festival kicked off, the discontent turned sour when “most local folks’ common 
reception of the installation art in the bunker was that: ‘What the heck is this?’ 多數的鄉
親在看完碉堡藝術裝置後，普遍的反應是：「這是什麼碗糕？」” (Quemoy Daily 13 
Nov. 2004). The editorial comment then discreetly suggested, “perhaps, the most crucial 
factor, which determines whether an event will be well-received, resides in whether it is 
‘easy to understand’ 或許，舉辦一場活動是否受歡迎，最大的要件在於是否「通俗」” 
(Quemoy Daily 13 Nov. 2004). Later on, the county-owned organs offered reflections on 
280 
the festival, and confessed that the artworks were teeming with “the abstract ideologies 
and abstruse, artistic vocabularies 抽象觀念與深邃的藝術語彙裡,” and evidently did 
not opt for “straightforward communication 平實的溝通” (Quemoy Daily 23 Apr. 2004). 
As a result, the lofty reinterpretations with the high cultural tone were inconceivable for 
common populace, and “provoked considerable repercussions among the local artists and 
commoners 引發本土藝文工作者及民眾不少反彈” (Quemoy Daily 23 Apr. 2004). The 
highly praised event among the international community was however vexatious for local 
folks, and accounting for the aversion, a critic retrospectively commented (Lin 2004, 22), 
It is nonetheless an evident fact that the [foreign] artists did not have profound 
understanding of the event venues, the event theme, and most importantly the local 
people’s perceptions [on the suject] 藝術家與表現場域、表現主題乃至最重要
的，與當地人感受之間的互動在多數作品中並不深刻，則仍是顯而易見的事實 
In this view, the indifference to the place specificity and the disregard of the locals as one 
audience of these artworks should be responsible for the discontent. By revealing the 
cause, the critic indirectly substantiated the gap between ordinary and cultural/tourist 
landscapes that the local elite created for cultural consumption and landscape pretension. 
Through reinterpretation of cultural landscapes, the local elites orchestrated an 
historic reconstruction to produce a multicultural, tourist landscape that is situated in and 
interrelating with the ordinary landscape. Their creations contributed to the diversity of 
tourism resources as well as the cultural hybridity, and in some cases, the tourist 
development also produced recreational spots for the locals. As fringe benefits of the 
cultural gentrification, these reinvented landscapes, such as the Maoshan Tower, are 
polysemic for the contemporary generation. They are at the same time recreational spaces, 
military relics, and heritage sites. Their multicultural and multilayer material settings 
reflexively annunciate multiple voices to their user groups, and lead visitors to multiple 
locales contingent on their spatial perceptions. These places are therefore sightseeing 
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destinations for tourists and leisure locations for the locals. The duality is the spatial 
characteristics that smooth out possible cultural gaps between the locals and tourists. 
These places as landscape palimpsests thus become a collage—historic venues in the eyes 
of heritage tourists, military sites in the eyes of military enthusiasts, and scenic spots in 
the eyes of the inhabitants—so their images should at least partially satisfy each social 
group with distinct recreational purposes. These places are analogous to theater scenes, 
against which the play can either be imaginary in the spectators’ mind, traveling through 
time, or be as real as the natural scenery in the innocent eyes. 
The Triangular Fort is located at the end of a projecting sandbar on the northwest 
coast of Quemoy, guarding the mouth of an inlet to Xiamen Bay (Figure 5.11). Until 1949, 
the mainland merchants had customarily sailed in junks into the inlet to trade with people 
in the Guningtou village for centuries (Lee 2009). The waters adjacent to the fort were the 
venue of a decisive naval battle, by which the allied force of the Netherlanders and the 
Qing Empire defeated the maritime power of Koxinga in 1663. The Qing Empire then 
scorched Quemoy, evicting all islanders, and turned it into a deserted island for twenty 
years. The local historian in Quemoy often terms the incident the “Guimao Tragedy 癸卯
之變” when the empire hastily and forcefully expelled inhabitants from their homeland 
(Xu 2010).  
The place, as a reminder of the awkward position of Quemoy in between the 
maritime and the land powers, again turned into a highly fortified spot during the military 
struggle between P.R.C. and R.O.C. In 1967 the QDH embanked the inlet for defense 
considerations, and turned it into a lagoon called Lake Cih 慈湖. In the intertidal zone 
outside the sea wall, the military implanted layers of anti-landing spikes made of 
segments of tipped railway rails rising obliquely from the seabed (Figure 5.12). On the  
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Figure 5.11.  The Triangular Fort in 2008. The surroundings of the fort were still 
under demining, which cleared most vegetation on the sand bar. The decommissioned 
tanks in front of the fort dejectedly stood aside the artwork created for the Bunker 
Museum of Contemporary Art. [photo by the author] 
Figure 5.12.  The Anti-landing Spikes outside the Cih Causeway. In the demilitarized 
today, the anti-landing spikes in the intertidal zone become ideal substrates for wild 
oysters to attach to. The skyline of the Xiamen city on the horizon is visible from the 
area on a clear day. The unobstructed view makes the area a favorite scenic spot. 
[photo by the author in 2008] 
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two ends of Cih Causeway 慈堤, the military subsequently deployed garrisons to prevent 
enemy from breaching through the point inland behind. In the deployment, the position 
on the north end is the Triangular Fort, surrounded by layers of defenses and minefields 
that still restrict human activities. An interpretive board erected outside the fort explains 
the rational for the nationalist deployment of garrisons at the location. According to its 
text, the fort occupies a strategic position that could monitor “the movements on the 
opposite [mainland] coast; [could coordinate] naval defenses on Kinmen‘s western coast”; 
and blockade the channel between Quemoy and Leiyu. The geographical characteristics 
promote the place repeatedly chosen as the venue of military activities. Due to the 
unobstructed visibility in the area that availed monitoring enemy activities in the past, the 
KNP constructed a rest area next to the bridgehead of the causeway in 1997. The area 
mainly consists of an overlook platform for visual enjoyment of the natural scenery. 
Mounted on the rail of the platform, a few interpretive boards illustrate the visible distant 
landscape, the nearby observable bird species, and the surrounding military relics. By 
their content, these interpretive media suggestively direct the tourist gazes upon the ocean 
view of the historic naval battlefield, the wetland and intertidal ecosystem, the modern 
military fortifications, and the skyline of Amoy city, P.R.C. The convergent constellation 
of the natural and cultural spectacles at the location thereby makes the place a popular 
spot for all social groups, who by popular votes accredit the “sunset on the Cih Causeway 
慈堤落日” as one of the “new ten scenic spots of Quemoy 金門新十景” in 2007 (United 
Daily News 11 Dec. 2007). 
The material settings however did not originally obtain the eclectic attractiveness but 
evolved with recreational and tourist activities through the years. The rest area with a 
warning sign of minefields in the surroundings was initially a sightseeing spot for the 
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locals and self-guided tourists. By the ebb and flow, the local fishermen and women in 
dribs and drabs would also appear in the beach to forage seafood or to check on their 
fixed fishing nets during the day. Due to a lack of nightlife, the night scene of the 
glittering and blinking Amoy city with winds and waves in the ear popularized the place 
as a rendezvous after dark especially for youngsters and couples requiring privacy. 
However, the sense of place gradually deviated from the local and bucolic tinge, and 
turned brighter and richer along with sequences of events held in the place. The first 
public gathering was for a firework festival synchronized with its counterpart in the 
Amoy city in 2002. The event again took advantage of the cross-border visibility, which 
allowed viewers to perceive the collaboration between the two firework shows taking 
place across the waters. By the synchronic display, the county government attempted to 
convey a notion of reconciliation to “substitute shellfire for the fireworks 以煙火取代砲
火” (Quemoy Daily 27 Feb 2002). The geographical characteristics enabling the past 
mutual surveillance became an advantage to commence a new type of engagement of 
peacemaking. Also, the ritual of cultural demilitarization visibly occurred again in this 
event. As shown in the case of the Mashan Observation Station, introduction of military 
simulacra to the heritage site of battlefield tourism spotlights the absence of necessary 
constituents of a battlefield—for example, soldiers and conflicts. Awareness of their 
absence from their verisimilar substitutes thereby polarizes the landscape change after 
demilitarization. When the catchphrase of the event juxtaposed fireworks and shellfire, it 
immediately pointed out the absence and the substitute employed in the ritual. Due to the 
similarity between the two types of explosives—their blasts, flares, and the acrid smell of 
gunsmoke—the pleasure brought by fireworks alleviated or even subverted the dangerous 
association of shellfire. For the declarative quality of the event, the county government 
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ritualized the fireworks to repeatedly demonstrate the goodwill of peacemaking and 
demilitarize the past by the contrast between two explosives in the performance. 
The theatricality of the area intensified after the QDH released the fort to the KNP, 
which soon offered it as a venue of installation art for the Bunker Museum of 
Contemporary Art in 2004. With two artists incorporating their works with the fort, 
tourists continuously made pilgrimages to the reinvented military structure that the 
military abandoned during the exhibition, and turned the fort thenceforward into a tourist 
attraction. After the art festival concluded, the fort identified as a reused military relic 
continued to attract self-guided tourists until the intensified bird-watching activities in the 
area induced a remodeling of its interior as a bird observation station in 2006. The 
well-conserved beachfront environment and the lagoon in the vicinity of the fort were 
ideal habitat for birds and water fowls. Lake Cih annually attracted approximately 8,000 
great cormorants in the winter. The magnitude of the migratory birds constituted a natural 
wonder, which not only provided a recreational opportunity for the local populace but 
also foreign bird-watchers and naturalists. Through the ecotourism attractions, these 
visitors reinvigorated the stagnant tourist business in Quemoy’s harsh and gusty winter, 
when northern birds migrate to this subtropic southern island.33 Grasping the opportunity, 
the KNP and the county government collaboratively have held an annual event called the 
Great Cormorant Season since 2003, and with years of the celebration they successfully 
insinuated the “local natural speciality” in the military structure. Like the Juguang Tower, 
the fort also underwent a change in place identity after reinvention (e.g.  
                                                 
33 The locals pose two reasons to claim the exclusivity of the natural phenomena in Quemoy: First, the 
location of Quemoy in the middle of the curvy coastline of Southeast China made the island an essential 
midway stop for most migratory birds en route (Quemoy Daily 16 Oct. 2003). Second, the underdeveloped 
environment of former military reserves accidentally resulted in a well-conserved ecosystem (Quemoy 
Daily 23 Jul. 2004) that attracted migratory birds form other industrialized, disturbed environments, like the 
urbanized Amoy city (Quemoy Daily 26 Nov. 2006). 
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Figure 5.13.  The Remodeled Interior of 
the Triangular Fort. The fort consists of 
three gun emplacements at the three 
corners, which enable bird-watching 
through their embrasures today. [Source: 
photo by the author in 2011; map adopted 
from the on-site interpretive board] 
Figure 5.14.  The Tank Display on the Sandy Ground. After the KNP completed 
demining the area in 2010, these tank introduced to the area reinforced the military 
image of the place. [photo by the author in 2011] 
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glass milk bottle/vase). The localization of the military structure contingently localized 
the natural spectacle by establishing its exclusivity in the region. The KNP remodeled the 
interior of the fort with interpretive boards introducing observable bird species in 
different habitats in the area. In the online newspaper introduced the Triangular Fort, the 
KNP staff explained the new use of the fort as a bird observation station (Figure 5.13; 
Kinmen National Park 2009): 
The past gun embrasures designed with defense consideration [to hide the shooter] 
become the best viewing window for bird watchers today. As flames of war in the 
pervading gun smoke had gone, shutters replace triggers. The past rule of 
engagement [on the wall of embrasures], “hold the fire in three situations: Do not 
shoot if the target is not in range; not in sight; or not aimed,” become the guidelines 
of photographing birds today. 昔日防禦的軍事射口，今日成了鳥友最佳觀鳥窗，
沒有煙硝瀰漫的戰火，快門取代了扳機，射口旁昔日射擊守則的「三不打」：「打
不到不打、看不到不打、瞄不到不打」，今日成了賞鳥攝影守則 
As the military structures often incorporated with their surroundings for protection and 
camouflage, their interior design also abided by the principles of defense and secrecy. 
Taking advantage of the spatial traits, translation of the fort into a wildlife observatory 
was functionally justified, since the design of fortifications indeed provided the secrecy 
necessary for a bird observatory. The conversion by spatial traits was not unfamiliar in 
the cases of reinvention in Quemoy, just as the exhibits of the battle museum had 
ironically turned the facility of anticommunist propaganda into a mouthpiece of pacifists 
after reinvention. The common spatial trait could thus justify the cultural appropriation. 
The reinterpretation of the rule of engagement as guidelines for photographing birds also 
demonstrated the appropriation. Despite divulging a mockery toward the rigid military 
culture, it seamlessly transferred the meaning of the fort into the post-conflict age.  
After a few stages of demining, the tract of land between the platform and the fort 
became available for development, which promoted the union of the two spaces. The 
sandy ground covered with clusters of evening primrose provided space for recreational 
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activities, like kite-flying, which energized the area limited only to sightseeing before. To 
integrate the two leisure spaces, the KNP built a boardwalk along the driveway for their 
connection, and an array of concrete pedestals for tanks displayed on the sandy ground 
along the coastline. The emplacements of the six decommissioned M41 tanks, lined up 
with their guns pointing to the Amoy city, formed a visual continuum extending out from 
the Triangle Fort (Figure 5.14). Also, the line of tanks corresponded to layers of the 
anti-landing spikes at the beach on the other side of the overlook platform. Their 
corresponding deployment highlighted the image of battlefield in the area, and further 
forged the piecemeal landscape features into a whole and eclectic spot for recreation. In 
addition to the spatial integration, the re-introduction of military features, as also shown 
in the rehabilitation of the Mashan Observation Station, showcased the conflicts in the 
past, and resulted in a sharp contrast to the prosperous city skyline of Amoy at a distance. 
The tilted gun barrels of the tanks, quixotically pointing at the wheel of history that 
ground over the naval battle and the artillery war, and thus exemplified the diachronic 
irony belonging specifically to the borderland island. 
As the eclectic backdrop evolving with and animated by recreational activities, the 
landscape of the Triangular Fort departed from its pragmatic everydayness of a facility 
for war. However, the change articulated its poetic dimension as a trope in the landscape. 
The symbolization of the site, such as the venue of a historic naval battle, was an attempt 
to fit the place into the newly formed signifying system of the cultural Quemoy. By 
popularizing the historic knowledge, the evocated geographical imagination, on one hand, 
increased the cultural value of the heritage site; on the other, diluted the place image that 
up to the point was connected exclusively to the military. Likewise, the contemporary art 
festival was another investment of cultural capital into the site for the evocation of artistic 
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imagination, and to disengage attention from military use of the fort. By attributing the 
ecological richness to the legacy of militarization, the portrayal of Quemoy as a unique 
bird habitat in the region localized the natural phenomena, and justified the reinvention of 
the structure as a bird observation station. The reuse then added another layer of disguise 
over the fort. Consequently, the more eclectic and polysemic the place had become after 
carnivals and reinvention, the further perception astrayed from the fort’s original raison 
d'etre.  
The people’s alienation from the conventional understanding of the fort indicates the 
achievements in its identity reformulation that induces the cultural heterogeneity to free 
the place from the monopoly of everydayness. As touring often involves otherness, 
recreation too involves activities other than mundane undertakings. The extraordinariness 
of leisure activities necessitates an out-of-place understanding of the material settings to 
spur people’s poetic performance in places for recreation. In this light, the development 
of poetic, leisure space from an everyday space is an attempt on an “enacted utopia.” For 
such creation, Foucault coins a term “heterotopia” (Foucault 1986, 24). He uses a mirror 
and the reflection in the mirror to account for the relations between the unreal utopia (the 
reflection in the mirror), the real Foucault in front of the mirror, and the reflexive 
Foucault inside the mirror. Although the utopia in the mirror, a virtual, counter space to 
the reality, does not exist, the mirror however does. As the reflexive Foucault appears in 
the mirrored virtual world where the real Foucault is absent, the real Foucault however is 
in the reality on a counter position to his reflection. By simultaneity, juxtaposition, and 
displacement produced by the mirror, Foucault intends to demonstrate the mirror, which 
eclectically subsumes all worlds, as the “enacted utopia” (Foucault 1986, 24): 
it makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at 
once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely 
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unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is 
over there. 
As the world in the mirror is unreal, imaginary, and poetic, the reality is trivial, mundane, 
and everyday. The contrast, according to Foucault, however stems from individual 
perception, namely intra-subjectivity. For this reason, I prefer this other heterotopia, the 
backdrop scene of plays instead of the mirror, to analogize the landscape in the Triangular 
Fort and epitomize “heterotopias.” As Mitchell indicated, “[s]pace is the unchanging 
backdrop against which the life is played out” (2000, 215). By the backdrop conception, I 
aim to emphasize the collective theatricality that anthropocentrically (re)enacts the unreal 
utopia through human orchestrated performance. Although a scenographer can alternately 
and repeatedly use the same backdrop to situate different scenarios in a play, the reading 
of landscape is each time distinct for situations among different players. Their unique 
understandings can render the landscape as a working space for foraging for seafood, a 
scenic spot for sightseeing, or the both/and also. Due to the semiotic nuances, the 
everydayness and the poetics of place can be interchangeable, juxtaposing, contesting, or 
at least agreeing to disagree in place. The leisure spot around the Triangular Fort is 
therefore where the cultural/tourist Quemoy meets the everyday Quemoy, while their 
jumbled attunement delivers the everyday poetics of the heterotopia shared by locals and 
tourists. 
Foucault has used variant real spaces to exemplify his concept of “heterotopia.” He 
considers that museums, “a place of all times that is itself outside of time,” and 
fairgrounds, “marvelous empty sites . . . teem once or twice a year” with extraordinary 
yet temporal crowds are both heterotopias of time (Foucault 1986, 26). The tourists, 
trapped in a snippet of time in each tourist spot, experience the representation of historic 
stages of Quemoy one by one, as a stroll through exhibition rooms in a museum. 
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Otherwise, they may have a quick taste of extraordinary happenings converging at the 
eclectic sites for a short duration, like scenes of dusk at the Triangular Fort. Since the 
tourist/cultural Quemoy are poetically outside of time, yet contingent to the temporality 
of the trip, the tourist experience of Quemoy coincides with Foucault’s examples of 
heterotopias. In his understanding, the modern destinations of heritage tourism are in fact 
the combination of the two heterotopias concerning time. Accordingly, the intention to 
create a museum island for heritage tourism in Quemoy unsurprisingly results in the 
unique social product of “the epoch of space” (Foucault 1986, 22). His emphasis on space 
is to reveal the characteristic phenomena of our epoch: the juxtaposition that transcends 
space and time. By the concept of heterotopias, he illustrates the phenomena (Foucault 
1986, 25):  
The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, 
several sites that are in themselves incompatible. Thus it is that the theater brings 
onto the rectangle of the stage, one after the other, a whole series of places that are 
foreign to one another . . . . 
Unlike the temporal juxtaposition (i.e. simultaneity), the spatial juxtaposition stands 
out by multilocality, which, as Rodman (2003, 211) points out, “is a way of experiencing 
those [heterotopias] and other places.” Whereas place is socially constructed, actors can 
not only act out the embedded social relations, but also inscribe social relations on places. 
Multilocality thus can be construed as the juxtaposition of different social relations to a 
single place, which is thus polysemic for different actors. For this reason, the Triangular 
Fort can have overtly different meanings to military enthusiasts, preservationists, 
bird-watchers, fishers, and tourists. They may put on a different play deemed proper in 
situ to create a world for themselves to be. The intersubjective realities among members 
in the different social groups constitute heterotopias with multilocality and therefore 
multiculturality, which then indicates the essentiality of human performance to place 
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formation. As heterotopias are the human effort to enact utopia, the local people in 
Quemoy in retrieving their homeland from militarization created a chaotic babel in which 
they dwell. In light of heterotopias, the cultural mechanism driven by irony and simulacra 
signifies a dialogical process of localization that through negotiation and selective 
appropriation turns heterogeneous heritage into cultural capital exclusively of Quemoy. 
To cope with the marginalization after demilitarization, the society of the border island 
dispatches the military reality to the past, while bringing an imaginary past to the present 
through landscape planning. To structure a heterotopia as home is therefore realization of 
social strategy for the reversal of the coordinate system today. Even though the babel of 
landscape reinterpretation makes each voice illegible, the hybrid potpourri of homeland 
endures, but it endures as a boat, “a floating piece of space, a place without a place, . . . 
from port to port, from tack to tack” (Foucault 1986, 27) in “a continuous process of 
becoming” (Vološinov 1986, 81). 
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CHAPTER 6  CONCLUSION: AMBIGUITY AS RESISTANCE STRATEGY 
This study investigated the change in landscape spurred by a change in the power 
structure of post-conflict societies. Following geopolitical shifts, places shaped by 
conflicts often undergo identity reformulation to celebrate the departure of the past social 
orders and the arrival of the new ones. Reshaping the landscape is thus partial fulfillment 
and embodiment of the identity reformulation. In this study, I investigated how the 
identity reformulation changed the post-conflict landscape and what the cultural 
mechanism of the change signifies. I selected Quemoy, a Cold-War frontier that has been 
engaging in a transformation since 1992 as my study site and revealed the significance of 
the transformation, which by irony subverts the past dominant discourses, and fosters 
cultural hybridity as the social strategy to thrive in the post-conflict time. 
In shedding its identity as a battlefield, Quemoy transformed itself into a heritage 
tourism site. The identity reformulation proceeded with the interplay of three major 
dynamics of the post-conflict society: demilitarization, reconciliation, and touristification. 
Their collaboration works in the landscape, which reciprocally articulates the formulating 
identity. In a holistic view, the landscape change represents a reversal of the coordinate 
system of Quemoy that its front and rear, left and right, inside and outside all switch 
directions. With the upside down and inside out, the former front of Quemoy dissipates to 
form the communal living sphere between Quemoy and Amoy, and the formerly 
well-protected and well-hidden inside now opens wide to attract tourists. With the decline 
of the combat economy, the left and right flip sides with the local economic center 
returning to the west, the side near Amoy. The switch of the geographical coordinate 
system thus bespeaks the reterritorialization and the resturcturing of social relations. 
294 
In a case-by-case perspective, the landscape change in Quemoy signifies the local 
effort of homeland reconstruction. Undertaking the change, the post-war society engages 
itself into an iconoclastic movement which destroys and abandons the majority of 
military structures in Quemoy. Otherwise, military relics that accommodate tourist 
development receive variant treatments for reinvention. “Disguise” as the most common 
and economic treatment covers up military structures to conceal their origins. Through 
this process, bunkers at traffic intersections formerly guarding against foreign entry now 
bear welcome signs inviting visitors to enter. The reinvention of military structures as 
tourist infrastructures thus shows historic irony in the landscape change. “Rehabilitation” 
recasts the military facilities into attractions of heritage tourism. Before opening these 
facilities to the public, the military deprives them of essential constituents, e.g. soldiers 
and weaponry. To counteract demilitarization, rehabilitation often selectively reintroduces 
military features back to the spots of battlefield tourism, and thereby reconstitutes their 
image in the Cold-War era for authenticity. The contradiction of the treatment that fulfills 
demilitarization through reintroduction of military simulation discloses structural irony. 
Last, “remodeling” is a treatment to paraphrase the meanings of monumental buildings so 
as to localize heritage sites serving as tourist attractions. Through reinterpretation, the 
localization selectively appropriates these sites, which become “topo-tropes” in the 
landscape, each with multiple meanings. In some cases, such as the August 23rd Battle 
Museum, the reinterpreted meaning directly contradicts the raison d'être of the museum. 
The juxtaposition of contradictory meanings thus reveals symbolic irony. By the lightness 
transpiring from the contrasts between these contesting meanings, the three types of irony 
subvert the significance of the past conflicts. Irony in landscape therefore serves as the 
initial mechanism of the landscape change in Quemoy. 
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The irony in landscape signifies the arrival of multiculturalism in lieu of the 
nationalist metanarrative from the past. The identity reformulation turns Quemoy into a 
heritage site and a museum island. For this purpose, the locals obliterated the majority of 
military facilities from the landscape, and re-presented the antebellum landscape for 
tourist development. The exchange of place image brings about the renaissance of 
traditional cultures and localization of landscape. The reshaping of landscape signifies 
locals’ recovery of control of place and their efforts toward homeland reconstruction. The 
resulting cultural hybridity forms a heterotopia with contesting representations and an 
ambiguous identity of the post-conflict society. As a result, the identity reformulation 
counter-intentionally frees Quemoy from a single place identity, and reasserts that the 
postmodern place is fluid, hybrid, and dialectical. 
Whereas the post-conflict society, by irony, culturally demilitarizes its landscape, the 
constitution of heterotopias with cultural hybridity actualizes its resistance to the 
dominant paradigm of the either/or dichotomy. The change has incurred and is incurring 
reversals of the coordinate system of Quemoy for reterritorialization. In geographers’ 
accounts, heterotopias manifest a “geohistory of otherness” (Peet 1998, 225) “at work in 
the interstices of these geographies of control, a history of resistance that itself emerges in 
and against the dominant order as a set of ‘counter-sites’” (Mitchell 2000, 215). 
Seconding their clarification of heterotopias, the transnationalist “anti-essentializing 
concepts of subjectivity that emphasize plurality, mobility, hybridity, margins, and 
in-between spaces” also celebrate the multi-cultural formations “that continually 
challenge the marginalizing impulses of dominant cultures” (McEwan 2004, 506). The 
construction of heterotopias in this sense signifies the resistance of the border island 
community to reterritorialization with ambivalence. More importantly, it indicates “an 
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emancipatory praxis” in search of “political solutions to the many forms of inequality and 
oppression, especially those associated with problems stemming from global 
restructuring” (Peet 1998, 225). As declared in the celebration of the ninetieth 
anniversary of Quemoy County, the county government aims to make Quemoy “no 
longer an offshore island but the center with an ocean and a continent as its hinterland” 
(Quemoy Daily 1 Jan. 2005). The boosterism based on cultural hybridity is then a strategy 
to avoid marginalization in the post-conflict era and the course of reterritorialization 
across the insular history. In this light, the cultural mechanism of landscape change, 
which by irony subverts the nationalist hegemony and by hybridity avoids 
reterritorialization, both aims to unshackle the border island community from binary 
oppositions. As such, the regulated improvisation for emancipation clandestinely operates 
under the disguise of hustle and bustle in tourist attractions. 
6.1 The Cultural Becoming of a Border Island 
Through a review of the geographical biography of Quemoy, I explored the 
geographical personality of the island that may contribute to understanding of the current 
changes in landscape. I discovered a repeated theme in the insular history that I term as a 
“reversal of the geographical coordinate system.” In brief, the small border island has 
repetitively faced dramatic change in relations with the land and maritime powers. A 
switch of geopolitical relations reverses the directions of social concerns of the marginal 
community toward the sea or the mainland. The inbetweenness of the border island 
articulates the marginality and the gateway characteristics of Quemoy. Due to its 
islandness, the limited environmental capacity of Quemoy promises the involvement of 
its people in the seaborne economic activities for their livelihood and overseas emigration 
to fend off overpopulation. Through foreign contacts in merchandise and personnel 
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exchange, the insular community developed a cultural diversity and hybridity in its 
position at a traffic intersection. As a land power, the traditional Chinese regimes deemed 
seafaring alternative, unorthodox, or even disturbing, and their responses to it were prone 
to imposing constraints. The imperial attitude toward the local way of life aroused 
conflicts of interests between Empire and the local people. In this context, the reiterative 
reversals represented the fervid articulation of either side’s position on the issue of 
maritime activities. By examining historical records of the region, I presented evidence to 
problematize the current discourses of the early history of Quemoy, arguing that the local 
persistence in the problematic discourses of history present a social strategy to maximize 
Quemoyans’ cultural capital relevant to their identities. Bogged in the either/or dichotomy, 
the islanders through history have built up their familiarity with the manipulation of 
identity politics. Their campaigns have been centered on their ethnicity as Han 
Chinese/sea nomads, their social status as obedient imperial subjects/rebellious sea rovers, 
and their current nationality of Chinese/Taiwanese. The conflicts spurred by the binary 
oppositions of the identities continuously leaves impresses on the landscape of Quemoy, 
while the both/and also juxtaposition bequeaths necessary ambiguity for the marginal 
society to thrive. Through the Sisyphean process of coordinate reversals, the alternation 
of conflict and ambiguity thus constitute the geographical personality of the marginal 
society on the border. With the identification of the characteristics, I then demonstrate 
how the repetitive process of landscape impress contributes to the place formation. 
The latest reversal of the coordinate system happened in 1949 when the nationalist 
Chinese retreated to and successfully defended Quemoy. The nationalist construction of 
defenses in Quemoy inverted the insular front against communist troops on the brink of 
the mainland. Through the theory of the geographical coordinate system, I examined the 
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social change after the reversal, and drew conclusions on its manifestation in three 
elements of Quemoy. First, by surveys of Quemoy’s landscape, I found that as a result of 
the four-decade militarization, the characteristics of a military landscape emitting from 
the insular defense system were rigid, hierarchical, and utilitarian. By the imposition of 
the defensive system on the landscape, the military carefully charted the spatial 
composition and demarcation. The geographical configuration with a clear center and 
periphery, front and back, inside and outside constituted an anticommunist stronghold 
prepared for a total war. Through the subsequent landscape manifestation, I then 
demonstrated how humans shape landscape to facilitate what they jointly engage in, and 
reciprocally how the landscape articulates the social intersubjectivity. Second, the 
creation of biopower through social control institutionalizes the military disciplines in 
everyday practice of the island residents whose bodies hence become the containers and 
the enactors of military culture. The biopolitical production unfolds in the militarization 
of everyday life in Quemoy where people lived abiding by military rule, and forced 
militia duty. The pattern of ordinary life disciplines individuals of the marginal society, 
and instills the nationalist metanarratives and anticommunism into the people. Last, the 
belligerent condition produced local knowledge specifically of Quemoy as battlefield. 
The knowledge provides understanding for unique situations in the battlefield, and 
provides necessary “common sense” to sustain the life under shellfire. Reproduction of 
the knowledge thus signifies the insinuation of military culture into the local semantic 
system. In particular, I explored two occasions that produce alternative meanings of 
shelling as desirables associating with joy and sweetness, and by the idiographic 
understanding demonstrate how social adaptation to the war condition contributes to the 
local knowledge. With discussions on the three social aspects, I theorized the social 
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changes of Quemoy arising after the reversal of the geographical coordinate system, and 
reveal the systematic configuration and capillaries of militarization. 
6.2 The Cultural Mechanism of Landscape Change in Quemoy 
As demilitarization and reconciliation are revoking the most recent reversal today, 
the coordinate system of Quemoy is reorienting. Due to the development of battlefield 
tourism, the former anticommunist stronghold is undergoing a drastic change from a 
disposition of expulsion to invitation. The juxtaposition of contradictory meanings of 
military structures produces pervasive irony in the landscape. Through observations of 
landscape change in Quemoy during the last decade (2003-2012), I examined the ironies 
in a landscape emerging from different management methods of military relics, and 
concluded three major types of irony: symbolic irony, historical irony, and structural irony. 
Their commonality resides in the power, once the lightness of irony transpires, to displace 
the historical significance of the nationalist metanarrative. By (re)production of irony in 
the landscape, the civil society subverts the former dominant paradigm of the military, 
and engages in cultural demilitarization. Coinciding with the production of irony, which 
erases the military legacy in Quemoy, a reformulation of identity mushrooms in the 
demilitarized landscape. The movement of historical preservation produces historical 
simulacra for the development of heritage tourism, which engulfs and localizes the 
military heritage to constitute a representation of Quemoy. The landscape change for the 
identity reformulation thereby concludes with the production of the tourist destination 
that announces the new identity of Quemoy to its visitors. Coming to the conclusion, I 
unravel the cultural mechanism of landscape change in Quemoy that is a continual 
dialectic between production of irony and heterotopias. 
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The movement of historical preservation creates a hyperreality, which 
simultaneously showcases the reformulated identity as a heritage site to a nonnative 
population. Although the image of a heritage site represents the desirable homeland of the 
local people, from my observations, the constructed destination image however alienates 
tourists from the local everyday reality. I discovered that the final product of identity 
reformulation is paradoxically a hyperreality of a romanticized Quemoy in an imaginary 
Golden Age. As such, I borrow the lens of Foucault’s heterotopias to look into the 
meaning of the cultural mechanism responsible for the reformulation. Foucault 
analogized heterotopias to a mirror, reflecting a desirable utopia. If Quemoyans’ nostalgic 
homeland, the collective imagined geography, is the utopia in the mirror, the 
reconstructed historic sites and the reinvented military structures are the mirror in the real 
world reflecting the image. Moreover, the mirror, as an enacted utopia in the world of 
ordinariness, captures in itself its surroundings that overlay the hyperreality. Their 
juxtaposition blurs the imagined and the everyday reality, and delivers an ambiguous, 
dialectical, and paradoxical place of the post-conflict battlefield. The polysemous 
multilocality of the post-conflict landscape thus reveals the embedded cultural hybridity 
constituted by fragments of a military base, a heritage site, and a border island. In light of 
the heterotopias, I substantiated that the cultural mechanism, driven by irony and 
simulacra, in fact constitute a dialogue of localization. Through negotiation and selective 
appropriation, the process transfers heterogeneous heritage into cultural capital 
exclusively of Quemoy. Facing the reorientation of the coordinate system, the border 
community dispatches the military reality to the past, while bringing an imaginary past to 
the present through landscape planning. Structuring a heterotopia as home is thus 
realization of social strategy against marginalization after demilitarization. As the 
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multicultural potpourri articulate the border island’s inbetweenness through history, its 
ambiguous identity emancipates the insular community from the oppressive, hegemonic 
either/or dichotomy. Significance of Quemoy’s identity reformation primarily resides in 
the negotiating process rather than its intended purpose to construct a dominant identity. 
6.3 The Border Island Identity in Constant Negotiation 
In this study, I review the development history of Quemoy in a general fashion of 
sequent occupance, discovering the geographical personality of the border island, which 
due to its key location at the mouth of Xiamen Bay, instead of the isolation often found as 
characteristics of small islands, stands out for its marginality. On the margin of land and 
the sea, Quemoy with the inbetweenness is a front of both Chinese regimes and maritime 
powers, of which their interplay directs the reversals of the coordinate system of Quemoy 
to their directions. I discover that social adaptation to an opposite geopolitical situations 
produces irony in the landscape, which in an immediate view nullifies the previous 
reversal while in a diachronic view reveals human futility in a Sisyphean process of 
territorialization in a border island. My findings of the repetitive reversal of the 
coordinate system of Quemoy therefore provide an angle of historical geography to probe 
into the issue of place formation of a border island. 
By an investigation on the reinvented heritage sites, I reveal that the production of 
irony and heterotopias constitute the cultural mechanism of landscape change in Quemoy. 
My identification of the mechanism suffices a real case of irony working in landscape. In 
the discipline of cultural geography, the subject has insofar largely remained at the 
discussions on theories (e.g. Smith 1996; Smith 1997), or conceived places (e.g. 
Brigstocke 2011; Craine and Aitken 2004; Ridanpää 2007). While few studies (e.g. Gray 
1996; Perera 2002; Smith 2002) explore irony in real places, they are often content with 
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the discovery of irony in landscape. By the case of Quemoy, I advance to demonstrate 
how the post-conflict society orchestrates irony in the landscape to subvert the past 
dominant discourses, and thereby substantiates the practical use of irony which suggests 
an unfamiliar realm long awaiting cultural geographers’ further expeditions. 
With the discovery of the cultural mechanism of the landscape change in Quemoy, I 
reveal the underlying strategy of social change, by which the post-conflict society resists, 
and therefore frees itself from, dominant orders. Although essentialists today may argue 
that the cultural hybridity articulates the inconclusive geopolitical relations that retain the 
identity reformulation in a status of becoming, my discovery substantiates that the 
“ongoingness” is the end product of identity reformulation, for fluidity, hybridity, and 
ambivalence of heterotopias provide opportunities for the border island community to 
transcend the geographies of control. The awareness of irony and ambiguity in landscape 
can thus lead to deterritorialization which obliterates the border island from the charted, 
cyclic course of history to become “a place without a place” (Foucault 1986, 27). From 
the experiment of the underlying strategy emerges the structure of regulated 
improvisation that induces the expressive cultural practice of people long on the margin 
of history, as sea nomads, pirates, exiles, repeating the Sisyphean task to challenge 
territorialization. Like Sisyphus (Richardson 2003, 339),  
[a]s he descends, he plans the route for the return up the mountain. He is man who 
knows his work. Each push back to the top comes from that knowledge. Each step 
arrives with it own purpose. And gods begin to have their doubts. Could it be that 
their punishment has been vanquished? 
In this ascent, people in Quemoy benefitted by their previous footprints and conceived a 
new strategy to carry their world through the current predicaments, and in their every step 
of vanquishment comes the answer to the peril of reducing being to the hegemonic 
totality.  
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APPENDIX THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FUKUOTUN CULTURE  
The discovery of Fukuotun culture has an anthropological significance to the 
hypothetical models of Austroniesian dispersal and the location of their homeland. 
Identification of Austronesian has amazed anthropologists with the wide distribution of 
Austronesian over Oceania, island Southeast Asia, and the coastal region of the mainland 
Southeast Asia. On the other hand, they are also puzzled with, and therefore eager to 
locate, the origin of Austronesians. A hypothesis proposing the region from the southeast 
coast of China to the west coast of Taiwan as the homeland of Austronesians has received 
general acceptance among a group of anthropologists (Rolett, Jiao, and Lin 2002; Tsang 
2001): Shulter and Marck first proposed Taiwan as the homeland of Proto-Austronesian 
culture in 1975. Peter Bellwood however suggested that the homeland of Austronesians 
should be on the southeast coast of China. The people first moved to Taiwan in ca. 
4000-3500 BCE, and over time gradually dispersed elsewhere. Robert Blust from a 
linguistic stand of view agreed that Taiwan was the homeland of the Proto-Austronesian 
language, or at least very close to it. Barbara Thiel by a comparison of the archaeological 
materials between those of Taiwan and Luzon of Philippines again concluded Taiwan as 
the homeland. Darrel Tyron, after examining all precedent hypotheses, inferred the 
homeland as Southern China, wherefrom the people moved to Taiwan during 4000-3000 
BCE. Although all these scholars tend to agree that the origin is located in the region 
from Taiwan to the southeast coast of China, their studies reach this conclusion with 
variant reasons and oftentimes chart different dispersing route or routes from one another. 
Nevertheless, even coming to disagreement on the exact location, those who consider 
Taiwan as the origin of Proto-Austronesian would also agree on the fact that 
Pre-Austronesian originate from the Southeast coast of China (Bellwood 2006, 65). After 
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all, the development of the proto-language could take place in either locations, but the 
Neolithic people in Taiwan should originally come from the mainland. The discovery of 
Fu-kuo-tun culture in 1969 thus provides a solid archeological evidence for the 
connection. Chang (1987), based on a comparative study on the artifact assemblages, 
claimes that Fu-kuo-tun culture has a close relationship with Tapenken 大坌坑
culture—the earliest Neolithic culture in Taiwan (4000-2200 BCE). The geographical 
distribution of this archaeological culture includes the west coastal region of Taiwan and 
Pescadores (Penghu) archipelago. Chang (1987) hypothesizes Tapenkeng culture as the 
materialization of Austronesian culture between 5000-2000 years ago; with the argument, 
he then alleges (10-11):  
If Fu-kuo-tun culture on the other side of the Taiwan Strait can be proved to be a part 
of Ta-pen-keng culture, I would then infer that the homeland of Austronesian can be 
pushed back [from Taiwan] to the southeast coast of China, largely concentrated on 
the coastal region ranging from the estuary of the Min River southward to the one of 
the Han River 韓江 on the east coast of Fukien and Canton.  
According to the latest research on Fu-kuo-tun culture, Kuo, Liu, and Dai (2005) updates 
the chronology of Fu-kuo-tun culture to 6000-3800 BCE; whereby makes it coeval of 
Hemudu 河姆渡 culture in Zhejiang—the other earliest archaeological culture in the 
southeast coast of China (6000-4000 BCE). With this chronological status and close 
connection with Ta-pen-keng culture, Kuo, Liu, and Dai then asserts Fu-kuo-tun culture 
an ancestor type of the former. (Figure 2.3) The discovery of Fu-ku-tun culture therefore 
associates Austronesian with Quemoy, and renders Quemoy a possible start point of their 
dispersal. Acknowledging this, this study then coincidentally substantiates a migration 
route from Quemoy to Taiwan six-thousand years ago since the outset of Ta-peng-keng 
culture in Taiwan. And, in turn, the migration route then makes Quemoy a prehistoric 
gateway of the region of China. 
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